






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AN
ESSAY
ON THE
ART OF WAR.

Translated from the French of Count TURPIN,

By Captain JOSEPH OTWAY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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DE F E N C E and attack have hitherto been treated of, principles have been established, from which others have been drawn, and we have also been endeavouring to apply examples to these principles. The knowledge of a country, the necessity of which has been shewn in the first chapter of this work, is the basis of the first and second books; it also extends over what remains to be said in the three following. There are some principles which ought to be understood, but which are not always necessary to be placed before the eyes of an intelligent reader; and there are also others which should be incessantly repeated to him.

Those given by Montécuculli are safe in their practice, and shew great knowledge; but they are apt to escape the memory from the shortness of them, and only permit part of the instructions, given by that great man, to be understood. The reflections of Santa-Cruz are of great solidity; but they, perhaps, contain useless details, and examples which are apparently too far-fetched. M. de Feuquieres has wrote very

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intelligently

intelligently upon what he has himself seen and executed, but carries his enquiries no farther; notwithstanding which, the instructions contained in his works are very just, and very proper to form a soldier. The chevalier de Folard leaves nothing to be wished for, he hath treated upon, and gone to the bottom of every subject; but a mind founded upon system, which sometimes gives conjectures instead of rules, and the productions of a lively imagination in the room of truths founded upon experience, is not always an infallible guide. The duke of Rohan in his *Parfait Capitaine* has, in a small number of pages, collected the most perspicuous lights; and if he has but lightly touched on matters as offered to him by the author, he hath chosen for a model, he has, at least, handled them in a masterly manner, and like an impartial judge.

The marshal de Puyfégur, in his *Art of War*, has put in execution the principles he has found in the authors of which he gives the extracts. He has formed marches, orders of battle, and many other intelligent dispositions; but almost every thing he advances is founded upon hypothesis. The war of Paris, which he supposes, is conducted with all the intelligence of a great general, and any officer, desirous of instruction, will there, without doubt, find the most solid maxims; but it would nevertheless be very dangerous to apply them on every occasion.

It is not the present intention to enlarge so much upon the operations, which now remain to be examined, as hath been done upon the preceding; because the quarters and cantonments depending upon the circumstances of nearness to the enemy, and situation of the ground, which being once foreseen and provided for, the remaining operations are merely mechanical, and the knowledge of them much better attained in the course of two campaigns, than by the innumerable precepts laid down in the many volumes which have been wrote upon these subjects.

The

The principles of cantonments, according to the marshal de Puyfégur*, are merely imaginary, and not at all fixed; nevertheless, he has undertaken to reduce them into rules.

The first rule he gives is, that no quarter should be open to an attack, without being sustained by others.

The second is, that some place should be pitched upon, whose situation may be advantageous for action.

The third is, this field of battle should be so situated, that all the troops may be assembled in it, long before the enemy can fall upon them.

The fourth is, that an army should neither be too much extended, or too much straitened, when in quarters.

He afterwards points out the precautions necessary to be taken in those quarters which are in the neighbourhood of the enemy's army. This book is founded upon the foregoing principles.

* Art de la Guerre, part II. chap. 5. art. 3.

CHAP. I.

Of the Distribution of the Quarters and Cantonments of an Army.

WHEN a campaign is finished, the general's first attention should be to fix his troops in quarters, both safe and free from all insult; which he will not accomplish, unless he distributes them after such a manner, that each different body may be a mutual assistance to each other. If the campaign has proved fortunate, the general by taking up his quarters in the conquered countries, will thereby the better secure his conquests, and also take a burthen off his own country; if, on the contrary, the campaign has proved unlucky, he should be careful that in establishing the army in its own country, the quarters should be so distributed, as to cover it, without, at the same time, taking up too large an extent of ground. Whatever extent of country, conquered or not, is necessary to be guarded, the general should endeavour to secure the right and left of the quarters by a place of arms, and, if possible, should have his front line covered by a river.

A general can never make choice of a very good position, unless he is thoroughly acquainted with the country; and if the troops, whatever may be the nature of the country, are not distributed after such a manner, that the enemy may not attempt any enterprize, however trifling, without their having timely notice, in order to oppose him.

If a general establishes his quarters in a conquered country, he must use many more precautions than if he established them in any other, because in that situation he will be very near the enemy, who will never remain quiet, and of whom he should always be watchful. Besides, the inhabitants are always to be feared, as they are naturally more attached to their

old

old sovereigns than their conquerors, unless the humanity of the latter hath wiped from their remembrance those horrors with which war is generally attended, and that, by a strict discipline among his troops, the general hath acquired a set of faithful subjects for his master. If the distribution of the quarters is well made, and so contrived that each separate body can readily assist one another, the army will not be less secure, than if it had many fortified places in the front of it; thus situated, it will easily recover the fatigues of the campaign, the troops will be recruited, and the recruits properly disciplined.

Of all who have pointed out the means of securing the quarters, those seem to be the best grounded, which have been laid down by Montécuculli, and marshal Puyfégur.

According to the former*, “A general should establish his quarters
 “and cantonments in the neighbourhood of some great town, and cover
 “them, if possible, by a river, marking out the quarters in such a
 “manner, that they may be assisted by it; being covered by detach-
 “ments in the front; by posting guards at the bridges and the passages,
 “by which the enemy might pass; by destroying the fords, to prevent
 “the enemy passing and being troublesome by their means; and to pre-
 “vent their parties from intercepting the provision or forage, which
 “they will endeavour at as much as possible: the forage drawn from the
 “country should be deposited in the places formed into magazines.”

“Whatever may be the situation in which an army is cantoned,”
 says M. Puyfégur†, “the cantonment should be disposed after such a
 “manner, that no quarter can be attacked without being speedily assisted
 “by the others; he should also endeavour, as much as possible, to pitch
 “upon some advantageous situation, where, in case of an alarm, the
 “troops may be formed in order of battle, and where they shall be

* Book I. chap. 4. art. 5.

† Art. de la Guerre, part II. chap. 5. art. 5.

“obliged.

“ obliged to rendezvous on the first order : the general alarm-post, or
“ general place of arms, should be fixed in a spot where all the troops
“ can assemble, before the enemy has time to fall upon the quarters and
“ cantonments ; which will depend upon the enemy’s distance, and that
“ of the general place of arms, from the quarters. Also before an army
“ separates, the general should know the distance between his army and
“ the enemy’s ; and whether, from the road he must take to come and
“ attack the quarters, he will require more time than the cantoned
“ army to assemble his troops, and fall upon the quarters.”

Such are the principles laid down by these great men ; and although these precautions relate to an entire army, they are, nevertheless, applicable to the particular quarters of infantry, cavalry, dragoons, or hussars, supposing it to be a separate body from the army to be cantoned.

Some other precautions only will be added, which also appear necessary to be taken : if the general covers his front by a river, he should cause the bridges to be occupied by infantry ; and he should order such bridges as appear unnecessary, to be broken down, to avoid encreasing the number of guards, and fatiguing the troops without occasion. Such as appear necessary to be preserved, should be entrenched ; proper attention should be had with regard to the fords, which must be either guarded or destroyed ; posts also should be placed at proper distances along the river, and centres between each post, near enough to hear one another ; and one thing most necessary to be remembered is, that as the enemy is always near, he should always be supposed desirous of seizing upon every opportunity, and capable of making the most of his time.

The villages in the front of the line of quarters should be occupied by infantry, intermixed with some regiments of hussars, in order to form daily scouring parties ; the patrols and the detachments, which should be continually upon the flanks and in the front, will be sufficient for the
security

security of the quarters, as well as to prevent the enemy from approaching too near, either to surprize or examine into the condition of them.

As quarters are intended only as places of rest to re-establish the troops, the detachments, therefore, should not be strong; the design of sending them out being not to bring the enemy to action, but to discover if the enemy hath formed any enterprize, and also to prevent his attacking the quarters, before the troops in them have received intelligence of his design. For this purpose, therefore, detachments consisting of ten or fifteen men are sufficient: should greater numbers be employed, the hussars, fatigued by the duty of the winter, cannot possibly be in a condition of taking the field with the other troops.

The remainder of the infantry, intermixed with dragoons, must be distributed in the rear of the first line, and form the second; the cavalry should be posted behind the second, in order to sustain the two first. The general should also post some regiments of dragoons upon the wings of the second line. Whatever may be the nature of the country in which the quarters are established, the infantry should always be posted in the first line; but within such a distance of the cavalry, as to be readily assisted by them: this last, which can seldom be serviceable in a woody or mountainous country, is much safer in the third line, because it is not only defended by the infantry, but is also near enough to join it, if the situation of the country renders it necessary and practicable.

The infantry and dragoons forming the second line, and the cavalry of the third, should always be as much upon their guard, and as vigilant as if they were in the first. A general never hath any reason to repent of being too careful, unless he should carry his vigilance to such an unreasonable length, as to fatigue his troops without answering any end. Whatever caution has been used in the distribution of the quarters, they can never be in security, unless the exactest discipline and vigilance is observed.

served throughout all the troops. It is the same with regard to quarters which are ill chosen, and where the troops are unable to sustain each other; and where, notwithstanding all the vigilance that may be made use of to secure them, they will not only be liable to attacks, but will also be in great danger of being taken.

During the last troubles of France, in the year 1652*, the viscount Turenne and marshal d'Hoquincourt, who commanded the royal army, having passed the Loire by the bridge of Gien, and the court having remained in that town till towards the beginning of April, the army was divided into two parts, one of which, under the command of M. Turenne, took post at Briare; as did the other, under the command of M. d'Hoquincourt, at Blaineau: they kept only the infantry with them, and sent off the cavalry to those places where they could best procure forage. The next day M. Turenne went to dine with M. d'Hoquincourt at Blaineau; and having observed the disposition of his quarters, could not forbear telling him, that he thought him too much exposed, and also advised him to draw his troops into a narrower compass. M. d'Hoquincourt, not giving proper attention to his advice, M. Turenne, on his return to his quarters, received information the night following, of the prince of Condé's having forced M. d'Hoquincourt's advanced-guard, and penetrated to the quarters farthest from the camp. That prince carried five of them one after the other; forced the infantry to shut itself up in Blaineau; pushed the cavalry three or four leagues towards Burgundy; and had it not been for the good disposition made by M. Turenne, and the advantageous post he chose, by means of which the prince of Condé was stopped, the king and his whole court would have been in great hazard of being taken.

* Hist. de M. Turenne, tom. 1. liv. 3.

In the year 1702 *, the army of France having made an ill choice of quarters near Cremona, the emperor's army found the means of establishing a secret correspondence in that city, and also of procuring admittance for five or six hundred men into it, who kept themselves concealed, till the time appointed for carrying their design into execution: the emperor's army passed through the quarters of the French army, which were too distant from each other, and which, perhaps, imagined themselves in perfect security; and the guard at the gate having been surprized by the six hundred men, already in the inside of the town, it was thrown open to the emperor's troops; but, nevertheless, by the vigilance and bravery of the French and Irish troops, prince Eugene failed in his enterprize, and was obliged to retire, after having lost half his men.

If marshal d'Hoquincourt had, in 1652, followed the advice given him by M. Turenne, his quarters would never have been taken by the great Condé, nor his cavalry driven almost into Burgundy; which shews the impossibility of a general's being too cautious in securing an army in its quarters; and also the necessity of a general, however experienced he may be, being on his guard against self-conceit, and neglecting the prudent advice given him by another.

If the army of France had, in the year 1702, chosen its quarters properly, it would, perhaps, have prevented the emperor's generals from having had any secret correspondence in Cremona, but certainly the six hundred men could never have procured admittance; and consequently, the troops headed by prince Eugene would never have been able to have traversed the French quarters; and that prince was doubtless too much experienced in the art of war, to attempt such an enterprize, had there not been a probability of success.

* Hist. du. P. Eugene, tom. 2.

These two examples serve to prove the ill consequences of extending the quarters of an army too much, under pretence of guarding a large tract of country, or placing the troops more at their ease.

The strength of an army is in proportion to the country it has to cover, which, if extensive, must consequently render the army exposed to any attacks attempted by the enemy on the quarters: a well chosen disposition of the quarters depends upon a thorough knowledge of the country, and the enemy's position; and their security consists in a well observed discipline.

The cantonments taken by the prince *, in 1694, between the Sambre and the Meuse, in order to subsist his army; and also, to be within a day's march of Gemblours, furnishes an example, wherein every military man will find great instruction in whatever regards that branch of his business.

His army, consisting of eighty battalions, and an hundred and seventy-four squadrons, guarded the banks of the Sambre, from Landrecy as far as Namur, and those of the Meuse from Namur to Charlemont; the infantry formed the first line, and was distributed along the banks of the two rivers; the cavalry was dispersed in the villages in the rear of the infantry; there were also posts of infantry between each quarter, upon the sides of the two rivers, which secured the communication between them, and also to keep up the communication in the rear, between each quarter of cavalry, and to secure the roads; he had also formed posts of five and twenty troopers, more or less, according as he supposed occasion required, who were within such a distance as to be able to converse together.

In order to subsist his army, without fatiguing it, he established magazines up and down, at different places; the quarters nearest Lan-

* Extract taken from a manuscript in the library of the prince of Condé.

drecy drew their bread and forage from that place; those nearest Maubeuge, from Maubeuge; those situate upon the river Heure, and the parts adjacent to it, received their bread and forage from Charleroy, as well as the others which were upon the rivulets of Gerpines, Presse, and the Fosse, as far as Namur, and from Namur to Charlemont.

Whenever cantonments are well chosen, the army is not only in security, and subsisted without being fatigued, but the general can also assemble it with ease, and in a very small time, whenever he thinks proper to encamp.

The prince having resolved to march to Gemblours in one day, and form a camp there, and from thence advance, in order to oblige the prince of Orange to remain behind the Gettes, he assembled his cantonments in one day, at two points; that part which was on the side of Landrecy, Marolles, Maubeuge, Charleroy, Gerpines, and Presse, marched, in order to encamp on the other side of the Sambre at Gilly, in the neighbourhood of Montigny-sur-Sambre: that part which was on the side of Charlemont, Namur, and upon the rivulet of la Fosse, marched and encamped at Ham-sur-Sambre; it was from these two points that the prince caused his army to march, the 15th of July, in six columns, to go and encamp at Gemblours.

The same rules which have been laid down for quarters, must also be observed in cantonments.

An army is generally cantoned either at the beginning, or towards the conclusion of a campaign. At the beginning, when a general being at too great a distance from the country where he would carry on the war, causes his army to leave its quarters very early in the spring, and advance towards the frontiers, in order to be ready to march on the first order, and encamp in the enemy's country, as was done by the prince; if the season is not yet too far advanced, and the general is willing to give time

for forming magazines in the rear of the army, he should then cause it to be cantoned; and it should observe the same rules as when in quarters, allowing for the nature of the country, and the designs intended to be carried into execution.

An army is cantoned, towards the conclusion of a campaign, when it hath suffered greatly in the course of it, either from sieges or from a battle; and that although the severity of the season renders it impossible for the troops to remain in camp, it is nevertheless necessary to remain in presence of the enemy, either through his own obstinacy, in keeping the field, or because that, without fatiguing the army, the general would oblige the enemy to go to a distance, that himself might take up his winter-quarters upon the spot. In general, cantonments should not be so extensive as quarters, and consequently, the troops should be drawn together in a narrower compass; and in case the enemy should have formed a design of attacking them, the general should have fixed upon a convenient rendezvous, where all the troops should assemble on the first order.

There are some occasions where a general causes only that part of his army to be cantoned, which has suffered most during the campaign; but the part which is cantoned, should always be within such a distance as to join readily that part which remains encamped. See the TWENTY-THIRD PLATE.

CHAP. II.

In what the Security of the Quarters consists.

IN order to secure to himself all the advantages, which may be drawn from the precautions mentioned in the foregoing chapter, after the quarters have been disposed of in the manner already mentioned, the general should send out detachments of hussars, or dragoons, to beat and scour the country lying on the opposite side of the river covering the quarters; and to prevent the enemy, ever attentive to take advantage of the least negligence, from approaching the quarters: if there should be no river, and the enemy can with ease come as far as the first line of the quarters, these detachments should be more in number, but never of any great force, as the intention of sending them out, is not to fight, but to bring in intelligence.

If, as hath already been mentioned, the general hath caused such bridges upon the river, as were superfluous, to be cut down, he should leave three or four passages in the front of the line, well guarded by intrenched infantry, in order to give free liberty for the detachments and patrols to go out, and to give also admittance for the forage, which should always be drawn, as much as possible, from the enemy's country.

It is unnecessary to place guards of horse in the front of each quarter; the troops would undergo as much fatigue in that case, as during the campaign; the patrols, which should be constantly on the outside upon the bank of a river, and the detachments of hussars in front, should be sufficient for their security; there are, nevertheless, some occasions

casions where guards of horse become necessary; as when the quarters, for instance, are entirely uncovered, and the enemy so near, that he can with ease molest the troops in them, by which they will be greatly harrassed; in such a situation, it is prudent to post guards of horse and dragoons, with hussars, always in the front in detachment. These guards of horse, which will receive and protect the hussars, if repulsed, should themselves also be sustained by a post of infantry, placed on the outside of every village, to which they may retire. But still these guards of horse should never be made use of except in such cases, the necessity of which must be determined by the general's prudence; the distance of ground between them should be regulated by the situation of the country, but so as to be within reach of the guard of infantry, which should be intrenched: the small guards can only be placed more in advance, in order that they may be able to see to a greater distance.

If the country to be protected is so extensive, as to require two guards, they should be placed after such a manner, as to be in sight of each other, that they may retire together with greater ease to the post of infantry; if the situation of the country is such, as not to allow the guards of horse to be within sight, the vedets, at least, must see one another, in order to give the horse notice of whatever may happen.

The precautions just now mentioned, are only useful in occasions where the enemy is so near as to be able to disquiet the quarters, and should not be looked on as general rules for every disposition that can be made: the detachments and patrols are generally sufficient, and they should retire to the quarters guarded by the intrenched infantry, and with so much the greater reason, because it is seldom there are guards mounted in the winter, or that the enemy should be so very near, as to render the detachments of dragoons or hussars insufficient.

There

There are seldom any villages but what are surrounded by gardens, and these gardens by quickset hedges, planks crossed over one another, by ditches, or ground thrown up, forming a parapet; there are also many villages, whose avenues are secured by barriers; but should any of these defences be wanting, thick boards, or waggons, may be used in their stead, in order to render the quarters free, at least, from being surprised, particularly as they are well guarded by infantry. In order for their being still in a better state of defence, there should be loopholes made in the houses which are on the out-skirts of the village, and there should be also trenches dug at these out-skirts, which will render the access more difficult to the enemy.

In every quarter, whether in the first, second, or third line, there should be a guard formed of the troops lodged in it, and also a piquet ready to march on the first order. The post for the guards belonging to the quarters of the first line, should be behind the barriers, or trenches, at the discretion of the commanding officer of each quarter; the same method must also be observed, with regard to the second and third lines: the piquets should be assembled in the market-place, separate from the rest of the troops, who are not on duty, in order to march with the greater expedition; it is on these occasions the thorough knowledge of a country becomes very essential, as by that means will be known the road, by which the enemy can with most ease make an attempt upon the quarters: furnished with these lights, a general may take the properest measures for opposing the enemy's designs, without over-fatiguing his troops.

During the night, the guards of the quarters in the first line, and which are most exposed, should be doubled, if in the neighbourhood of the enemy; the patrols of dragoons, or hussars, should, also, be constantly patrolling during that time, and not return to the quarters till after sun-rise.

If

If there should be intelligence received of the enemy having formed any design upon one, or many quarters, as it is uncertain which he will attempt, half the troops in each quarter should be under arms, and the remainder ready to take theirs; the officers commanding in the quarters of the second and third lines should have notice to hold themselves in readiness on a particular signal; such, for instance, as the discharge of two pieces of cannon, if the enemy's attack is upon the right; one, if upon the left; three, if in the center; and four, if he has formed many different attacks.

In order for this, the general should be very exact in his orders; and give in writing, such motions and dispositions, as he would have executed by each different body, as well as the parts to which he would have them march, according to circumstances and the signals which have been given.

If the general knows, or even suspects the enemy of intending to come in force, and attack the quarters, he should order all the troops to repair to their particular alarm posts, on a signal being given, and from thence to the general place of arms, or field of battle. The general should be the first man there, to be ready to issue his orders.

If the quarters of the first line are well chosen, and that by reinforcing them with the infantry of the second line, the situation of them becomes advantageous, it would be unnecessary to chuse another; but if by the extent of the quarters, the troops, although well distributed as to the quarters, are not enough together to be sufficiently strong when attacked, it is then the general place of arms becomes necessary, to assemble the whole of them, according to the order given them.

As soon as all the troops are under arms, ready to receive the enemy, and all the dispositions are made, the general should send out a large detachment of cavalry, preceded by hussars, to examine the enemy's disposition

sition more nearly, and to receive the small advanced parties, and which must certainly be repulsed : the detachment of cavalry, or dragoons, will cover the retreat of the hussars, in case the enemy should be too strong. This last detachment should not advance at too great a distance from the main body of the army, the design of it being to protect the advanced hussars, and not to fight : the officer commanding the hussars should examine, as nearly as possible, into the strength of the enemy, the disposition of his march, and the nature of the troops composing his army, whether cavalry, infantry, and artillery ; after this examination, he will inform the general of all that he has discovered, who, upon his report, will take the most exact and ready measures.

It often happens that the enemy perceiving his designs discovered, and that proper measures are taken to counter-act him, will retire ; his intention having only been to examine or surprise the quarters : then the general, whose chief object ought to be, to preserve the tranquility of the quarters, without seeking to attack the enemy in his retreat, should only cause him to be followed by the large detachment of hussars that has before been observing him ; and which should be sustained by the detachment of cavalry, or dragoons. The hussars may attack the rear-guard, if an opportunity offers, but they should be cautious of doing it, unless they see the country clear before them ; neither should they continue the pursuit too far, for fear of being attacked by the rear-guard, which will certainly be the case, if by leaving the quarters, or the corps of cavalry, too far behind them, they should be too far advanced to receive ready assistance, and because they may be liable to fall into some ambuscade : and it may be very probable that the enemy's whole intention, in approaching the quarters, was to draw some of the troops belonging to them into some snare.

When the huffars have pursued the enemy a sufficient length of time, and to such a distance as to be secure of his retreat, they will leave the detachments which were advanced to observe him, and continue to observe his motions; and they will return with the cavalry sent out to sustain them, and of which they will form the rear-guard.

If, on the contrary, the general perceives the enemy is determined to attack him, he will then himself advance to examine his situation, and will regulate his own disposition by the enemy's; or, if that which he already has chosen is good, he will, without making any alteration, wait the enemy's coming.

It is very advantageous for an army to have the front of the first line covered with villages strongly entrenched and guarded, supported by cavalry, or dragoons, and particularly when the army which attacks is uncovered and exposed. Even when the latter is superior, the general need only be careful to avoid a surprize; neither should he occupy too large a front, that the force of the troops may be increased by their being closer together, and that also each different body may be a mutual support to each other.

It is on this occasion that an army should in appearance be resolute and steady, which firmness often makes an impression on the enemy; and the good disposition which he observes in the troops ready to receive and give him battle, may perhaps make him abandon his project of an attack, and leave the quarters in tranquility.

There are often quarters so situated, as to be obliged to be separate from the rest, either owing to the nature of the country, to keep up a communication, to draw forage, or to raise contributions, although winter, in an enemy's country; these quarters being therefore the most exposed, naturally draw the attention of the enemy, who will endeavour to take them: the officer commanding them, ought to follow the same rules

rules which have been already given, whether for an attack, a defence, or a retreat, if attacked by a superior force; but he should never have recourse to this expedient, till reduced to the last extremity; and should then conduct himself, as well as on every other occasion, with vigilance, and by the same precautions which he would use for his defence, or to avoid being surpris'd. If the enemy is so very superior, as to render both courage and good dispositions unavailing, he had better take the resolution of retreating, than obstinately persist in fighting on unequal terms; but nevertheless, a general should not retreat, till after having tried the chance of war, and given time to the troops in the neighbouring quarters to come to his assistance.

A general often acquires more reputation by making a timely retreat, than by beating the enemy: it is very imprudent to persist in maintaining a post, when the enemy's superiority takes away all expectation of preserving it; brutal courage is often more fatal than inexperience and timidity. For a general to have it in his power to retreat in security, and yet wait for the enemy in a disadvantageous post, or where he will not be sufficiently strong to make a defence, is certainly a proof of incapacity; but for a general to be beat by an equal force, and in a good post, after having defended himself to the utmost, is only submitting to fate; but yielding after a faint resistance, is giving up to fear.

The count of Lorges, who succeeded to the command of the army after the misfortune which France sustained by the loss of M. Turenne, shewed more ability in the retreat he made, than if he had attacked the enemy; that retreat was an homage to the superior genius of M. de Turenne, and also shewed the modesty of a great man; this was neither timidity nor inability on his part, since he charged the Imperial troops, who attacked the French army in its retreat, with a courage on that occasion worthy of the hero he succeeded. By retreating, he gained more

honour than if, regarding only his own courage and the glory of commanding in chief, he had attacked the Imperialists and beat them.

M. de Lorges was unacquainted with the designs of M. de Turenne, who had alone examined the situation of the enemy; and having discovered only one favourable passage to attack them, instead of waiting the decision of chance, contented himself with placing the army in security.

CHAP. III.

Of the Vigilance necessary to be observed by every commanding Officer in his Quarter, or Cantonment.

AS the season towards the end of a campaign is generally so severe, as to render it impossible for an army to continue in the field, the general should therefore think of placing it in quarters. The measures for their security can be taken with the greater ease, because the enemy being employed in the same manner, there will be no room to apprehend any disturbance from him; or, even if he should follow the army, after it has broke up camp, his intention would be rather to be sure of its retiring, than from any desire of molesting it in its march. The army being arrived in its quarters, each different body must enter that which is appointed for it; and then the general will give instructions to every officer commanding the quarters, after what manner he is to act, the precautions he is to take, in order to avoid being surpris'd, and the readiness with which he is to send information of any intelligence he shall receive concerning the enemy: every commanding officer should be continually upon his guard; and, without letting the enemy perceive he is too mistrustful, he should take every precaution necessary

to

to avoid being surprised, and to prevent the enemy from entertaining even the thoughts of an attack; and he should also conduct himself in the same manner for the security of one quarter, as if the charge of many was entrusted to him.

As soon as the troops have entered and are established in a quarter, the commanding officer should examine all the out-skirts of it, and in consequence of that examination, should determine upon the part where posts are most necessary, in order that they may be placed in them; afterwards he will appoint a place of arms, or general rendezvous, where all the troops shall assemble on any notice they shall have concerning the enemy's motions, in order to be able to march readily, and on the first order they receive from the general. No person whatever should be allowed to go out of the quarter, on any pretext, without leave from the commanding officer. When the officers set the example of strictly observing all orders, the soldiers will never complain of the severity of discipline: the troops, when in quarters, are distributed in the same manner as in camp, so many of them lodged together; the commanding officer should make an officer bring him a report of the company he belongs to every day, both morning and night.

A major should be ordered to visit the barracks every day, beside that which an officer of every company ought to make, and of which he will give an account to the commanding officer, who, on his part, should every day visit the out-posts, in order that he may satisfy himself of every thing being in proper order. As soon as he has examined every post, and informed himself of every thing relative to them, and also rectified what he has found wrong, he should go and give an account of his proceedings to the general; or if, by the nearness of the enemy, or the distance of the head-quarters from his own, his absence should be improper, it will then be sufficient to send a major with the detail of his

his quarter to the general: each officer commanding a quarter will observe the same order, as well those who are in the rear, as those who are the most exposed.

It is a general rule, that it is absolutely necessary always to have advanced detachments; it is by them the safety of the quarters is assured, or at least protected from surprizes: this does not belong to the particular commanding officer of each quarter; it falls within the province of the general who commands; the others are only to obey. But still, as a commandant should always suppose himself liable to be attacked, he should consequently use every precaution to avoid being surprized; the duty of a commandant only is to be careful of the interior security of the quarter, and that of the general to provide for the exterior, at the same time not neglecting its interior.

Men of lazy dispositions, which this multiplicity of precaution will tear from the arms of indolence, will sometimes murmur at the general, and accuse him of giving needless trouble. It is the duty of the officers to suppress these complaints, which serve only to disgrace the authors of them; but neither the general, or a commandant, should fail punishing those they discover to be guilty of them: the glory of success, which cannot fail being the consequence of these precautions, will sufficiently indemnify them from such idle slanderers.

It is neither the number of the guards, nor their strength, often embarrassing, that constitutes the security of one or of more quarters; it is the manner of disposing and adapting them to the situation of places. In reality, what advantage would be derived from guards extremely strong, but which, from their distance from the others, could not receive assistance from them? Instead therefore of these, guards placed at a reasonable distance immediately join at the first signal, and form a little army, which seems to increase in proportion as it is attacked.

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The advanced detachments, the strict discipline of the troops, and the vigilance of the commanders, are the sources from whence spring the most glorious successes.

Although the enemy appears to be quiet, and is also at a distance from the quarters, the commandant should nevertheless increase his vigilance. That security which is founded upon distance, is always dangerous; and that feigned tranquility of the enemy often proves to be a scheme to surprise and conquer with greater ease, and which often ends in the ruin of many quarters.

In a word, it is the general's duty to issue his orders for the security of the quarters. A particular commandant is only the channel by which they are executed, and the explainer of them; but he should nevertheless be careful to perform even the minutest part of them: the greater liking will he appear to have for his business, and the troops under his command will obey him with a greater confidence.

CHAP. IV.

Of the particular Place of Arms for every Quarter.

THE place of arms, or rendezvous, is a place appointed for all the troops to assemble, in case of an alarm.

This place should be fixed upon, according to the situation of the ground, and the sort of troops quartered in the village. In an open country it is easy to fix upon a place of arms, because the general has whatever ground he thinks necessary. If the village is situated on the side of a river, and that river divides the enemy and the troops in the quarters, the place of arms should be appointed in the high-street, or in the market-place, for infantry, that it may march together to the side
of

of the river, and take possession of the houses the nearest to it, and which should have loop-holes made in them. If there is an entrenched bridge over the river, belonging to the village, that should be the place of arms; but in case of an attack, the guard of the bridge should be reinforced and refreshed from time to time. If the quarter is in a mountainous country, the place of arms should be appointed upon a spot where the troops may assemble with ease, and from thence take possession of the posts which have been discovered: if cavalry is quartered in this sort of country, the place of arms should be fixed, if possible, in the front of the quarter, or in some part where it can with great ease assemble, in order to march from thence to the general place of arms. Infantry quartered in a village may for some time defend itself, and wait for assistance; but with regard to cavalry it is different: not that cavalry are supposed to be deficient in courage, or that they cannot dismount, but unused to fire-arms, they will neither load or fire with the same readiness as the infantry; and it is certain, that notwithstanding all the courage of cavalry, a village that is attacked by infantry would be very ill defended by cavalry, and very soon carried; it therefore seems best for them to mount, and assemble at the place of arms appointed, in order to march from thence to the general place of arms, having first taken care to send off all the baggage, which, as well as the troops, ought to have a place appointed to assemble at on the first order.

As there will be no reason to apprehend a surprize, after having taken the precautions already mentioned for the security of the quarters, there will be time sufficient for the commandant to cause the carriages to be loaded, and march to the place appointed for their joining again.

It is also necessary to be observed, that if the quarter is occupied by cavalry, the place of arms should not be appointed either in the market-place or in the streets, because of the confusion which will be occasioned

sioned by the parties who come there to assemble, particularly if the streets are narrow, which is very often the case in villages : although disorder must be avoided as much as possible, it is generally occasioned by the eagerness of the troopers to mount ; infantry are assembled with less trouble, they are sooner under arms, sooner paraded, and are immediately ready to march. With regard to cavalry, the disorder will still be increased if the enemy makes an attack in the night, a circumstance which often happens ; which disorder never is so great, if there is only infantry in the quarter. If there are any dragoons in the village, as they are trained up to serve on foot as well as on horseback, they should observe the same rule that is laid down for the infantry. As for the hussars, instead of retreating to the general place of arms, like the cavalry, as soon as they shall have received information that the enemy is on his march, after having given notice to all the quarters and to the general, they ought to assemble at their particular place of arms, and from thence march on before, to examine the enemy's disposition, to protect the advanced detachments, to endeavour to stop the enemy, in order to give the general sufficient time to assemble his troops, and to make his dispositions.

We shall not dwell longer on this subject, because the spot proper for a place of arms intirely depends upon the situation of the ground, and the nature of the troops quartered in each village, and more particularly upon the prudence of the general, and every commandant under him. It will be sufficient to add, that a general's principal attention should be to secure his retreat : it is laid down as an invariable rule that a general should never advance, establish the quarters, the cantonments, or engage in any other sort of military movement, without securing every place in the rear of his army, nor without having well examined them.

CHAP. V.

Of the General Place of Arms for many Quarters.

IN order to establish the quarters properly, it is very essential for the general to have an exact knowledge of the situation of every village enclosed within the circle of them, in order to know which of them are most, or least exposed to the enemy's incursions.

Some villages may be covered on one side by a river, or by canals; on another side by morasses, in such a manner as to leave but one opening to the enemy: in which case the general place of arms for all the troops ought to be appointed opposite to this opening. The general also should do his utmost, to render this position as advantageous as the ground will admit of, and should, if possible, have it sustained on the right or on the left, by a morass, or a village; if there are two villages, serving as supports to the two wings, they ought to be entrenched and filled with infantry, as has been already remarked: if the right can be supported by a river, and the left by a morass, it will be a very eligible disposition, and the order of battle will also be stronger in infantry. The place of arms should be chosen in such a manner, as neither to be surrounded, or to allow the enemy to present a larger front than that opposed to him. See the TWENTY-THIRD PLATE.

The disposition of the troops should be regulated by the nature of the country; if an open one, the infantry should be placed in the center, the cavalry upon the wings, but the whole upon two lines, with a reserve composed of some brigades of infantry, and all the dragoons. If it is a country interspersed with thickets, and small plains, it is probable, that some platoons of infantry, mixed among the cavalry, might
prove

prove advantageous. As cavalry, when the country proves mountainous, can be of no great service, it should be placed in the rear, as was done by Hamilcar at the battle of Hache, against the African rebels: general rules, however, can only be given; circumstances, and the situation of ground, usually determining the disposition and the evolutions of troops.

The post for the hussars has been already fixed in the first line with the infantry, in order to shorten the distance of the patrols, the scouting detachments, and also to advance readily on the first news of the enemy's approach, that either by stopping, or amusing him, the troops may have sufficient time, to fulfil the general's orders; and as soon as the commanding officer of the hussars judges that the troops are assembled at the general place of arms, or on the field of battle, he ought to retreat; and according to the orders he has received from the general, and the situation of the ground occupied by the troops, he will divide his hussars in two parties, or remain in one only, and will take post upon the flanks, in order to prevent the enemy from surrounding the main body, and to be also able to flank the enemy, at the time he makes his attack. Should this happen in a mountainous country, the hussars, after having examined the enemy's disposition, and endeavoured to retard his march, should retire with the cavalry, as they cannot be of any farther service.

This retreat of the hussars from before the enemy, can be effected with the greater ease, as the general may cause those troops of horse or dragoons who first arrive at the general place of arms, to advance, in order to sustain or assist them in repulsing the enemy, in case he is not very strong.

It may also happen that these quarters are situated in a country exposed on all sides, and disposed after such a manner, that the enemy

has it in his power to attack which ever of them he judges proper. In which case, vigilance becomes equally necessary for all the troops, whether of the first, second, or third line; and each line also should be as exact, and as much upon its guard, as if it had no expectation of being assisted.

The general should be acquainted with every different situation of the country, and make choice of such a spot, either for a general, or a particular place of arms, as shall be the least liable to an attack, and where, also, the troops can the most readily assemble; provided that by this position the troops cover the quarters. The particular place of arms for each brigade, whether infantry, cavalry, or dragoons, ought to be appointed at the general place of arms. In order for which, there should be an order of battle drawn out, by means of which, every brigadier, colonel, or major, can know the ground he is to occupy. He should also go and examine it upon the spot, in order to prevent his being mistaken, supposing it should become necessary to make the troops march there.

In case of a cry to arms, the major of every particular quarter ought to be the first at the alarm-post, or place of arms of the quarter, in order to arrange the troops; and likewise the major-general, with his brigade-majors, should for the same reason, be as soon as possible at the general place of arms. There ought to be a very severe punishment allotted for the brigade, or regiment, that does not assemble in proper time. The general should advance toward the enemy, in order to examine his disposition, and by that regulate the attack, his defence, or his retreat; but he should never indulge thoughts of the latter, till absolutely forced to it.

C H A P.

C H A P. VI.

Of Guards of Horse and Vedets.

IT is seldom customary to place guards of horse, advanced of the winter-quarters, in order to cover them; but it may nevertheless sometimes happen, that the proximity of the enemy, and the continual incursions of his light troops into the neighbourhood of the quarters, may render them absolutely necessary: it is right, therefore, to mark out where they ought to be placed, to establish their duties, to point out the manner in which they should guard against surprises, and the dispositions and evolutions they should make use of when attacked.

These rules may, perhaps, be seldom applicable to practice, either because the front of the winter-quarters will be protected by a river defended by infantry, or because the continual patrols, and the advanced detachments will be sufficient; and also, because the cavalry should be suffered to remain in quiet, that it may be in a condition of entering upon the next campaign, entirely recruited and complete: but they are by no means supposed to be unnecessary for the guards which are in the front of a camp, and which also contribute to its security; advanced detachments always constituting the greatest security of either camp or quarters, they are therefore particularly deserving of attention.

The distance which a guard of horse is advanced before a camp, or quarter, should be regulated by the nature of the country; but whatever may be their situation, they should always have a place of support behind them; which ought to be formed of guards of intrenched infantry, to which the guards of horse should retreat, if attacked. From these

guards

guards of horse, a cornet should be detached with a certain number of troopers, who should be advanced about thirty or forty paces; this advanced post is called the small guard, and the troopers taken from this advanced post, and placed in the front, are called vedets.

The reason for establishing vedets is, because the guard cannot be continually on horseback, and consequently, cannot discover to a proper distance: the vedets give notice as soon as they see any troops, that the guards may have time to mount, and be in a condition of receiving the enemy; there are different manners of placing them, according to the situations of places and ground.

It is to be observed, that it is always proper to post them double, and that also they are taken from the same regiment, as well as the guards from the same brigade. They ought to be double, that whenever they make any discovery, one may be detached to give notice to the small guard, and give time for the officer commanding it, to send word to the guard. Secondly, that they may keep each other more vigilant. Thirdly, that whilst one observes every thing on one side, the other keeps a look out on the other, and by that means render it impossible for any thing to come into the plain, without being seen either by one or the other. They should be posted, if possible, upon small heights, or upon cross-ways, in order to occupy the avenues; they ought to be at the distance of sixty or eighty paces at most from the small guard; there should be two on one side, and two on another. The same rule will be observed with regard to a greater number. A greater distance will prevent them from hearing, even with regard to challenging. Neither should both of them ever quit their post at the same time; but one should always remain, whilst the other goes to inform the small guard, of what he has seen, or what discovery he has made. They should allow nobody
to

to approach; and for fear of being surpris'd, they must stop all who would pass, and conduct them to the guard.

At retreat beating, the officer commanding the guard must withdraw his small guard and his vedets, and when they have all joined, he will remain a quarter of an hour in order of battle; at the expiration of which time, he will retire under cover of the fire of the intrenched infantry that ought to be in his rear.

The same guard of infantry may serve for many guards of horse; guards should never be unnecessarily increased; the sole object in view being the security of the camp, it is fulfilled whenever there are the guards necessary for it.

Sentinels are appointed to the small guards and to the vedets, as soon as the guard of horse is fixed on its night-post. They ought to be placed, as much as possible, in low places, because that in the dark, they can better discern what comes from above them. If the vedets guard a quarter, they should permit no person whatever to enter, or come out of it: if a camp, they will let nothing go out, unless it should be detachments; and even then, they should have an order from the commanding officer of the guard, to permit them to pass. It is the same with regard to a detachment that returns; the vedets ought to stop it, and one of two should be detached to give notice to the commandant of the guard. As soon as the officer commanding it shall have got his party mounted, he will detach an officer with some troopers to go and examine it.

Although an officer should at all times be strictly exact in whatever relates to the service, yet he should be more particularly careful during the night than in the day, that being the time most favourable for surprises, as those who are not immediately on duty are asleep, and cannot so readily give their assistance; but during the day, besides every body's attention being taken up with observing the enemy, they are sooner under arms,

arms, sooner in readiness to march, neither is there any great reason to be apprehensive of confusion.

The small guards ought to be changed in the following manner. When the time of relieving them is come, if it is the cornet who commands the small guard, the lieutenant will take the number of troops intended, as well for the small guard as for the vedets, and will go and post himself on the right of him who is to be relieved; this last will be mounted, sword in hand. The two officers commanding these two parties will approach each other, and the one to be relieved will give the counter-sign to him that is come to take his place. The corporals of the two troops should go together, and relieve the vedets, because those on duty can only be relieved by those who posted them; as soon as they are all relieved, the two corporals will return to the two troops which are drawn up. That which is to remain will take up the ground of the other, which by wheeling to the left, on the right will join the guard.

It should be observed that, as soon as the officer to relieve sets out from the guard, the officer to be relieved should send out and observe him, notwithstanding he is come from the guard. These precautions ought never to appear superfluous to intelligent minds, which know the consequences attending the least negligence, in the business of war. The guard going to relieve another should proceed in the same manner.

Whenever the small guards are relieved, the guards should be on horseback, and during the night it should always be so, although near to a body of infantry.

The captain, the lieutenant, and the cornet, must go their rounds, each in his turn, and must visit the small guard, and the vedets, to see if they are vigilant, whether they remember their countersign, and whether they are alert upon their posts. This round, which should commence an hour after they have been posted, ought to be made every two hours.

hours. The officers should at all times be vigilant, but more especially so when the enemy is near; without this strictness there is great danger of being taken, and there needs nothing more than a disaster of that sort to occasion the intire ruin of many quarters.

A guard is generally attacked by huffars only, or by other detachments of horse or dragoons, sent by the enemy's general to annoy the army, and to endeavour to carry off some of the guards; exploits whose success always does honour to the person who undertakes them, but which are attended with but little advantage to the army, and to the general who causes them to be put in execution: nevertheless, these trifling advantages may have very considerable consequences, from the informations which may be given by the guard that is taken, by the encouragement which they give to him who has succeeded, and by the disheartening the army from which they are taken.

By taking the precautions above mentioned, it is almost impossible for an officer to be taken; the great danger he runs of being taken is, in case he should be surprised. To avoid this inconvenience, his whole guard should be kept mounted during the night, and always half of it in the day time; the other half should always have their bridles in readiness, to bridle their horses, and mount at the first order. As the officer will be apprised by his vedets of the enemy's march, he will have time for those who are on foot to mount their horses: in this situation he may be beaten, but he cannot be taken; neither will he be beaten, unless his troop breaks: but if, when he sees the enemy coming to him, he forms his guard in two bodies; if each of these bodies detaches a small one from it, which keeps upon the flanks of the right and left; if these little troops by their fire, though not a great one, can at least keep the enemy at a little distance, and if the two bodies retreat one after the other to

the post of infantry, which ought, as has been said, to be so near as to cover them, this officer will not be beat; he will have retreated in a soldier-like manner, which is all to be expected from a common guard. He is not placed in advance to fight, but to give information; more notice should be taken of an officer behaving in this manner than of another, who only consulting his own courage, instead of retiring, marches to the enemy, and even beats him; because the one has done his duty, and that the other, in a fit of rashness, has exceeded his orders, and so much the more, as it will be with great difficulty that he can beat him, because that the enemy is undoubtedly come with a strength so sufficient, as not to be beaten by so small a number.

Besides the advanced detachments, the guards constitute the security of a quarter, or a camp, and consequently, they cannot be too exact in their duty. The officers who command them should never be afraid of fatiguing them too much; they should extend their endeavours for preventing the quarters, or the camp which they cover, from being disturbed, or at least to have such timely intelligence, that the troops may have time to take their arms. What unhappy consequences may attend the taking of a guard, and what anguish must an officer commanding a guard covering a quarter, feel, when by his being taken, the enemy hath an opportunity of entering the quarter, and destroying the troops within it? If it is the guard of a camp, what trouble does not its being taken occasion in the army? The negligence of one man only may occasion confusion among fifty thousand, and cause part of them to perish, especially when it is in a post, on which the safety of the troops depends; and if it is any quarters, it may be the loss of five or six leagues of country that the troops occupied.

Although it is almost impossible not to fall into some error, still that is no alleviation of the distress it may occasion; but an active and vigilant

lanc officer who loves his duty will very seldom do it, or if he does, he will so quickly remedy it, that the enemy will not have time to take advantage of it.

CHAP. VII.

Of advanced Detachments to secure the Quarters, or the Cantonments, and the Roads leading to them.

IT is not sufficient for the security of the quarters, that they are well distributed, that the guards of horse are posted on the outside, and guards of foot on the inside, and that patrols also are added to them; detachments must be sent out in advance of the guards, in order to make discoveries. These detachments will advance into the country according to the situation of it, or the distance of the enemy, taking care not to expose themselves too much, particularly, as they are not sent out with an intention of fighting, nor even of disturbing the enemy in his quarters, but merely to secure their own, and preserve the tranquility of the troops in them, and enable them to recover the fatigues of the campaign.

A quarter should never be imagined to be totally secure, whilst there are only guards before it: it would not be difficult for the enemy to come close up to them, particularly if the country is enclosed, either in day or night time, and if it is an open country in the night time only.

It is probable that if the enemy can get up to the guards and charge them, the troops which are in the quarters will not be assembled, or ready to receive the enemy; at best, there will be only the guard of foot and the piquet, which would be but of very little service in case of a surprize. If the enemy succeeds in pushing the guards, he will enter the quarters with them, while others of his parties surround them.

Detachments in advance of the quarters are absolutely necessary even when there are guards; they should be increased, according to the number of the troops, and in proportion to the extent of country to be guarded.

These detachments should march separately in the front, and they should occupy as much country as possible upon the flanks; they must march upon the roads leading to the enemy. In the day time they must scour the hedges, thickets, and woods, the villages, the hollows, and every sort of place that may serve for an ambuscade; in the night time they must draw nearer the quarter, and remain at the distance of at least four hundred paces, and even farther if the country is open. In the night, detachments must march very leisurely, not advancing, but crossing each other, and beside the word given out in orders, they will still have another particular one to know each other. Every now and then they must stop and listen, in order to discover whether they can hear any thing: the officers commanding the detachments should avoid fighting, till the last extremity; they should be sensible that the sole intention of their being ordered to advance is to preserve the quarters from a surprize.

These detachments should not continue out above six or eight hours, and consequently should never dismount. If there are any hussars in the quarters, they should be employed in these detachments preferably to any other troops, as they are better calculated to scour a country than cavalry, or even dragoons, their horses are more in wind, and fatigue themselves less, and it is also the sort of war natural to hussars.

As soon as these detachments are returned, others should be sent out for the same purpose, as the quarters should never be uncovered in front. If these detachments hear any thing in the night, the commanding officer should send to discover what it is, and will afterwards convince himself of the truth of it: if it should be occasioned by troops, he will directly

directly send an hussar to the commanding officer of one of the guards, if there are any in the front of the quarters; but if not, then to the commandant of the first quarter, who will give notice to the general. He must conceal himself in some place, from whence, without being discovered, he will with greater ease be able to form a judgment of what is marching towards him; and when he shall be more confirmed they are enemies, he will send a second hussar to give notice to the first post, who will inform the general, and will always continue to observe their motions by marching either on their flank, or before them.

On the arrival of the first hussar, the general will put part of his troops under arms, and order the rest to hold themselves in readiness to take theirs, but without noise: he will make his disposition in order to receive the enemy, neither must he forget to send notice to the commandants of the quarters nearest his own. On the first report of a pistol, all the out detachments must re-enter the quarters.

If the commanding officer of the detachment that has met the enemy does not find any places proper to conceal himself, and if he cannot well distinguish the number of the enemy, after having sent to give notice, he will march in the front of the party that came towards him, as if he made the advance guard to it, and as soon as he judges that the first and second hussar are arrived at the quarters, he will dispatch a third to confirm the intelligence of the two first. As for himself, he will always, as much as possible, be in front, or the flanks, without being seen, observing the march of the enemy, and trying to find out by the noise made by the troops in marching, whether there is infantry and cavalry, and to form a near guess of the force they may consist of.

As soon as he shall be within two hundred paces of the quarters, and shall judge that the troops within them have had time to get under arms, and that the dispositions are made to receive the enemy, he will give notice

notice by firing. It is this first fire that should serve as a signal for the detachments that are without to return. They will all endeavour to meet at the place where they heard it, and will, if possible, impede the march of the enemy, in order to give more time to the commandant to make his dispositions, to get his troops in order, and be in readiness to give the enemy a warm reception.

It has been already said, that on the account brought by the hussar from the detachment which has met the enemy, the general should immediately get part of the troops under arms, and order the rest to be ready to stand to theirs; but as soon as the second hussar is arrived, all the troops should be got under arms, without waiting the arrival of the third; there should never be any time lost in making dispositions, notwithstanding the particulars of it may have been settled beforehand. An attack during the night generally produces confusion, and the orders, although given with great propriety, are never so exactly and readily executed as in the day; but as the proper orders, in case of an attack, are undoubtedly given to every officer commanding a quarter, it is their business to carry them into execution as speedily, and with as much silence as possible: the general should also mount his horse, visit his posts, and be himself an eye-witness of all his orders being put in execution. If these precautions are observed, it seems very difficult for quarters to be surprised; they will be in a condition to receive, and even repulse the enemy, provided that the advanced detachments are mindful of the rules now given.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the Distance to which Detachments may advance.

AFTER having observed that the quarters cannot remain in security, unless care is taken to send out proper detachments, and that whatever vigilance a general may observe for the safety of the interior parts of the quarters, will prove insufficient, unless he also extends his care to those which are exterior; it is necessary, therefore, to say something relative to the distance which the detachments may venture to go; but which it is impossible to be decisive upon, as it depends upon the situation of the country, the distance of the enemy, and upon many other accidental circumstances.

If the country is open, and the detachments meet neither rivers or narrow passes, between the quarters and the enemy, it is impossible for them to advance too far, provided they do not expose themselves to the danger of being cut off, by neglecting the precautions necessary for securing the rear; their orders are not to fight, their duty being only to examine thoroughly, every thing they meet with in the plain, whether bushes, hollows, woods or villages. These detachments should endeavour to gain intelligence in every town, village and hamlet, and inform themselves whether the enemy makes incursions into the country, at what distance he is from the quarters, if there are any rivers between them, if there are bridges and fords upon these rivers, if the enemy has posts on them, of what nature they are, and whether or not they are intrenched.

Whenever the detachments find a plain, they should not shew themselves, but, on the contrary, should keep themselves in some place, from whence

whence they may be able to make discoveries, and remain unseen themselves. Whenever they perceive any villages at the distance of a quarter, or half a league, the commandant should detach some hussars, or if he has none with him, some dragoons, to ask questions, and bring some of the peasants belonging to the villages to him, and particularly the burgo-masters, or principal inhabitants, if they can secure them: by means of whom he will be able to gain information of the enemy, whether he is in detachment or in full force, whether he has been at the village, and by what road he marches. If nothing is to be got out of them, either by promises or threats, the commandant should conduct them to the general; if they still remain obstinate, they should be threatened with imprisonment; and should they after that persist in their silence, they should be threatened with having their village pillaged, and reduced to ashes, if the enemy advances without their giving notice of it.

A guard of infantry should be posted upon the bridges, or in the narrowest passes, through which the enemy will be obliged to march, in his way to attack the quarters: this guard will be a means of facilitating the retreat of the detachments, which ought to advance beyond it, and even when these bridges, or defiles, are at half a league distance, they will serve to give notice to the quarters, in case the advanced detachments are attacked; and for the speedier conveyance of intelligence, this guard should have two orderly hussars assigned to it.

If these advanced detachments are attacked, they should fall back upon the above mentioned guard, which re-united to the detachment, should stand its ground at the bridge, or defile, in order to give the general time to send assistance, and to get the troops under arms.

The general is not to fix upon the number of troops to be sent to their assistance, till he shall have received a second information by a note, brought

to

to him by the second orderly hussar, from the officer commanding the post of infantry, and by which he will be informed of the enemy's strength. The officer commanding the post of infantry, at the bridge, or the defile, ought to take proper measures to secure and maintain his post, till such time as he shall be able to receive assistance from the quarters.

The security of the quarters, or cantonments, consists in the number of small detachments, continually sent out to examine into the condition of the exterior dispositions, to prevent the enemy from approaching them, and also to give such timely notice of his motions, that the troops may take to their arms, and be in readiness to receive him.

The general should be particularly careful in his choice of the officers, to whom he entrusts the command of these detachments; and it is by their prudence and talents, not by their age nor rank, that he should determine; the safety of the quarters, and consequently that of the whole army depends upon them. Moderation and reflection are more conducive to the success of these detachments, than bravery and eagerness to engage.

CHAP. IX.

Of what is necessary to be done in Case of false Alarms.

A Watchful and vigilant enemy will never fail of giving a real or false alarm to the quarters, whenever he has opportunities, which are generally in his own power. He often proposes no other advantage than that of disturbing the troops, and fatiguing them by keeping them always upon their guard; or that in the end, by having amused the general so frequently with false attempts, he may expect to succeed in a real

one ; and should the general, in consequence of this, abate of his vigilance, his example will soon communicate to each particular commandant, and extend to the troops, from whom the enemy may at least take some quarters.

But a wise and prudent general knows how to guard against these inconveniencies, by the order he establishes in his quarters, and by taking the necessary precautions for their security, by ordering the infantry to take their arms without beat of drum, and by making the cavalry mount without a trumpet, so that the enemy deceived by this silence, and imagining the troops asleep, comes to fall upon them ; but as soon as they find them under arms, the enemy's surprize will contribute to his defeat, or at least make him abandon his enterprize, and retreat, in doing which he will be very much harrassed.

It is on such occasions that a general's genius becomes conspicuous ; he should not only know in what manner to secure his quarters, but he should also turn to his own advantage those very dispositions made use of by the enemy against him. This seems probable, and if practiced with success, the general will have nothing farther to apprehend from false alarms, as the enemy will be convinced of the alertness of his troops ; but still he should not pursue his advantage too far, for fear of some ambuscade : nevertheless, whilst he sees the country clear before him, he should take every advantage of the enemy's surprize, and charge him as briskly as possible.

It is always necessary to get the troops under arms without noise, silence on all occasions being a very favourable circumstance, by means of it the commander makes his orders better heard, and they are executed with greater readiness. There again results another advantage from silence, particularly on this occasion ; which is, that if the enemy does not come within reach of the quarters, and has only presented himself

self with a view of disturbing them, he will have no reason to flatter himself with having alarmed them, or of having made the troops continue the whole night, or the whole day under arms.

The natural consequence of this silence, which does not prevent the quarters from being upon their guard, will be, that the enemy angry or disheartened, at being thus traversed in his designs, will forbear giving false alarms, and the quarters will of course remain in tranquility; and the enemy will himself endeavour to recover the fatigues which he has undergone in fruitless attempts.

As for the horse, they on the signal for mounting, must necessarily occasion disorder, particularly in the night; on these occasions therefore they should mount by word of command, for whatever good order there may be in the quarters, the trumpets on one side, the cries on another, the hurry in saddling the horses, the confusion in finding their arms, will occasion great confusion in the orders, and make them very ill understood; quarters when in this confusion, may be very easily carried by an inferior number of troops, whose original intention was, perhaps, only to give a false alarm, or to examine the situation of them.

In general, the good order maintained in the quarters depends upon the capacity of the officer commanding them, on his vigilance, and on the good discipline he causes to be observed. It is by such a conduct, that instead of having any thing to fear, he turns every attempt against himself to the disadvantage of the enemy; and the reputation he will by this means gain with the enemy, will procure him advantages scarcely to be expected.

CHAP. X.

After what manner the Detachments and Guards of Horse belonging to a Quarter should be conducted; what Method they should take, when obliged to give way, to prevent the Enemy entering the Quarter with them,

IT sometimes happens that the cavalry is placed at a distance from the infantry, either because of the situation of the country, or by reason of the scarcity of forage; and that although the quarters are situated in the rear, the enemy by marching some distance about, may attack them, and expect to carry them, without apprehending any danger from the neighbouring quarters. Thus circumstanced, the officer commanding them ought to double his vigilance, by establishing guards in front, sending out patrols, encreasing the number of detachments; and, in short, by entrenching the quarter, as has been already mentioned in the second chapter of the third book.

As the enterprize formed by the enemy upon this quarter, will require spirit and vivacity, it cannot be executed but by cavalry, hussars, or dragoons, in order that they may retire with greater ease, whether they succeed or not; therefore the troops in the quarter consisting of cavalry, they are on equal footing, except that the quarter being intrenched, the troops may remain on foot, occupy the houses which have loop-holes in them, and place themselves behind the trenches; and although their fire will not be so brisk as that of infantry, because they are not used to defend a post in the same manner, it is nevertheless certain, that by firmness and a good disposition, they may expect to repulse the enemy, and baffle him.

him in his enterprize, more particularly as the attack is made with cavalry, whose fire is not more to be dreaded than that of the cavalry defending the quarter. This observation, although right as to the cavalry and hussars, is not so with regard to the dragoons, who are armed like the infantry, are exercised in the same manner, and are excellent in the evolutions of infantry.

Whenever the enemy would attack a quarter, and has by stolen marches during the night been able to approach near enough without being perceived, he will then march on briskly; and his advanced guard, which without doubt is strong, will charge all the small detachments it meets, with great vigour, and also endeavour to hem them in, in such a manner as to prevent their carrying any intelligence to the advanced guards: if it cannot hem them in, it will pursue them closely to the guards; this advanced guard, which will be followed by the gros of the troops, will endeavour to mix itself with the repulsed guards and detachments, in order to enter the quarter with them.

This charge will be made with great vivacity, in order to prevent the repulsed troops having time to send notice to the quarters; so that they will remain ignorant of what is doing, except by the firing which they hear, and which may be one means of succeeding in these kind of enterprizes.

But, as has been already said, that there ought to be a guard on foot, and a piquet in every quarter, that as soon as these two bodies on duty, and which should be continually on their guard, hear the first fire of the troops that are attacked, they will immediately give notice to the commandant, who will directly make his dispositions, as properly as the time will permit him to do. He will order the garrison to mount, the trenches to be lined, and the houses which have loop-holes in them to be occupied.

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If the guards and the detachments are repulsed, they ought not to retire through the roads leading to the quarters, and which ought to be closed up by intrenchments; but as soon as they are got near the quarter, they will keep up a brisk and constant fire, to stop the impetuosity of the enemy, at least for some time, so as to give time to the troops in the quarter to take to their arms, and post themselves according to the order given them: they will not cover the high roads, nor the houses with loop-holes, but they will retire by the side of the hedges, so that the fire of the troopers who are behind the trenches, and in the loop-holed houses, may protect them, and stop the enemy. Covered by this fire, they can retreat through small paths known only to those belonging to the quarter; so that the enemy, stopped by the intrenchments and the hedges, will not know at what part of the quarter to enter, and by these difficulties will be discouraged from pursuing his enterprize. Every entrance to the quarter should be closely shut up, entrenched, or at least well guarded, it being probable that the enemy will not confine his attack to one side only, but that he will surround the quarter, and endeavour to penetrate on some side or other; the remainder of the troops will be disposed round about the village, behind the hedges, or the pales surrounding the gardens.

With these precautions, an officer may hope to maintain a post attacked by a superior number of enemies, and, provided that he can stop or retard the enemy, he may expect assistance from the neighbouring quarters, notwithstanding they are at a distance, especially, that as at the first fire of the advanced detachments, notice of the attack ought to be sent to them.

It is on this occasion that a commandant ought to preserve himself cool; and a situation so critical, plainly shews of how much importance it is at this time to send out detachments to a greater distance, so as to
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have such early intelligence, as to be in readiness to receive the enemy. A quarter that is surpris'd is in reality forced; and it will certainly be surpris'd, if there are no advanced detachments; and if there are only home guards, because they cannot soon enough give notice to the troops to put themselves in order for their defence, before the enemy falls upon them.

The same disposition ought to be observed for a quarter of infantry, attacked by infantry, except that the troops of the quarter can more readily be succoured, because that infantry not being obliged like cavalry to separate through the want of forage, are more together. Besides, infantry not being able to march with the same speed as cavalry, consequently, the advanced detachments have it in their power to send and give notice to the quarter, and the troops in it have time sufficient to prepare themselves for the defence of the post, and to receive the enemy vigorously.

Still, if the enemy, too fool-hardy, has the imprudence to continue the attack of the village, so as to give time enough to the neighbouring quarters to send troops to its assistance, the opportunity should not be missed, and the troops in the quarter should take the advantage of these troops of the enemy in front, while they charge him in the rear, and pursue their success as far as prudence will permit. An officer should never let slip any opportunity where an advantage can be gained over the enemy, unless it is to be feared that a trifling success may prevent something more considerable; as if, for example, in a chain of forage, the troops are more attentive to the pursuit of the enemy that would disturb the foragers, than to continue the foraging, after having dispersed them. It is by small successes, that soldiers grow accustomed to conquer, and that they are taught to fear the shame of being overcome.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Precautions to be taken by an Officer on his Arrival at a Quarter in the Night-time that the Troops are unacquainted with.

THE precautions to be mentioned in this chapter vary according to the nature of the troops, who arrive at a quarter during the night.

Suppose infantry, or dragoons, to arrive very late in a quarter, or at a time when it is dark or stormy, and that the darkness of the night prevents the commander from examining exactly the adjacent parts, and those places where it is necessary to post guards and sentries: suppose, also, that the village where the troops are to be quartered, may be molested by the enemy, and that it is in an exposed and almost defenceless situation; but that there is a necessity for placing troops in it, either to preserve some communications, or to be able to push on detachments to a great distance, and to give them a point of support and retreat in this village.

This supposed, as soon as all the troops have entered the quarter, the commanding officer must leave the piquet, and the guards designed for its security in the market-place; after which, he will send for the chief magistrate, in order to be informed of the situation of the village, of the side which is towards the enemy; whether it can be surrounded, and [how that can be effected? How many out-lets there are into the country? Whether there is a river, or rivulet; whether the banks of it are marshy or not; what part covers this rivulet; whether there are any bridges or fords? &c. During the time required for gaining these informations, the

the billets for quartering the men should be distributed, and the troops will remain under arms in the market-place, or in the street, till farther orders.

The commanding officer, attended by the chief magistrate, the principal inhabitants, and the guards designed for the security of the quarter, should go round the village, and from his own observation make himself acquainted with the outlets, the roads, the woods, which are within a small distance and by this knowledge of the situation; he will place his posts of infantry at every outlet of the quarter, with orders to barricade them for that night with waggons, or thick planks crossed one over another. The posts ought for the first night to be stronger than usual, and the sentries doubled; and as soon as they are placed, the commanding officer should order the remainder of the troops not immediately upon duty to go to their quarters. If dragoons, it is unnecessary to place guards on horseback on the outside of the quarter, which will be in much greater security when guarded by men on foot, and entrenched. But nevertheless there should be a piquet of horse in the market-place, with orders from the commanding officer to divide into three bodies, and patrol on the outside of the quarters every two hours. Those off duty may unsaddle their horses, with orders, in case of an attack, to proceed on foot to the places appointed for rendezvousing, and which shall have been carefully examined by the commanding officer. If it is infantry, there must also be a piquet, which, like that of the dragoons, must patrol on the outside of the quarter every two hours, taking particular care to examine the hedges and gardens on the road-side.

These are thought to be the precautions most conducive to the security of the quarter, and which ought to be taken by a commanding officer, who can have but a very imperfect knowledge of the situation of it, and the adjacent parts.

Cavalry and hussars may proceed much after the same manner as infantry and dragoons : the commanding officer should likewise, in the same manner, go round the quarter with the principal magistrate ; after which he will place guards in front of the quarter, taking care also that they are not so far distant from each other, as to be in danger of being cut off, but are at such a distance only, as to be able to prevent the enemy from falling immediately upon the quarters. The avenues of the quarters should be guarded by dismounted troopers, but not intrenched, that in case of an attack, the troops who are off duty, and the piquet, may march immediately, and charge the enemy.

There is one distinction to be made between cavalry and infantry, which is, that the former ought to charge the enemy on the outside of the quarter, and the latter ought to wait for him behind their intrenchments, and by a brisk and constant fire, prevent him from advancing ; it is therefore, for this reason, that the troopers not immediately on duty, should always have their horses ready to bridle on the earliest notice. During the first night, the horses should remain saddled, and every trooper, or hussar, should be in readiness to mount on the first order.

If the enemy, informed that the troops are arrived by night, and consequently very much fatigued with their march, take advantage of that opportunity to attack the quarter ; the guards should be ordered to charge them, even supposing they should not be in strength, without troubling themselves about number ; the piquet, which should be on horseback, should march into the field and join the guards, and the remainder of the troops will mount their horses, with as little noise as possible ; and as soon as they have joined the guards, they will make a vigorous and brisk attack upon the enemy. These attacks, executed with vigour, and without hesitation, have often been attended with happy success, more particularly so, as the enemy would not attempt the attack, were it not from

from the knowledge of these troops having made a tedious march in the evening, in bad weather, which may induce the enemy to imagine, that troops thus fatigued have been more mindful of their repose, than taking the precautions necessary for their security, and have contented themselves with placing only small guards in front. The enemy may also flatter himself, that the troops, the commandant, and the officers being asleep, it will not be very difficult to carry the quarter; but finding himself repulsed with vigour, his firmness will yield to surprize, he will be discouraged, and instead of the easy victory he expected, he will find himself in great danger of being defeated.

George Basta* cites many examples of these unforeseen strokes; one of which only shall be mentioned here, in order to prove that whenever a body of troops is attacked, particularly in the night, it should march out toward the enemy without considering his force, because the darkness making it impossible for him to distinguish the number, his imagination will always make it appear more considerable than it really is.

“ Being commissary-general, I was quartered,” says that great officer,
 “ at Osterhaut, a village near Breda, where I found myself placed with
 “ only an hundred horse, having detached the rest on certain enter-
 “ prizes; of which the enemy having received intelligence, came about
 “ midnight with four hundred foot, to attack the quarter. On hearing
 “ the alarm, I went immediately to the guard, composed of two com-
 “ panies, the one belonging to Antonio Oliviera, and the other to Al-
 “ phonso de Mondragon; I found their officers with them: being join-
 “ ed, we met the enemy with so much resolution, that we not only re-
 “ pulsed them, but also put them totally to flight; but soon after,
 “ notwithstanding the darkness of the night, the enemy suddenly re-

* Le Gouvernement de la Cavalerie, par George Basta, chap. 10.

“ covered, and would have returned to the assault, if, at the same time,
 “ count Decio Montfredy, ensign in the marquis del Guaſto's company,
 “ arriving with some horse, by my order, but contrary to the enemy's
 “ expectations, fell upon them with such courage and resolution, that
 “ he totally routed them, leaving above two hundred dead upon the spot :
 “ a thing almost incredible, that so small a number of horse should in
 “ the night, and in a place so confined, be able to accomplish so great
 “ a defeat.”

If there are instances where an hundred, or an hundred and thirty horse, have beaten four hundred foot, it is to be presumed that they are also able to beat any cavalry that may come and attack them, by taking a speedy resolution, and falling upon them sword in hand. If they do not entirely defeat the enemy, they will at least escape being beaten, and will also oblige the enemy to retire without having carried his point ; if they are beaten, which may happen, they will have done their duty, and will have nothing to reproach themselves with : but if they should oblige the enemy to retire, they will by that means acquire fresh reputation.

A commanding officer should never suffer himself to be affected with the complaints of those who murmur against the precautions which they suppose to be unnecessarily increased : these supposed grievances are common among the private men, but they are easily suppressed, when an officer shares the fatigue with them. Charles XII *. by his own example, supported the patience of his soldiers, which would sometimes give way, and which had a greater effect on them, than any punishment he could have inflicted. A general undoubtedly should never expose his troops to fatigue, till the last extremity ; but he should never spare them upon exigent occasions ; and they are sufficiently recompensed, whenever they

* Nordberg's Hist. of Charles XII. vol. 2.

have baffled the enterprizes of the enemy, and have time sufficient to recover the toil they have undergone: and whenever the enemy has been sufficiently foiled, he will be so well convinced of the vigilance of the troops in the quarters, as to let them remain in tranquility during the remainder of the season.

CH A P. XII.

Of the Precautions to be taken by a Commander, when obliged to establish his Quarters in a woody and mountainous Country.

IF the knowledge of a country is necessary to an officer, it becomes more particularly so when the quarters are to be established in a woody and mountainous country: the more impracticable and difficult it appears for it to be surrounded, the more precaution is required; a narrow pass, that has not been properly examined; a way, of whose windings the commander is ignorant; a valley, whose depth is unknown; heights, which in appearance are inaccessible, and which the commander has neglected to have occupied, will sometimes furnish the enemy with an opportunity of taking the quarters in rear, of attacking and carrying them.

With this knowledge of a country, a general will not only put his quarters in a state of security, but he will also prevent his troops being fatigued, by placing such guards only as are necessary, and by not increasing the number of patrols, which he must be obliged to do, if he has but a superficial knowledge of the country.

After having taken these first precautions, he will place all his infantry in the first line, in the most considerable places, such as the cities,

or

or towns. To this infantry he will join some huffars, in order to push on detachments in front, whether for the security of the quarters, whether in order to carry off the forage which is between him and the enemy, or in short, to raise contributions if he finds it practicable. The cavalry will be covered by the infantry, and as the dragoons; guided by circumstances, can do duty either on foot or on horseback, he will place them on the flanks of the cavalry, in order to cover them.

Beside the intrenchments with which every town and village should be secured, there ought also to be trenches cut at the head of the narrow passes, or ways leading to the quarters, with a barrier, in order to let the detachments of huffars or dragoons pass; the trenches should be very carefully guarded by infantry.

In a mountainous country the detachments should not advance to the same distance as in an open one, because it will be easy for the enemy to cut them off, by sending infantry through the bye-ways, and where the huffars cannot penetrate: these troops will place themselves between the quarters and the detachment, as soon as it shall be passed, and at the same time that it shall be attacked in head, they will attack it in rear, and put it between two fires.

Sentries should be placed upon the heights, with order, if they see any troops, to give notice, but not to fire, so that the enemy may imagine the quarters are not on their guard, and by which means the officer commanding them may lay ambuscades for the enemy, and prevent him from attacking the quarters, or approaching near enough to examine them; because the troops are only placed in quarters, there to remain quiet, there to subsist during the winter, and to be in a condition of entering early into the field: but still, if the enemy should attempt the attack of some quarters, as by the precautions which have been pointed out, he will find the troops under arms and ready to receive him, he may
probably

probably be beaten, or at least obliged to retire; it is probable that this check will discourage him, and that he will suffer the quarters to remain quiet. This tranquility, whether real or supposed, ought not to prevent the commanding officer from sending detachments to examine and scour the country very exactly; for these kind of discoveries, a corporal, a quarter-master, with six men on one side, and six on another, will be sufficient. The detachments which are sent out to draw forage from the front, or to raise contributions, ought to be stronger; but at the same time not too numerous: they should be composed of infantry, hussars, or dragoons, according to the situation of the country.

If, the narrow passes leading to the quarters cross each other by different ways, and these ways all fall into the great road which leads to the quarters, there should be a guard of hussars, or dragoons, posted at this crossing during the night, and sentries, or vedets, upon all the roads. This guard must retire at sun-rising, as it will be of no use in the day, because the enemy seldom chuses that time for an attack, and that even in such a case, the first attack will be made on the trenches, which are in the front of the quarters, at the entrance of the passes and the roads, and consequently, the troops will have time sufficient to stand to their arms, and to occupy such posts as are ordered.

If from a want of forage, the general cannot subsist his cavalry, and as it is of no use among mountains, he can send it into the country, in the rear, and into places where it will remain in security, and where it will be able to get forage; unless the general intends to leave the country he is in, and carry the war into another, where the cavalry can act with more facility.

But should the general be so circumstanced as to be obliged to remain among mountains, and is also in want of forage, he must only keep his hussars and dragoons, the former for detachments in front, and the latter may be of use, by doing duty on foot like the infantry.

Although cavalry is in a very bad situation when among mountains, it is nevertheless obliged to be established there, when the open country has been laid waste; but it should always be posted in the second line, and in that part of the country which is least mountainous, and where there is the greatest plenty of forage: and it should always be so situated as not to be liable to be attacked by the enemy, especially as it will not be able to act, and therefore it will be impossible for it to defend itself against infantry, which the enemy will undoubtedly make use of in these kind of countries.

It will be needless to mention the precautions that ought to be taken by cavalry in a mountainous country, because it is not to be supposed that cavalry only would be established there. These precautions would at most but serve for the facilitating its retreat, and not for defending itself; and the enemy would very soon be master of the country, if when only opposed by cavalry.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Precautions to be taken for securing the Quarters of Cavalry, in a plain and open Country.

WE shall here be contented with relating the methods made use of by George Basta *, for the security of his quarters of cavalry: they appear to be so much the more eligible, as they are very plain; besides, the authority of a man so well versed in the military art, and so generally approved, seems to be a precedent worthy to be regarded.

George Basta supposes a village in the midst of a plain; he establishes his guards, and small guards upon the roads, which may lead to the

* Gouvernement de la Cavalerie, par George Basta, liv. 2. chap. 10.

quarters;

quarters ; after which he sends out his detachments in front, as far as it is possible for him to go, without running the danger of being cut off ; he places the guards at an hundred and fifty paces from the quarter, the small guards in proportion, and the vedets at fifty paces from the small corps de garde.

In the night the vedets will form themselves round about the quarter, and near enough to hear each other ; they should always be moving towards one another, as if they would change place : by this continual movement, no person will be able either to go into, or come out of the quarter, without being seen and stopped. His detachments which were in the front, secured at a distance every thing on the outside ; he also had patrols of three or four men who advanced upon the roads, two or three hundred paces before the vedets, in case the enemy should have escaped the vigilance and searches of the detachments : these patrols, as well as the detachments, stopped from time to time, and attentively examined whether any troops were coming towards them. If there were garrisons at a little distance, the detachments had orders to advance as near them as possible, first in order to secure the tranquility of the quarter ; secondly, to keep the enemy in awe, and to prevent his coming to molest it, by letting him see that it was always on its guard.

These precautions appear to be very good ; but if this quarter is attacked by infantry, what will this cavalry do in the town or village ? The best it can do will be to take advantage of the intelligence of the advanced detachments, to send away the baggage, and then make its retreat ; for it is impossible for cavalry to defend a town or village against infantry, whatever precaution it may have taken in intrenching the town, making loop-holes in the houses, and in sending out detachments in front. The cavalry has no other choice, whenever it is attacked by infantry, than to place itself in a plain, in order to be able to act : ram-

parts are not made for horse; it is from their sword they are to expect victory, or derive their safety. This quarter of cavalry established by George Basta, only serves to prove the necessity of vigilance in war; but this conduct ought never to be pursued in the quarters of cavalry, but whenever they are very much exposed.

It is always wrong for cavalry to be placed alone in a country, however open it may be; it is even very rarely that circumstances require it: but if the situation of affairs, or a want of forage make it necessary, these precautions of George Basta appear to be good, and even the only that can be practised, in order to prevent a surprize.

A quarter at a distance from the enemy, covered by other quarters, in a country whose situation will not permit the enemy to attack the quarter, till after having forced those which cover it; requires fewer precautions than another quarter intirely uncovered, or in some measure exposed. Nevertheless, an officer should never neglect any precautions, were it with no other view than to keep the soldiers strictly up to their duty, and by that means render it habitual to them. The pleasures and repose enjoyed by the Carthaginians at Capua, caused them to grow slack in their military discipline, and contributed to the successes of Fabius; and, to speak in the language of Vegetius*, a small number of troops well skilled in the art of war, fly, as may be said, to victory; whereas a great army, destitute of the principles of exercise and discipline, is nothing more than a multitude of men led on to slaughter. Montecuculli in his Memoirs† says, that there is nothing so necessary to a soldier as discipline: destitute of that the troops are more hurtful than useful, and become more formidable to their friends than to their enemies.

* Book 1. chap. 1. sect. 1.

† Book 1. chap. 2. sect. 30.

The END of the THIRD BOOK.

parts are not made for horse: it is from their sword they are to expect victory, or derive their safety. This quarter of cavalry established by George B. only serves to prove the necessity of vigilance in the quarters of cavalry, but this could not be put in the quarters of cavalry, but whenever they are very much exposed.

It is always wrong for cavalry to be alone in a country, however open it may be; it is even very rarely that circumstances require it: but if the situation of affairs, or a want of horses make it necessary, they can be practised, in order to prevent a surprise.

A quarter at a distance from the enemy, covered by other quarters, in a country where the enemy is not to be expected, requires fewer precautions, till after having forced those which cover it, requires fewer precautions than another quarter, which is covered, or in some measure exposed. Nevertheless, and other quarters, which are not to be expected, it with no other view than to keep the soldiers strictly up to their duty, and by that means to render it more difficult for the enemy to enjoy the pleasure and repose enjoyed by the Carthaginians at Capua, caused them to grow slack in their military discipline, and to neglect the duties of their arms, and to neglect the duties of their arms, and to neglect the duties of their arms.

BOOK THE FOURTH.
CHAP. I.
Of Precautions for the Attack of one or more Quarters.

THE taking of the quarters is a circumstance which ruins the design of the enemy, which discourages his troops, which harrasses him, and insensibly destroys him. The success depends upon the manner of attacking them, upon the address and prudence of the general, on the choice of the troops, on the number he should take with him, on the favourable moment, which should never be suffered to escape; and also in the discipline which the general should have observed, whenever he has penetrated into the quarters, whether in order to preserve them, or for his retreat.

As the care and the defence of the quarters demand many precautions and an exact vigilance, so also does the attack of them require much cir-

cumspicion and great secrecy : it is supposed, that the general has spies always ready to give notice of the least negligence of the enemy, which he should be ever watchful to take advantage of; that he should rather make use of stratagem, than force to take them; that, in short, he should be acquainted with their position, by the knowledge which he ought to have of the situation of the country, and their distance one from another, so as to direct his attack towards that which is farthest from assistance.

M. de Feuquieres * in his Memoirs, relates famous examples of the taking of quarters, owing to the negligence of those who had the care of them; to which the reader is referred. Without doubt instruction may be gathered from example : but it is thought when rule is joined to it, the instruction becomes more solid. Rule shews what ought to be done on such or such an occasion; by example the rule is justified : it gives opportunity for reflection, and lets the person who studies it, into a knowledge of the good or bad evolutions which have been performed in an action.

The first thing for a general to observe, who would take one or more quarters, but not the whole of them, is to approach as near as possible, without being perceived by the enemy's detachments; the second is, not to march towards the quarters without having first regulated his disposition by the knowledge which he has of their situation.

It is very seldom, however open the country may be, that a general does not meet with some hedge, height, hollows, or some other advantage, under cover of which he may conceal all his troops. In order that the design may be performed with greater quickness, there should be a sufficient number of troopers to carry grenadiers behind them, who will also serve to facilitate the retreat of the troops, in case they fail in their attempt.

* Chap. 6. and 7.

A general should never advance towards the quarters till twilight, and make the attack at twelve or one o'clock at midnight; he should divide his infantry into two or three bodies, according to the situation of the quarter: the cavalry, divided into the same number of bodies, will follow the infantry, and the hussars and dragoons, forming a separate body, must march upon the two flanks, in order to fall into the quarters behind: in this position the troops march toward the quarter very silently; they must charge at the first order, the infantry with bayonets fixed, and the cavalry sword in hand, and will try to penetrate at some part or other. During this time, the hussars and dragoons who have surrounded the quarter, will endeavour also to penetrate on their side: if the rear of the quarters are guarded by intrenched infantry, the dragoons must dismount, and make the attack without firing, but always with the bayonet. Such resolution often makes an impression, especially upon troops surrounded and attacked on all sides. The hussars will divide themselves into many bodies, in order to prevent any soldier, or peasant, coming out of the quarter; the cavalry on their side will do the same; and if a body of infantry can penetrate, the rest will soon find an opportunity of entering at the same place. In proportion as the troops enter the quarter, the general who commands the attack ought to place a strong guard in the market-place, distribute troops in every street, and order them to fire upon every one belonging to the enemy whom they find armed. The general should do his utmost for immediately securing the commandant and his officers; the guard which has been posted in the market-place should never quit it, that it may be ready to carry assistance wherever it is required: by this disposition the defeat of the enemy is certain. As soon as all the infantry shall have entered the quarter, it will be impossible for any soldier to escape; the quarter being surrounded by the cavalry, hussars and dragoons, if they have not been

been obliged to dismount; in that case they will form a body with the infantry.

In the beginning of the attack, quarter should never be given to those who are resolved to defend themselves; but when success is sure, blood should always be spared, it being always more glorious to make prisoners, a sure mark of victory, than to massacre soldiers who surrender themselves, and who are destitute of the means of defence.

The enterprize is attended with more difficulty, when, instead of one quarter, the general would attack a number. The dispositions ought to be regulated by the situation of the country, as in the attack of one quarter only; but as a greater number of troops are requisite, it will be more difficult to conceal them, unless the country should be full of woods, or that the enemy should be so neglectful, that troops may march to his quarters, without finding any obstacles in the way. But this should be never supposed; such a thought would argue but a small degree of vigilance in the officer who is to command the attack, and would make him more negligent in his precautions, than if he was assured of the enemy's vigilance: even supposing there were just grounds to imagine the enemy was neglectful, it should never influence the general with regard to his own exactness. A general belonging to the enemy, whose incapacity may have been shewn by many blunders, may yet on some occasion take good advice, and follow it with great exactness.

There is another disposition for the attack of a quarter, which seems much easier, and perhaps better. The officer who commands the detachment destined for the attack, ought to know exactly the hour of the enemy's arrival at it, and how it is situated: by the knowledge which he ought to have of the country and the place, he will be capable of judging whether it can be surrounded.

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When the officer commanding the detachment which is to make the attack, knows within an hour, or half an hour, to the time at which the enemy will arrive, he should begin his march so as to have an hour or two advantage of the enemy, in order to be able to place himself in ambuscade before his arrival, and to make his dispositions for the attack. Whether the detachment is strong or weak, the commanding officer should have the same hopes of success: in cases of surprize, it is not the strongest who has the advantage, but the person who makes the attack; a detachment of three hundred men may carry a quarter in which there are five hundred; the whole success depending upon its being surprized. Troops which surprize others should employ that time to beat the enemy, which is necessary for him to recollect himself.

The march should be conducted as secretly as possible, in order to which all the high-roads ought to be avoided, and the general should always endeavour to march under cover of some wood, or some hollow. If it is an open country he should march in the night, and arrive, as has been said, an hour or two before the enemy; he should have spies to follow the enemy in his march, who will give an exact account of his motions.

Those countries which are most covered are not always fit for ambuscades; on the contrary, the less covered a country is, the less doth the enemy suspect ambuscades, and the fewer precautions does he take. If there are any trees very thick with leaves, soldiers, by way of sentries, should be placed in them, so that they may give notice as soon as they discover the enemy; and especially all the troops should hold themselves in readiness to march on the first order.

When the troops who come to occupy the quarters are got into them, it is customary to cause them to draw up in the market-place, if there is one, if not, in the streets, in order to distribute the billets, and to

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give the usual orders, which is soon done; consequently, the officer commanding the attack must wait about the space of an hour, otherwise he would find every body under arms. But as this distribution is soon made, and then the officers and soldiers retire, excepting those who are ordered for the guards and the piquet, who remain on the market-place, till such time as they are properly placed; till the soldiers are all got to their quarters, where they lay by their arms, light fires, and are sufficiently taken up with dressing their provisions; then is the favourable moment for falling upon the quarters: but the commanding officer must be certain that the enemy has not received any information of the enterprize; which he cannot be sure of, unless he hath gained the inhabitants of the country over to his interest, and has stopped all strangers, peasants, or any other persons who pass near the detachment during its march, or near to the ambuscade.

If the enemy's general shall be apprised of the design against him after having entered the quarter, he will order all his troops to remain under arms, and make his dispositions in the proper places, at the avenues of the quarter, which he will barricade with waggons, or things of the like nature. If the attack is designed in front, the safest part he has to take, is himself to go and attack the troops who would surprise him; and by this unforeseen attack, which he will make on all sides, by dividing his troops, he will have hopes of baulking the enemy in his enterprize, and even of beating him.

M. de Feuquieres * says, that attacks upon quarters ought to be made in the night, or at day-break; but there are some occasions which will not admit of delaying it till night, and where the situation of the country, and the negligence of the troops in the quarter, in a manner, invite the detachment to a speedy attack, although in the day, for fear the com-

* Memoires, tom. 3. chap. 6. and 7.

mandant should rouse from his negligence, or that by good advice he should be prevailed on to change his superficial precautions into such as are prudent and useful.

It may be seen by the example of M. de Monclar * taken in his quarter, and which is cited by M. de Feuquieres, that it is impossible for too many precautions to be taken in war. Too much confidence is fatal; foresight and activity are necessary; and not a security, which often proceeds merely from want of ability, or presumption. If M. de Monclar had placed guards and detachments in the front of his quarter, the enemy would never have been able to have fallen upon him, without his having had sufficient notice to have put himself in a proper posture of defence. The more care there is taken, the fewer designs will the enemy form of attacking; and when formed, he will at least always find troops ready to receive them: precautions will never be found useless and superfluous, however numerous they may be, provided they are not the suggestion of caprice; they ought to be well considered, especially when success is to be the consequence of stratagem. The blunder of a soldier saved M. de Vendome from being taken, when attempted by prince Eugene in 1702; a daring enterprize, but one that proves not a great addition to the glory of that prince.

An officer should never think himself secure in a quarter, either from the number of his troops, or from the distance of the enemy; because that troops who are surprised, are very soon beaten; and also, that whilst the enemy is supposed to be quiet, and at a distance, he is already on his march; that he does not regard the length of the way when he is once resolved; that even from this distance he may promise himself an happy success, by the certainty he has, that an unvigilant general will not take the necessary precautions.

* Remarques, tom. 3. chap. 64.

A surprize the best executed, whose beginnings are the most successful, and which promises a compleat victory, may take a disadvantageous turn in an instant, if the officers are not attentive to keep their men together, and if they do not prevent them quitting their ranks in order to plunder.

It ought to be the penalty of death for the first man who leaves his company without orders ; to obviate this inconveniency, there should be always an officer at the head of the small bodies, detached from those which entered the quarters, to hinder the enemy from reuniting.

If the troops which have entered any quarter, whether infantry or cavalry, amuse themselves with pillaging before the enemy is intirely beat, those troops who are attacked will find less difficulty to struggle with, and consequently will unite themselves with much greater ease, to form a body in a condition of defending itself ; their commanders can give their orders with greater ease, and may even change the face of affairs ; the victorious assailant will soon find himself attacked, overcome, and unable to retreat without sustaining great loss ; for besides that those who are busied in pillaging, will not be able to save themselves, the detachment will be certain of being closely pursued in its retreat, and the victory will be wrenched from the detachment into the hands of the enemy.

A general may attack, be repulsed, and retire even with loss, without disgrace, when he has taken all the precautions necessary for succeeding in the attack, and has also made a good retreat ; but it is scandalous for a general to owe his misfortune to his negligence, which can never happen but to a man who is void of the talents necessary for war, and consequently of commanding, or to one who has the ill luck to be placed at the head of undisciplined troops.

Pillage

Pillage cannot be permitted in quarters that are attacked or forced, because that the quarters are either in a friend's or an enemy's country; if it is an enemy's country, the soldier, or trooper, in pillaging the baggage belonging to the beaten troops, will also plunder the inhabitant and the peasant; from which circumstance will result many more inconveniencies than advantages.

Troops, who would extend their conquests, ought to endeavour to give the inhabitants of the country they propose conquering, a favourable impression of them; such gentle behaviour would be attended with greater advantage, than all the plunder they could make: such was the policy of the Romans, who always endeavoured to attain their ends by soft and gentle measures, before they proceeded to the severities and horrors of war; they seldom slaughtered such as they could hope to make their prisoners; and the conquered people became their allies.

If the inhabitants of the conquered countries, instead of the usage common to faithful subjects, are treated with too much severity, the conqueror will find nothing but exasperated hearts, and enemies whom fear, and not love, render obedient to him; the peasants who have lost their cattle, their harvests, and their goods, will oftentimes find their despair productive of expedients; and if they dare not openly rebel, they will become the more dangerous spies.

If in a friend's country, the reason for good behaviour becomes still more evident, and less attention should not be paid to the soldier's conduct: it would be very bad policy to ruin whole families for ever, in order to enrich a number of soldiers for a small time; such an injustice would cause a dissatisfaction, which has been often known to be closely followed by rebellion; it is true, that the soldier should not be hindered from what belongs to him, and is his due, the baggage and the horses of the enemy he has a natural right to. They ought to be justly distributed,

but the distribution should not be made in the quarter that is taken, but at the camp, or in the quarters from whence the troops set out.

As soon as the conquest of the quarters is perfected, the commanding officer should order all the waggons to carry the wounded, as well enemies as friends; and if there are any waggons remaining, they should be loaded with the baggage of the conquered troops, and should take the road leading to the quarters, or the camp, of the victorious troops, escorted by two detachments, one of cavalry, and the other of infantry; the detachment of cavalry must lead the horses that have been taken, and will conduct the waggons the shortest way, and by that which is the least capable of concealing ambuscades: if there are any magazines of forage, and time sufficient to load the other waggons, it ought to be done; but if the time will not admit of that, the commanding officer should set them on fire, unless he has an absolute order from the general of the army to carry them off; then he must give them the preference to the baggage, and give leave to every soldier, trooper, hussar, or dragoon, to carry off as much as he can, but without loading themselves so much as to be encumbered, and by that means retard the march. They should be ordered, on arriving at the camp, or at the quarter, to deposit all in an appointed place, where they will be fold.

All the horses and baggage which are taken should be sold to the best bidder, and the money should be distributed, according to rank, to every soldier, and others, who were on the detachment: great care should be had to distribute this plunder to the troops, in order that by what they have gained, they may be encouraged to exert themselves yet more, when another occasion offers; and they should be made to understand that what is given them, is as a reward for their courage, and not by way of payment for their labours.

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As soon as the quarters are forced, and the prisoners are under guard, and those which could not be taken are got off, the commanding officer should think of retreating, for fear lest those who have been able to escape, should have spread the alarm in the neighbouring quarters, and that the enemy should come and attack the detachment, whilst it is in the forced quarter, or on its retreat. From these reasons, the officer commanding them should be induced to think of retreating as speedily as possible, and of disencumbering himself immediately of the waggons where the wounded are placed, as well as those which contain the forage and the baggage which is taken, and to send off the whole, as soon as possible, by the shortest road, escorted by a large detachment.

But if the officer commanding the detachment is ordered by the general to maintain himself in the quarters, he ought then to proceed in the manner that has already been mentioned, with regard to the security of the quarters; but he should always send off the wounded and the baggage under an escort, so as not to be incumbered, in case the enemy should come to attack him. The precautions which the commandant ought to pursue, for the preservation of the quarter that is taken, should be very exact, because that being nearer to the enemy, he is the more exposed to be molested by him; besides it is evident, that the enemy will make use of all his efforts and endeavours to surprize him, and to drive him away; on the other hand, from his knowledge of the quarters, it will be easy for him to form a design for an attack, and execute it with success.

CHAP. II.

Of the Attack of one, or many Quarters, when the Enemy has arrived in the Night, and is fatigued also by a long March.

THE most favourable opportunity for the attack of one, or many quarters, is, when the troops have arrived in them in the night, or at the close of day; for, in that circumstance, the commandant cannot have time to examine his quarters thoroughly, and the troops, fatigued by their march, will not be alert in their duty; by reason also of this fatigue, the commandant will neither place posts sufficiently strong, or cause the avenues to the quarters to be properly shut up; and having but an indifferent knowledge of the country, he will be unacquainted with the proper places to fix his posts, and will, perhaps, neglect those parts which are most exposed; and even when his posts are well placed, and he has caused all the avenues to be closed up, how will the troops that are in these posts be sufficient to repulse the assailant, whom the night renders still more formidable to them, and these troops find themselves not sustained by the rest, who are asleep? It may even happen, that the commandant, worn out with fatigue, has not sent out any detachment, or if he has, that they are but very weak. It is even probable, that he has only superficially visited the parts adjacent to the quarter, and that he has trusted to some other officers.

But even when the officer commanding the detachment is certain, that the commandant has taken all the precautions pointed out above, it would argue great weakness to neglect this attack; it may probably not succeed,

ucceed, but then the commanding officer hath nothing to apprehend, because he may retire whenever he pleases; the troops who attacked, run no risque of being pursued by the troops of the quarter, because, as they are unacquainted with the country, they will be fearful of losing themselves, or of falling into ambuscades, and will rest contented that they have not been forced.

The time for the attack should be at twelve or one o'clock at midnight, in order to give the troops in the quarter time to go to their lodgings, to get their supper, and go to rest, which they will not be long in doing, when they are so much fatigued.

In order for the taking of quarters, what has already been said should be observed, with regard to advancing as near as possible, to observe a profound silence, to divide the troops into many bodies, and while two of these bodies make a vigorous attack upon the different posts, whose fatigue will have rendered them too weak to resist an unforeseen attack, the two others will surround the quarter, and will endeavour to get into it, and take possession of the market-place, from whence they will detach troops to every part, to prevent those who are in the quarter from getting together. The commandant and the officers should observe what has already been said higher up, relative to the commandant and the officers of the quarter, because the troops who are attacked having no officer to give them orders, will be overcome with confusion and fear, and a quarter thus surpris'd cannot fail of being taken.

The two bodies which have attacked the posts, must detach two small troops each, to march round the quarter, in order to stop the runaways.

Supposing that the soldiers and officers are negligent of their security, if the troops which are arriv'd in the night are numerous, and that they occupy many villages, it should be endeavour'd to take them all, or at least a great part; but then the commandment should have a thorough knowledge of the country.

Suppose four villages to be attacked, the commanding officer should then form two real and two false attacks, and divide his troops into six bodies, place an experienced officer at the head of each, and safe guides to conduct them to the quarter they are to attack. The two which form the false attacks should be weaker, than the other four who make the two real attacks; and as soon as they shall be within reach of the quarters, each body must divide, and attack together at the same time.

It is the commandant's business to determine real or false attacks; according to the position of the villages, they may be made at will, in the center, or on the flanks; but yet, if the ground will permit, the attacks will succeed better in the center, because that if those in the center are forced, those on the flanks, not being able to get any assistance, will be no longer able to hold out. The four strongest should divide themselves and attack two quarters; the two others should employ the quarters upon the flanks, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, and prevent his sending assistance to those which are really attacked: when the quarters in the center are forced, two of the bodies should march to the party where the false attacks are formed; and whilst they are amused and kept in awe by the troops, they will surround the quarters in front, by which position the enemy will be placed between two fires, and be forced to lay down his arms.

A body of troops should be left in every village that is forced, while the remainder of the troops for some time pursue such of the enemy that may have made their escape, and by that means prevent their rallying.

It is to be observed that each of the bodies designed for the real attack, should be, at least, equal in strength to the troops which are in each quarter, because such a strength, joined to the enemy's surprise, will, in all probability, ascertain the success: it should be also observed, that those

those bodies which are to conduct the false attacks, ought to be sufficiently strong to take up the enemy's attention, without running the danger of being repulsed.

The troops designed for the real attacks must act after the same manner, as has been already mentioned for the attack of only one quarter; that is, the second body should separate and surround the quarter, to endeavour to penetrate at some part that may render the taking of the quarter certain. See the TWENTY-FOURTH PLATE.

CHAP. III.

The Manner of retreating after taking one or more Quarters.

IN every design which a general meditates, and which he would also carry into execution, he should always foresee every circumstance that may happen. As an attack of any kind whatever, may have either a lucky or unlucky issue, he should make proper dispositions, either in case of meeting with a check, before he actually attacks one or more of the enemy's quarters. The officer commanding the detachment must give a signal for retreating to each officer commanding a separate body, both of infantry and cavalry, in case he does not succeed in the attack, or after taking of the quarters. This signal should consist of two or three calls of the drum. Upon this signal they are to proceed to the place marked for their reunion, as at the entrance of the quarters, that from thence they may take the way leading to the camp, or the place from whence they set out.

There is no manner of doubt, that such of the enemy as have been able to make their escape, will give notice to the neighbouring quarters, and that the troops belonging to them will come in full force, not only to

retake the quarter, but also to attack, and endeavour to beat the detachment, which must of course be fatigued by the first attack, and also to recover the prisoners, the forage, and the baggage belonging to the troops who were first beaten, which cannot be done without the loss of great numbers.

If the commandant succeeds so far as to beat the enemy, he must cause them to be pursued for some time by the hussars, but not farther than half a league, during which time the cavalry should re-assemble at the place appointed for them; the infantry should also leave the quarters, and meet at the same place, excepting some companies, which the commandant should leave in the quarters, with officers, to get all the waggons together and put the wounded into them, as also the baggage and the forage, which should set out as soon as they are loaded, escorted by a large detachment.

After their departure, the commandant should cause the hussars which pursued the enemy to return, and should leave one or two troops of them at the entrance of each of the quarters, who should face towards the enemy. They must continue in their post, till they receive orders to retire; they should each of them have a small guard in their front, and vedets advanced beyond them.

When the troops are re-assembled, the commandant should have them called over, and in case he finds more of his men are missing than he imagines to have been lost in the attack, he must detach as many bodies of infantry, each commanded by an officer, as there are villages, with orders to search them, and make those who are found in them re-join their respective bodies.

When the cause of their staying behind is enquired into, and found to be plunder that retarded them, they should be marked, and on their arrival at the camp, or the quarters, the soldiers belonging to the infantry

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try should be sent to the piquet, or the quarter-guard, and the troopers to the standard-guard; but if in quarters, both the one and the other ought to be sent to prison. In order to make them more exact in obeying orders for the future, and to prevent their quitting their posts for the sake of pillage, that part of it which falls to their share should be distributed among their comrades; by which means the guilty will be punished, and their example will be a lesson to the rest of the troops.

As soon as the whole detachment has joined, and the waggon with their escort are on their march, the commandant must cause the troops to march in that order which is most suitable to the nature of the country. If the country is woody, the infantry ought to form the rear-guard; if an open one, it should be formed by the cavalry, the hussars marching upon the flanks; if it is a country filled with thickets, some platoons of infantry should be intermixed with the cavalry, always presenting as large a front as possible. If, in short, it is a country promiscuously divided by woods, plains, small hills, hollows, and rivulets, the officer commanding the detachment, should use the infantry, or cavalry, according as the country varies; he should in some measure foresee what dispositions will be necessary, that his orders may be issued with propriety, and performed with expedition. As soon as the detachment begins to move forwards, notice should be sent to the troops of hussars that are on the opposite extremity of the quarters, in order that they may retire; they are to form the rear-guard of the whole, and will leave their small guard to form theirs. On this occasion, the commanding officer should not forget to detach small parties on the flanks to the right and the left to visit the villages, woods, and hollows, for fear the enemy on the news of the quarters having been forced, should have taken a shorter way, and have placed himself in ambush in the road through which the detachment must march on its return, and amply revenge the misfortune

that has happened to the quarters, by pouring from all sides upon the detachment, which must already be greatly fatigued.

In order to obviate this inconveniency, after the surprize of a quarter, the detachment should, if possible, retreat by a different road than that by which it marched to the attack. If the situation of the country is such that the detachment cannot do this without going too far about, it should not load itself with any thing that can encumber it on its march; and it is on this occasion particularly necessary to have sent off, under a good escort, the wounded, the forage, the baggage and the horses which are taken; so that the detachment, free from all embarrassment, may be able to defend itself, in case it should be attacked.

It is impossible that any place capable of containing ambuscades can be examined with too much exactness; in short, a detachment, retiring after any expedition, should avoid fighting as much as possible in its retreat, even though superior in strength to the enemy, and it should endeavour, after succeeding in one enterprize, to retire without hazarding a second, but particularly against fresh troops.

On the first intelligence of the enemy's having formed an ambuscade, the detachment must quit the road it is in, and fall into another, though it should go farther about. This change will not be immediately perceived by the troops which are in ambuscade; therefore the detachment, being so considerably advanced, cannot be overtaken, except by some hussars or dragoons, who may probably attack the rear-guard; in which case two or three forage waggons should be placed between the rear-guard and the detachment. This rear-guard should consist of infantry, and the troops of hussars, who will form the rear-guard of the whole. In case they should perceive the enemy, they must barricade the way with these waggons, and set them on fire, after taking off the horses, in order to retard the pursuit, and to give time to the detachments and the waggons which are

are in the front, to gain ground. This will certainly succeed, provided the road is narrow and the enemy can neither pass to the right or the left.

If the situation of the country renders all hopes of retarding the pursuit, by this method, groundless, the commandant should place all the forage and baggage-waggons which he has taken at the rear-guard, to accelerate the march; but not those in which the wounded are placed, and which ought to be taken very great care of. If the enemy advances, the horses should be taken off, and the waggons set on fire, that the enemy may not reap any advantage from them: if the enemy does not advance, these waggons will not be lost, but will join the detachment.

The commandant should never imagine himself free from danger, notwithstanding hussars only have been seen, and who can effect nothing against infantry supported by cavalry, as it is probable these hussars have advanced only with a view of amusing the detachment, and to detain it a sufficient time for the infantry in their rear to come up with, and attack the detachment with their whole strength; for which reason the detachment should always continue marching on, keeping back the enemy's hussars, and preserving the waggons till such time as the enemy's infantry appears. But if by the delay which the attack of the enemy's hussars may create, their infantry has time to come up, and the detachment cannot avoid fighting but by setting fire to the waggons, it should then be done; and, first of all, the horses should be taken off and sent into the front of the detachment. The troops being no longer encumbered by these waggons can march more leisurely, or, at least, they will no longer have any other object than their defence in view, without being obliged to think of that of the waggons: the hussars, too weak to resist the united strength of the enemy, will retire under the protection of the infantry. Should it be nothing but some hussars who come to attack the rear-guard, by covering the waggons with some companies of infantry,

try, they will be in security. If the enemy, whether hussars or infantry, cannot come up with the detachment, the hussars who make the rear-guard to the waggons will be sufficient to conduct them to the place appointed.

The commander should, as much as possible, endeavour to preserve the advantage he has gained over the enemy, whether by taking his forage or his baggage from him; but he had better abandon these two last than risque a second action: nevertheless, to prevent the enemy reaping any advantage from them, he should set them on fire, if reduced to that extremity, and he should always be careful to prevent their falling again into the enemy's hands; an advantage which would give him great cause of boasting, and which might be the consequence of a second action. From the desire of keeping every particular, the commanding officer would be in danger of losing not only the fruit of the attack, but perhaps his whole detachment.

CHAP. IV.

The Attack of a Quarter found under Arms, and the Retreat of the Troops who have not been able to force it.

HOWEVER well informed a general may be by his spies of the vigilance kept up by the enemy in his quarters for his security, it may happen that they may be deceived; consequently it is necessary, before the undertaking the attack of these quarters, that the commandant of the detachment should put himself in a condition to avoid being repulsed by the enemy, whom he may find under arms; which will be very difficult, or at least not to be effected without loss, unless all the precautions necessary on this occasion are taken.

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Suppose a quarter in the front, or upon the flank of those of the army, either to serve as vedets to the army, or to keep a communication with some place; but not at so great a distance from the quarters but it may, on giving timely notice, receive assistance, unless it should be surprised, (which is not to be supposed, because, whatever the position of it is, it should always be on its guard.) In this quarter there is supposed to be one battalion of foot and two squadrons of hussars.

The commandant of the quarter ought to be very quick in foreseeing what enterprizes the enemy can form against him; his posts should be well distributed, his quarter well entrenched, and his detachments in the front should give him timely notice if the enemy advances upon him; he should also have spies on whom he can depend, to inform him of all the enemy's motions, and of all the detachments, however small, which he sends out: with these lights, and by these precautions, he may hope to baffle the enterprizes of the enemy, and even compel him to retire with loss. This success can never be wanting to an officer, who, to the love of his duty and the desire of reputation, joins ability and vigilance.

It has been observed, that the place of arms for the infantry should be fixed in the market-place, that they may be able to march together to the front of the quarter, and possess themselves of the houses which have loop-holes cut in them; that there should also be trenches at every part leading to the quarter. If there is cavalry, the place of arms should be on the flank on the outside of the quarter, to be able to act as circumstances may require.

As soon as the commandant receives information that the enemy is marching towards him, or has reason to imagine he shall be attacked, he should immediately send notice to the nearest quarters, it being supposed that the troops in them are ordered by the general to march to his assistance.

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ance on the first notice, and himself to march to that of others. The order that every quarter should naturally have to assist each other should be general. Afterwards he should, without noise, put all his infantry under arms, and post it at the places which have been examined; he will cause the hussars to mount, and place them at the place of arms appointed. They should conceal themselves, if possible, behind the houses or hedges; the commandant should permit every one who chuses, to come into the quarter, but should not suffer any person to go out of it. If it is an enemy's country, the commandant should forbid the ringing of bells, the hanging out of signals on the steeple, the lighting of fires, or the giving any other indications, or any thing that can inform the enemy of what is transacting. A profound silence should be observed throughout the whole quarter, and every thing managed in such a manner that the quarter may, to all appearance, be in its usual tranquillity. In the mean time, the barriers at the trenches should be shut. The advanced detachment should remain till such time as the enemy appears: but as soon as they perceive him, they should immediately send notice of it, and make their retreat towards the quarter, at the same time keeping up a constant fire upon the enemy; they will afterwards place themselves on the flank of the hussars, who should by that time be at the place of arms.

When the quarter is attacked, the troops should keep their ground firmly, till the assistance which cannot fail coming to them is arrived; the certainty of which ought to increase their resolution, and determine them in their defence. As the enemy's detachment without doubt will not only be strong, but will also be composed of infantry, hussars, or dragoons, and perhaps of horse, the hussars belonging to the quarters not being strong enough to resist them, must either avail themselves of the fire of the infantry belonging to the quarter, or retire towards the neighbouring quarters to wait for and expedite the succours. The neighbour-
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ing quarters, on receiving the news of the attack, should immediately order all the cavalry, hussars, or dragoons, to mount, and who should also be followed by the infantry. As soon as all these troops are within a quarter of a league of the quarter that is attacked, they should divide into two bodies, one of which should be composed of infantry or cavalry, with half of the hussars belonging to the quarter; one should march to the right, and the other to the left, in order to take the enemy on the flanks.

The enemy, in danger of being attacked on his flanks, seeing assistance coming, and being considerably weakened, ought to retreat before the arrival of this reinforcement: but as he ought, before having attacked, to provide for his retreat, it is necessary for him to have placed an ambuscade in some wood, hollow, hedge, or behind some height, there being no country but what presents some one of these objects. This ambuscade should consist of infantry and hussars, and should be placed upon the road through which it is intended to retreat. These troops have two objects; that of facilitating the retreat, in case the detachment is briskly attacked and repulsed, and that of charging and beating the enemy, if he is so imprudent as to pursue too far and without precautions; by which means, at least, some troops will be beaten; an advantage that will, in some degree, make amends for not having been able to succeed in the taking of the quarter: but as these troops will be on their guard, and will not follow the detachment but to a certain distance, the detachment that retreats may, by the assistance of this ambuscade, effect it in quiet.

The troops which follow the retreating enemy, will, by pursuing too far, commit a great fault, more particularly so, as they will not be able to see the whole country before them; therefore they should stop as soon as they have reason to suspect any ambuscade, and stay a certain time, in order to be certain of the enemy's retreat; and should also detach some

parties of infantry and huffars, to be affured with greater certainty of the enemy's retreat; but these parties should march with great precaution to avoid being cut off.

CHAP. V.

Of the Attack of the Quarters of an Army.

A General to whom the campaign has proved unsuccessful, and who has not been able to drive the enemy out of his country, but, on the contrary, has seen him establish his quarters in that very country, should do his utmost to annoy him: he should endeavour, by means of continual detachments, to hinder him from establishing himself, and by frequent alarms force him to fatigue his troops.

It is undoubtedly true that the more the enemy is disturbed in his quarters, the less able he will be to take the field early; by reason of the fatigue he has endured during the whole winter, and, consequently, his infantry cannot be sufficiently recruited and exercised, because the troops have been continually in motion, and because of the losses they must have sustained in their many detachments. The enemy's cavalry being always in readiness to run to the assistance of the infantry cannot be reinstated, and will return to the field in as bad a condition as it left it. The general who attacks can with the more ease fatigue the enemy, as he is not under a necessity of employing a greater number of troops than he chuses; whereas the side that is attacked is necessarily obliged to make use of all their troops, or at least of a great part of them; particularly as the enemy's commander is ignorant of the number come to attack him, of the side on which the attack will be, and whether there is more than one attack intended.

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It often happens, that a small number of men are able to keep a whole chain of quarters in continual apprehension; and an experienced general, who finds himself shut up by the enemy, can, by employing only a small number of troops, repair, by his vigilance, the losses which he has sustained during the campaign, and prevent the enemy from enjoying that repose and tranquility with which they flattered themselves, during the time they were in winter-quarters: he may even deprive him of the fruit of his labour of the last campaign, and, by the bad condition of his troops, force him to abandon the country of which he was possessed.

For the attacking of quarters, almost the same precautions are necessary, as for the defence of them. The general should have a perfect knowledge of the country; he should know the parts which are weakest, and those by which he can, with the greatest ease, penetrate into the quarter. He should also attack the enemy two or three times lightly, and then retire under pretence of being too weak, or to induce the detachments sent out towards him to believe, that he himself is not come to molest the quarters; he should likewise remain some days quiet, without sending out any detachments, in order to induce the enemy to be negligent, and send spies into his quarters, under pretence of selling provisions or other things: these spies ought to be intelligent, and capable of giving an exact account of whatever they have seen or heard.

These spies ought to examine the situation of the quarters; the number of towns and villages occupied by the troops; the extent of ground they take up; the distance from right to left; if any river covers the quarters; whether the bridges are cut down, and if there are any fords which have not been destroyed; if the troops are strict in their duty; if they frequently send out detachments, their number and their strength; they

should follow them as much as possible, to observe their motions, and to be able to know to what distance they advance: in short, they should examine every thing so thoroughly, as to be able to give an exact account of the situation of the country, the quarters, and the precautions taken by the enemy for their security, both of the exterior and interior parts of them.

By the knowledge which the general ought to have of the country belonging to him, he will be able to form a good judgment from the report of his spies; and when the country does not belong to him, he should instruct himself from the maps, the peasants, and the principal inhabitants of the towns and villages in the neighbourhood of the quarters, whom he should by every method endeavour to gain over to his interest, and which will also enable him to judge of the fidelity of his spies. He should not, nevertheless, place his whole confidence in one, but send out many and at different times; and he should also, according to the maxim laid down by M. de Puyfégur, be particularly careful that they are unknown to each other: he should also question them often and separately.

When the general is thoroughly informed of every thing necessary, and hath taken all the precautions abovementioned, he should endeavour to discover the genius of the enemy's general; whether he is vigilant, active, or indolent; whether he is led away by pleasure, or is attentive to his business; esteemed by his troops, and whether they place confidence in him; if he is firm in himself, or too apt to be governed by the advice of others.

Never to ask advice is a sign of fool-hardiness and presumption; and it is equally weak and timid never to undertake any enterprize without the assistance of counsel, as it is prudent to accept it on proper occasions. The surest sign of an intelligent man is his having a modest opinion of his

his own understanding: nevertheless, it is by no ways commendable to be entirely governed by the opinions of others; such a man is fickle and unsteady, and is in danger of being often deceived, as he generally closes with the last advice given him. There are circumstances where the consequences of indetermination are fatal: such a moment is critical for an attack; an active enemy is also upon the point of making use of every opportunity that offers, in which case there must be immediate means taken for a proper defence; a retreat may in some cases become directly necessary; and if proper precaution is not taken, the enemy may get possession of some very advantageous post: on these occasions, therefore, the time that is consumed in collecting opinions, which generally differ, may be with greater success employed against the enemy.

It is nevertheless necessary to make a distinction between irresolution and diffidence; one is a dulness of the mind, a timidity of the soul, constantly engaged in objects which present nothing but obstacles, without having a proper strength of genius to surmount them; the other is the effect of a prudent mind and penetrating quickness, which knows the extent of its own lights, without over-stretching the limits of genius.

A general should be as assiduous in finding out persons capable of giving him good advice, as he should be desirous of executing his designs with propriety. Men of an engaging wit, and agreeable members of society, are not the most fitting persons for a general to have recourse to, in case of intricacy: he should rather endeavour to find out those whose judgment, naturally solid and improved by reflection, is founded upon principles whose goodness are proved by experience.

Whenever a general proposes to attack his enemy in his quarters, and is determined to it by his own knowledge of the country, as well as by the report of his spies, he should assemble his principal officers, or those whom he intends to charge with the conducting of the different attacks,
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and give them their instructions, with a particular recommendation of secrecy. The general should, according to the situation of the quarters, form three real and three false attacks, the last to be directed against the strongest, and the first against the weakest parts. As the center and the two extremities of the line on the right and left will undoubtedly be the most fortified and furnished with troops, the false attacks should therefore be made on those parts, in order to prevent the general who is attacked, taking any troops from thence to reinforce the weakest parts, where the real attacks are briskly carried on. The disposition for the attack should be in column; nevertheless every disposition should be guided by the nature of the ground and circumstances: these kind of attacks should be very expeditiously carried into execution, in order that the troops attacked may not have time to recollect themselves. The general should distribute separate bodies along the line, drawn from the troops forming the six attacks, to amuse and keep back the enemy, and by that means contribute to the success of the real attacks. In order also to induce the enemy to imagine that his flanks and center are attacked with great vivacity, the bodies intended to amuse him should have each of them two brigades of artillery, and also keep up a constant fire of cannon and small arms: the troops forming the real attacks should advance vigorously towards the line with bayonets fixed, and if possible break through it. If one of the real attacks can be so far successful as to break into the line, the troops belonging to the quarters will be very soon put into disorder; then the whole of the cavalry should be ordered to enter at that opening, in order to attack the quarters in the rear. If the cavalry should join the infantry that has forced its way into the quarter, the enemy will find himself between two fires; at which time the remainder of the troops will not find it difficult to gain entrance. What remains of the cavalry should

should be formed in order of battle, in order to oppose that belonging to the enemy, which may probably come to the assistance of the infantry that is beaten; but the assistance of cavalry can be but of little importance to infantry already routed, and flying from all parts. However brave cavalry may be, it should rather think of retreating than attacking troops which it sees victorious; and even should he maintain his ground, it ought to be more with a view of facilitating the retreat of the infantry, than of making an attack, as it would do in case it was victorious.

The only resource left for a general who is beat, is to collect the remains of his infantry, and retreat as soon as he can and in as good order as possible. A check of this sort ought not to stain the reputation of a general who has taken the necessary precautions to prevent it, and who in the course of the action hath shewn all the coolness and ability, that can be expected from a good officer. In most situations of life it is more difficult to support unexpected prosperity than to submit properly to adversity; but with regard to the profession of arms, it is different: adversity shews the greatness of that man, who, when surrounded by misfortunes, can preserve his wonted calmness, and exert, as usual, the strength and vivacity of his genius. Porus, when overcome and made a prisoner, gained the admiration of his conqueror, who could not forbear saying, instigated by the greatness of the example before him, "Were I not Alexander, I should wish to be Porus."

It is impossible to determine every disposition that can be made for the attacking of quarters, as they generally depend so much upon circumstances. A disposition that would be very proper for an open country would be very faulty in one that was woody. The method of making an attack may be given, but it is impossible to determine what the success of it may be: when the dispositions are properly taken, the success of them is decided by the vivacity with which they are carried into execution; the chief point

point consists in approaching so near the quarters as to attack them, before the troops in them have time to assemble and march to the general place of arms, or without giving time for the second or third lines to march to the assistance of the first which is attacked; and it is also necessary that the first and chief attempt, should be made before the junction of the first and second lines.

The success of any enterprize must of course remain doubtful, if any of these precautions are neglected; particularly if there is time given for the enemy to occupy every post; and for his second line of infantry to join his first; after which, if a general finds his troops repulsed in many brisk and repeated attacks, he should desist from sacrificing his troops to the caprice of fortune: firmness and perseverance are commendable as long as circumstances continue in any degree favourable; whereas obstinacy is not only a fault, but may be deservedly accounted a vice. An officer entrusted with the defence of a place of consequence should maintain it to the last extremity; but if through his obstinacy his garrison is reduced to rely on the mercy of the conqueror, he ought to be answerable for all the blood that has been wantonly spilt: it is neither by the effusion of blood, or excess of rage, that a general is to expect fortune to declare in his favour, when the impossibility of success is visible to him. He who owes his victory to the slaughter of his soldiers is in some degree unworthy of the name of conqueror. He, on the contrary, who is sparing of the blood of his soldiers, is loved by his own people, respected and revered by his enemy, esteemed by his sovereign, who entrusts his soldiers to him with confidence, in the thorough persuasion that he will not expose them but when it is absolutely necessary. During the troubles of the first triumvirate, Cæsar having shut up Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's generals in Spain, was more desirous of obliging them to surrender, by cutting off their provisions and subsistence, than by giving them battle, the advantage

vantage of which would, in all probability, have turned entirely on his side. The great art of a good soldier is to preserve, by his prudence and ability, any advantage he may have gained over his enemy. Whenever a general proceeds to violence, and exposes his troops without gaining any essential point over his enemy, he only drives them to despair, and the general who attacks, although superior in numbers, is often the sufferer, as was the case at the battle of Poitiers in 1356, and that of Pavia in 1525, where France had reason to hope for advantages as considerable as her losses were bloody. So far it is true, that, instead of despising his enemy, a general should always suppose him to be feared, notwithstanding his situation may be seemingly embarrassing.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Retreat of an Army after an unsuccessful Attack upon the Enemy's Quarters.

IF the attack of an army in its quarters demands infinite precautions, and that dispositions should be provided for it beforehand, the retreat after the enterprize hath failed, requires not less knowledge and conduct; the most consummate prudence is necessary to both, and the exactest forecast in the general, and the officers acting under him. If attacking the whole quarters of an army is difficult, it is more so to retire before an army that could not be forced, but which also pursues with vivacity, in order to make the most of its victory: it is therefore necessary that every thing should have been provided for and considered, before the attack is carried into execution. In these circumstances it is to be supposed, that a general who would attack an army in its quarters,

has previously taken his measures in case of success, as well as the proper precautions if obliged to retreat; and that the general who is attacked, has, on his side, been equally careful to prevent his being forced; except that he cannot have fixed on his dispositions for the pursuit of the enemy in his retreat, as they must depend upon the circumstances which attend that event, and of which he can only form imperfect conjectures, as he will not be certain of any movement the enemy will make either in the attack or the retreat: thus two generals may have very clear notions from rules what ought to be done, which they will find to be very different from practice.

It shall now be supposed, that an army hath attacked another in its quarters, without having been able to force it after many vigorous and repeated attacks.

After the general hath attempted and done every thing that can be expected from an experienced soldier, and sees the impossibility of succeeding, either owing to the good disposition of the army which he is to attack, or to his own troops being discouraged by their frequent repulses, he has no other resource left but to retreat.

The disposition for the retreat of a body of troops, forced to retire from before the enemy, and which has been mentioned elsewhere, may serve for an army reduced to the same situation, with this difference, that as more ground is necessary, a more extensive knowledge is required in the general.

Before a general begins his retreat, he should send notice by his brigade majors, and his aids de camp, to all the general officers, who should have been acquainted with the dispositions resolved on, in case of a retreat becoming necessary. Three cannon, one of which should be fired on the right, another upon the left, and the other upon the center, should be the signal for the troops to collect themselves, and form in columns, in order to effect their retreat.

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If the country is an open one, the general should cause his troops to march in six columns, and encrease the number of them in proportion as the country grows more open. The front which these columns present, should be equal to that of half a battalion, with the grenadiers upon one flank, and the piquets upon another: a brigade of artillery should be distributed among the intervals of each column, and keep up a constant fire. After firing, the cannon should be loaded again, and retreat in such a manner, as always to preserve the intervals of the columns: if it does not retire at the same time with the columns, it will be in great danger of being taken; each column should also keep up a constant fire by platoons, or any other method, provided it is continual.

The columns should constantly march on, although slowly, otherwise it will be impossible to preserve order and regularity: the cannon should retire with the columns, always preserving the same disposition. The cavalry upon the wings of the infantry should be formed in the best order the ground will admit of. As the country through which this army retreats, is supposed to be an open one, the cavalry should be formed in two lines, and retire at the same time with the columns: the first line should pass through the intervals of the second, and take post two hundred paces in the rear of it; the light horse and dragoons upon the flanks of the first line, should keep their posts and not retire, till the first line has passed through the intervals of the second. The second line should perform the same evolution as the first, as also the light horse and dragoons upon its flanks: the distance of the columns of infantry from each other, should not exceed two hundred paces; by means of which they will be more collected, they will take up less ground, and can more readily assist each other.

It is necessary to observe, that the flanks should be covered by light horse and dragoons, and that light infantry should also be employed for that

purpose: on such occasions, it should take possession of the woods, hollows, or any places of the like nature, which may happen to be upon the flanks of the army, in order to prevent the enemy's gaining any advantage there. This light infantry should retire at the same time with the light horse and dragoons. See the TWENTY-FIFTH PLATE, FIG. I.

If the country grows narrow, the six columns should be reduced to three, and instead of one brigade of artillery, each column should be allowed two, if the ground will admit of it; an evolution that may easily be performed whilst the columns halt, and, together with the cannon, keep up a constant fire upon the enemy: the three others should march leisurely, and in order; and as soon as the rear-guard shall have gained the head of those who have halted, it must join them, and all together begin to march. It is necessary to observe, that whenever the columns are doubled, the grenadiers and piquets covering the flanks of each column should be strong in proportion: neither should the enemy be supposed more formidable at this time than before, because, as the country grows narrow, he will not be able to present a larger front than that which is opposed to him. The cavalry should also approach the columns, and form in three or four lines, according to the nature of the ground; always taking care to preserve their proper distances and intervals: the light horse and dragoons may remain in their original places, performing the same evolutions just mentioned, as the cavalry and the light troops. See the same PLATE, FIG. II.

If a defile is to be passed, a part, but not the whole, of the cavalry should be immediately ordered to pass it, as it is necessary to keep some cavalry to support the infantry. When part of the infantry has passed, the remainder of the cavalry should follow them; after which the light horse and dragoons should remain, and will also be sufficient to guard and protect the infantry that has not yet passed.

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As soon as the cavalry which the general judges proper to order to begin the retreat, shall be passed, the center column should retire; and in proportion as that advances into the defile, the two other columns should approach each other: the center column, which passes first, should leave the cannon belonging to it, at the entrance of the defile, planted on the right and left of it, and guarded by grenadiers. When these batteries are placed, the remainder of the cavalry should pass; after them the column upon the right, with the cannon belonging to it; which, keeping up a constant fire, will facilitate the passage of the dragoons, who will march leisurely, under cover of the cannon which is planted at the entrance of the defile, together with its own fire, and the light horse, which are always upon the flanks. When they have all most passed, the cannon following the column should be drawn off, and the light horse should approach the defile, protected by the cannon and the light infantry posted first, as well as the grenadiers who guard the cannon at the entrance of the defile, and will pass also protected by them: when the whole hath passed, the cannon should be drawn off, the grenadiers and the light infantry forming the rear-guard of it. It is probable that the enemy, seeing the army on the other side of the defile, will quit the pursuit, and retire to his own quarters. When the whole army has gained the other side of the defile, it should be supposed in safety, and should also remain there till the enemy retires; and, when he is in full march, the army should detach some light horse sustained by dragoons, not to attack him, but to be assured of his retreat: when that is ascertained, the troops which were detached should return, and the army proceed on its march to its camp or quarters.

It is necessary that the bodies of infantry which pass first, should take possession of the heights, as hath been already mentioned in the fourteenth chapter of the first Book, in order to cover the troops which are retreating. See the TWENTY-FIFTH PLATE, FIG. III.

If the road thro' which the army marches to the attack of the quarters, is crossed by a river, the general must consequently have been obliged to erect bridges for his army to pass over it; and it is also to be supposed that he has left proper detachments to guard them, in order to secure his retreat, and that he hath caused the ends of the bridges which are next the enemy to be entrenched, according to the method laid down in the third Article of the tenth chapter of the second Book, and hath established batteries upon the flanks of the bridges on the opposite side of the river: precautions which should always be taken; for if the general does not succeed in the attack, he will be greatly annoyed in his retreat by the enemy. When the head of the army is within a short half-league of the bridges, part of the cavalry should be ordered to pass them, and take post four hundred paces distant on the opposite side of the river; after which a third part of the infantry should pass, and take post upon the bank of the river on the right and left of the bridges, in order to keep the enemy off by their fire, and to protect the flanks of the retiring troops: the remainder of the cavalry should retire when that third of the infantry hath retreated. Then the light horse and dragoons will occupy the posts which the cavalry were in, to cover the last third of the infantry as it retires, being careful not to cover the batteries which are on the other side of the bridges. As soon as the whole of the infantry has passed, the dragoons and hussars should draw near the bridges; the former will pass under the protection of the cannon and infantry which line the bank of the river, and the light horse which cover them; the light horse should pass the last, their rear-guard being always formed by light infantry: the grenadiers who were in the redans, must retire when the whole army has passed.

It is necessary to observe that, in order to encrease the defence, each column of infantry that has passed the bridges should distribute its can-

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non along the side of the river, and cause it to maintain a continual fire. As soon as the whole army has gained the other side of the river, the general should cause the bridges to be destroyed, except one, which should be left in a condition to be re-established, in order that, when the enemy retires, some troops may be sent over, to watch him in his retreat, following exactly what has been laid down for the passing of a defile: the bridges just now mentioned should be composed of copper pontons that they may with greater ease be conveyed from place to place. While the enemy remains within cannon shot, he should be fired on incessantly: it is nevertheless natural to suppose, that, when the army hath passed, he will be more inclined to recover the fatigue it hath already undergone, and retire towards its quarters. See the TWENTY-FIFTH PLATE, FIG. IV.

If the army is obliged to march through a woody country, the cavalry should march at the head of the columns of infantry, in which disposition the prince of Orange retreated after the loss of the battle of Steenkirk. As that retreat was made over a rough and uneven country, his cavalry could not be of any service to him; he therefore caused it to retire first, followed by his infantry in such good order, that M. Luxembourg could not find an opportunity of attacking him.

The light horse and dragoons only should be left to cover the flanks of the columns, taking care to observe the same disposition, and method of marching, spoken of above, if the country will allow of it: it depends upon the general's prudence and ability to suit his dispositions properly to the ground. The reason why the cavalry is sent off first is, that it will not be able to act, at least not without great difficulty, in this kind of country; and as that belonging to the enemy will be circumstanced in the same manner, this body, instead of being useful, will but embarrass the rest of the troops.

If the country is mountainous, the situation is less dangerous, because the enemy will not be able to present a larger front than that which is opposed to him, and the army marching through many roads, all leading to the place from whence it set out, the enemy will also be obliged to separate; and as the army will have no reason to apprehend being either surrounded or taken in flank, as it has undoubtedly caused the heights to be occupied, the infantry will have no other object than the enemy pressing upon its rear-guard, which should retire slowly and in order, keeping up a constant fire upon the enemy, if he approaches too near: and if the country will admit of the use of cannon, the general should avail himself of that help, which will certainly do great execution among the enemy who, from the situation of the country, will be unable to make an attack or continue the pursuit but in column. The cavalry, light horse, and dragoons become entirely useless, unless the last are caused to dismount: the cavalry and light horse should also march at the head, which will prevent that belonging to the enemy, also incapable of acting, from getting beforehand into the avenues and hollow ways, and who, by this means, will also be in danger of being attacked by the infantry in ambuscade. It would be a sign of great rashness in an enemy to continue the pursuit among mountains, and would be a much greater proof of a general's courage, than his prudence; and a man placed at the head of an army should have acquired sufficient experience not to commit a fault, which, far from justifying by his conduct his sovereign's choice of him, shews but a feeble genius, unequal to the task of commanding.

Whatever may be the nature of the country, if the general who retreats finds an advantageous spot, where he can make use of his whole force, with his flanks supported by a morass, an hollow, or something of the like nature, he may very safely make a stand and give the enemy battle, particularly if, from the nature of his own post, that which the enemy will
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be obliged to take is disadvantageous : it is on these occasions that the genius of an officer shews itself, either by making a fine retreat, or by immediately taking a post so advantageous, which in securing the army, exposes the enemy to great danger if he offers to attack.

As there is no day in which a general may not find some opportunity of unfolding his genius and shewing his talents, there is also no time in which he may not be liable to commit mistakes ; which, however trifling they may be in appearance, must, notwithstanding, give the enemy some particular advantage.

The smallest faults become essential in war ; and the enemy will, either early or late, find an opportunity of profiting and deciding the fate of a campaign by one mistake, which at first seemed of no consequence, but which, in reality, becomes entirely productive of his whole success.

It is impossible to give any other than general rules for a retreat, as the dispositions must be entirely regulated by the nature of the ground, and circumstances ; but it is necessary to observe, that over whatever kind of ground a retreat is made, it should always be performed slowly and with order. Hurry gives birth to confusion, and often spreads the panic amongst the troops, which generally produces a defeat when it ought to be least expected.

A PRINCIPLE

On which the Plan of a Campaign may be established.

IT is to be feared, that whilst a man confines himself to publishing his own thoughts only, however just they may be, they will prove less instructive than when, by adopting the ideas of others, he hath the art of extending, and also in finding in them a source of solid reflections. Men of succeeding ages have generally followed the thoughts of those of the preceding; it is therefore impossible for any one to write with propriety upon a subject, unless he hath first diligently studied and consulted those authors, who have already treated of the same, and whose reflections result from experience.

The principle upon which the plan of a campaign may be established, and which is now going to be given, is not my own, but was communicated to me by an experienced officer. He particularised all the different branches of it to me, and convinced me of the usefulness of his design, and the advantages which many great officers have drawn from it; who, without having formed any particular system, have been guided by the principles on which he has established his method, and from which they have scarcely ever deviated: he has, by this means, in a manner rendered the conducting of a campaign, not only methodical, but the event of it almost certain.

This officer, whose modesty forbids me to name him, communicated this idea to me which I have adopted, but claim no other merit in it than having, in some measure, given more scope to his reflections. He has indulged me with the satisfaction of imparting this method to my countrymen, but the honour accruing from it is entirely his; but if it is productive

ductive of the fruit it seems to promise, I shall not esteem myself less happy, than if the thought had been originally mine.

War could not be termed a science, were it not founded upon invariable principles; nevertheless, it would be rashness to affirm them to be absolutely fixed, or to pretend to conduct their operations to such a certain point, as to assure their success, without indulging notions too chimerical. Why could there not be some general method established, which, being accommodated to the circumstances of time and place, would render the event of the operations more certain, and their success less dubious? Art is now brought to that perfection, that there is almost a certainty of carrying a place when the siege of it is properly formed; why therefore, with regard to the conducting of a campaign, cannot there be certain methods resolved on beforehand, for making the operations conducive to the end proposed, and from whence new ones may also be derived, if necessary? A general who proposes succeeding by such a method, will find prudence more necessary than bravery, and genius with an extensive foresight, more requisite than intrepidity.

Those officers, therefore, who study, and are also desirous of excelling in the art of war, should consider the principles on which an army moves, in a more extensive light than those which direct the evolutions of a detachment; nevertheless, this consideration is too much neglected by those who have not been accustomed to command large bodies.

If some men confine their genius within bounds too narrow, when they are capable of exercising it in a more noble and extensive field, there are also others, who, falling into the contrary extreme, are too apt to be hurried on by their own opinions, and embark in every enterprize without previously considering the consequences; and who, from a natural impetuosity, make an army move as if it were nothing more than a detachment of light troops.

War is a profession wherein much reflection is required ; there is no science, as hath been often repeated, more replete with principles, but the application of them must always be relative to the nature of the ground and the position of the enemy.

By one unexpected movement of the enemy, the deepest-laid plans, and best concerted measures, may be destroyed. If, in order to make conquests, advancing was the only thing necessary, the general who was most daring would gain the greatest reputation, and every officer commanding an army would act after that manner ; but it is not sufficient only to advance, the reason for doing it should be well considered, and the proper measures taken for retreating in safety.

A general conducting a siege does not at once proceed to the body of the place, and leave the outworks untouched, but begins by destroying them with artillery, and afterwards attacking them ; in which, if he is successful, he makes a lodgment, from whence he forms an attack upon some other work, and so advances by degrees up to the body of the place. If, after having made a lodgment upon that part of the covered way which contains the front of the attack, the general neglects the two ravelins covering the curtains, and only makes a breach in the bastion of the body of the place, he certainly can never take it ; because those outworks, whose communication with the body of the place cannot be cut off, remaining entire, and being also well furnished with men and artillery, will undoubtedly prevent the besiegers from pushing on their advances to the body of the place.

An army in the field will be in the situation here described, if it always advances, leaving in its rear fortified towns, forts, or even intrenched posts belonging to the enemy. If it should meet with a check, or be obliged to retire, it would find great difficulty in retreating, without being annoyed and attacked on all sides by those posts, the attacking and taking of which
had

had been neglected. The battle of Spire, gained in 1706, by M. Tallard, is an example which proves how highly imprudent it is for a general to leave any post in a state of defence behind him. The enemy crossed the Rhine at Spire, in order to succour Landau, then besieged by M. Tallard; that general left a sufficient number of troops in the trenches, and marched out of his lines to meet the enemy. The enemy, in marching up to the French army, neglected two posts which were in two towers, concluding they would of course surrender after M. Tallard was beaten: the enemy however was beat, and in his retreat, the troops in these posts destroyed a greater number of his men than he had lost in the battle.

The wars of Italy under Charles VIII. under Louis XII. and Francis I. sufficiently prove the danger of incursions and sudden invasions in distant countries, which may not only occasion the ruin of the army, but of the state also. The necessity of establishing general and probable principles for the prevention of such mistakes for the future, and from whence also combinations for every particular operation of a campaign may be produced, becomes evident.

In order to establish a principle of this nature, it is necessary to suppose that the officer who is to carry it into execution, is thoroughly experienced in every thing relative to the science of war. The first thing a general should do, is to examine the map of the country through which his army is to march; he should use the same precautions generally practised to gain the knowledge of the ground round a place that is to be attacked, and over which the trenches are to be directed. The operations for carrying on war offensively may be compared with those of a siege; the town which is attacked being the point to be gained, the tail† of the

† DEPOT. The word *Dépôt* in the military phrase, is a particular place at the tail of the trenches, out of the reach of the cannon of the place, where the troops generally assemble, who are ordered either to attack the outworks, or support the troops in the trenches, when there is reason to imagine the besieged intend making a vigorous sally: it serves also as a magazine for fascines, gabions, and every thing necessary for the carrying on of a siege.

trenches being the center from whence the different branches issue, which give assistance to the parallels.

When a general would advance methodically and safely towards a place, the right and left of the parallel should be sustained, and the communication between the parallel and the tail of the trenches should be kept always open and unembarrassed. It is an established rule, that a general should never think of forming a second or a third parallel, to advance nearer the body of the place, till the first is entirely perfected and established, and the magazines of the trenches placed within reach of the zigzags, which are pushed on to form the second and third parallel, the means of arriving at the body of the place, are well secured. These magazines are intended for supplying the troops more speedily with whatever is necessary for carrying on the attack of the works. If they have not a free communication with the tail of the trenches, they will be very soon exhausted and unable to supply the heads of the advanced parallels; and if these parallels are not properly provided, the siege will be retarded, and the intended attacks come to nothing.

If the batteries which are erected to destroy the defences of the place, do not take in the whole front of the works; if there is not a strict communication kept up between them and the tail of the trenches; if they are not supported and protected by the parallels, or not well served; they will never be able to silence the fire of the enemy, and will also be in danger of being taken, occasioned by the difficulty the troops will find in coming to their assistance.

The reason for advancing these different principles, which, in reality, are the rudiments for conducting the operations of a siege, is to mark their analogy with those of a campaign. The province, or country to be conquered, hath always some principal point, which it must be the general's
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endeavour to arrive at : therefore, when a general is advancing into a country, why may not he form a first parallel and a general magazine for subsistence, in the same manner as that at the tail of the trenches ? The communications with the general magazine of subsistence should be kept open, and supported on the right and the left of the first parallel that is established in the enemy's country. In order to form this parallel, the general should have the right or left of it towards some advantageous post, which he should take possession of; and before he thinks of advancing farther, this parallel should be strongly supported by taking possession of the rivers and towns in the direction of it. It should also be observed as a rule never to begin the second parallel till the first is completely established, and the communications between the general magazines and the rivers and towns perfectly secured.

The same rule should be observed in advancing from a first to a second, and from a second to a third parallel.

As magazines of the trenches within reach of the zigzags, are necessary for carrying on the operations of a siege, in the same manner, also, intermediate magazines of provision and ammunition should be formed in the first parallel established in the enemy's country; by which means every thing necessary will be conveyed with ease from the general magazine to every part of the parallel.

The success of a campaign whose plan is formed upon this maxim, seems to be almost certain; and if by any unforeseen events, the general's expectations should not be fully answered, he need not be apprehensive of any bad consequences, as he will always remain in possession of that part of the country, where the first parallel is established. Even if the whole season has been employed in establishing the first parallel, it should not be looked upon as time thrown away, as it will be the means of securing the winter-quarters, and facilitating the execution of the measures concerted for the ensuing campaign.

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In conducting of a siege, parallels are sometimes pushed on at hazard; as, for instance, when the officer commanding in the place does not present obstacles worth attending to. In like manner, in carrying on an offensive war, some unexpected successes may present favourable opportunities of establishing two or even three parallels in the course of the same campaign: nevertheless, a prudent general will never suffer himself to be so much elated by a fortunate beginning, as to lose sight of his principal object; and his principal care will always be to have the parallels he has established in the enemy's country, secured after such a manner, as to render the communication between them and his winter-quarters perfectly free and open, as well as that the communication between them and the general magazine shall remain intirely free and uninterrupted. This general magazine will serve to establish the several intermediate ones necessary for pushing on another parallel the following campaign.

A general should do every thing in his power to keep the enemy at a distance from his sovereign's territories, and should contrive to render the burthen of war as light as possible, by establishing his winter-quarters in the conquered countries, and there raising contributions of money or provisions, whether meal, forage, or whatever else is necessary to support the army. If the general, during the course of the campaign, has established a parallel, he should form the first line of his quarters there; and if he has been able to establish a second, the disposition of his quarters will be still better, as the troops in them can more readily assemble and assist each other.

The detachments which are sent out during a campaign, may be compared to the batteries which are erected in the course of a siege: this comparison will still appear more just, if followed through every part.

In effect, the intention of erecting batteries at the extremities of the parallel, being to fire diagonally into the works of the place, so the design of sending out detachments is to take such positions, as will prevent the enemy

enemy receiving subsistence, and interrupt the communication between him, and his magazines.

The batteries in a siege should find their effect, by keeping up a fire superior to that of the place. The view of a detachment should be to keep back the enemy and harass him, to protect the forage, and extend contributions over a province. When a battery is well served, the soldier is always animated; and when detachments return successful, it raises the general's credit with the army. The batteries of the trenches have yet another object, which is to cover the attack of a work, and to assist in pushing on the branches, which are to establish the third parallel upon the covered way. In the same manner, large detachments are designed to advance, and take possession of the right or left of a country, to cover the body of the army by which it is followed, in order to establish the intended parallel.

As a battery whose platform is placed too far before the parallel, may easily be taken; in the same manner a detachment too far advanced before the army, instead of answering the end intended, is exposed to the danger of receiving a check, by which the whole operations of a campaign are often retarded.

There is sometimes a necessity for abandoning a battery, when established in too slight a manner, and without a communication with the magazines of the trenches; a detached body, also, whose communication is not kept up, is obliged to retire; and by the same reason, that in a siege, batteries should never be pushed on, which, in the end, may become useless, also, every general commanding an army, should lay it down as a rule, never to hazard large bodies in front, unless he is certain they will not be forced to return. It is more pardonable in a general to neglect seizing a post, than to take possession of ground that he is forced to abandon.

It is easy to perceive, by following all the parts of this parallel, which are but lightly touched on here, the affinity there is between the management of a siege, and the conducting of a campaign; and from whence may be inferred both the ease and advantage of preserving in detachments nearly the same rules and proportions as are fixed on for batteries.

From what has been said upon this subject, it seems probable that the principles which serve for conducting of a siege, may become rules for forming the plan of one or many campaigns. This rule is not calculated only for offensive, but may also be practiced successfully in defensive war, by acting in an opposite manner to the instructions here given.

An officer defending a besieged town can in effect have no other end in view, than to retard the establishing of the enemy's parallels and batteries.

The object of the general defending a country, should be to calculate the distances in such a manner, as to get possession of those places, where the enemy who attacks him would establish his magazines; the retarding of which ought to be the intention of the detachments sent out by a general who is on the defensive. When war is carried on defensively, the enemy is supposed to have the superiority of numbers, and also that the general acting defensively should always avoid coming to action: nevertheless, in every position he takes, he should do his utmost to destroy the communication between the enemy and his subsistence, as well as to prevent his advancing, and establishing of parallels. A general who, acting on the defensive, hinders the enemy from establishing a second parallel, oftentimes gains more advantage than if he had won a victory.

In short, whether in offensive or defensive war, it would be impossible to particularize every resemblance subsisting between the method of directing a siege, and that of conducting the operations of a campaign. The
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more any person reflects upon the histories of great soldiers, as well as the different actions in which they have been conspicuous, the more he will be confirmed of the truth of the maxim which hath here been attempted to be explained. There are some, who without intentionally forming this rule, have always acted according to it, and others who have seemed to consider it as their duty to keep up to it: M. Saxe, also, seems never to have lost sight of it in all his military operations.

In all the different events with which both ancient and modern history furnishes us, it may be remarked, that the defeat of an army, and the loss of an extent of country, after an unfortunate defeat, are generally owing to the neglect of generals in securing to themselves the places from whence they set out, or causing the posts necessary for retreating through to be secured. There are but few examples where the losses of battles have not been in some measure owing to one or another of the above-mentioned neglects. It hath been sufficiently proved, that if much advantage is not gained, there can at least no ill consequences attend the pursuing of this method, which is here proposed for the advantage of those who may hereafter have an opportunity of carrying it into execution.

The END of the FOURTH BOOK.

ART OF WAR

AN ESSAY

ON THE ART OF WAR

BOOK THE FIFTH

CHAPTER I

The Necessity of having Hussars and Light Troops

EXPERIENCE has shown, during the last wars, how useful Hussars and light troops are to an army. Foreign powers have been so well convinced of the necessity of them, that the horse or Austrian, which at the beginning of the year 1777, had not at most three or four regiments of hussars, maintained in the last war twelve regiments, each consisting of twelve hundred men. France, which in the beginning of that campaign, had no more than two regiments, very soon found it necessary to form a third, and also raised a fourth, in the beginning of the last war, exclusive of four or five other regiments of light troops, both horse and foot. The king of Prussia hath formed eight regiments of a thousand men each. The emperor Charles of Bavaria two, the

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CHAP. I.

The Necessity of having Hussars and Light Troops.

EXPERIENCE has shown, during the last wars, how useful hussars and light troops are to an army. Foreign powers have been so well convinced of the necessity of them, that the house of Austria, which at the beginning of the year 1733, had not at most three or four regiments of hussars, maintained in the last war twelve regiments, each consisting of twelve hundred men. France, which in the beginning of that campaign, had no more than two regiments, very soon found it necessary to form a third, and also raised a fourth, in the beginning of the last war, exclusive of four or five other regiments of light troops, both horse and foot. The king of Prussia hath formed eight regiments, of a thousand men each. The emperor Charles of Bavaria two, the

the Dutch one, besides some regiments of light troops and free companies: and the cavalry of Spain, so famed for speed and activity, was thought deficient without light horse, a regiment of which was accordingly raised, and not reduced till the peace in 1748.

It hath been to these troops, that the most warlike people have often been indebted for success; they rush into the midst of the enemy, and are in a manner sheltered from danger by their lightness and dexterity, while they serve to protect the army to which they belong; they discover the enemy's motions, render his ambuscades useless, and also form ambuscades themselves. M. de * Montesquieu observes, that the Romans, in the time of the second Punic war, would have been greatly distressed, had it not been for some entire bodies of Numidian cavalry, which came over to their aid, both in Sicily and Italy.

The first light troops mentioned in history were those formed by the Numidians. This warlike people, according to † Sallust, were formed, as well as the other nations of Africa, from the remains of the army of Hercules, composed of different nations, which separated after the death of that hero. The Persians, who united themselves with the Getuli, went roving about on all sides for settlements, and to discover a country where they might fix themselves; by force of arms they overcame all who opposed them, and at length established their colonies in the countries adjacent to Carthage.

They rendered themselves formidable to their enemies by their stratagems, and their method of fighting. The Romans themselves often proved what bravery could effect, in conjunction with address and agility; they therefore sought the alliance of this people. Syphax, king of one part of Numidia, prevailed upon his countrymen, serving in the Carthaginian army to go over to the Romans; and the Numidians, conducted

* Causes de la Grandeur, & de la Decad. des L'Emp. R.

† De Bell. Jug.

by

by Syphax, on their arrival in Spain, gained a battle over the Carthaginians: and unless the citizens of Carthage had prevailed upon Massinissa, king of the Massilians, who inhabited another part of Numidia, to oppose Syphax, that republic would not, in all probability, have been able to have made head so long against the fortune of the Romans; and even when Cælius and Massinissa, formerly in alliance with Rome, fought against Syphax, it is very apparent that that Numidian king could not have been overcome unless by a prince of his own nation. The Roman history furnishes many examples, which prove the address of these people, and at the same time evince the necessity of light troops, with regard to the present times. Minutius, in the war against the Gauls and the Ligurians, being entangled in a defile, was extricated by the address of eight hundred Numidians, who, according to Titus Livius, mounted their horses, and pretended to march without either order or resolution; they were in appearance lean and ill-favoured, which joined to horses, who seemed rather to crawl than obey their riders, gave no sort of mistrust to the Ligurians, who laying their arms by, beheld these troopers, with derision, capering and flying before them: the Numidians, taking advantage of their inactivity, at once returned, and crossing the Ligurian camp, laid the neighbouring country waste with fire and sword. The cries of the perishing inhabitants, together with those of the old men who had escaped, and who went to implore the help of the Ligurians, drew the soldiers towards the villages which were in flames, the camp of course became abandoned, and the defile in which Minutius was enclosed, being but ill guarded, that general was contrary to all expectation, delivered and enabled to continue his march.

The Numidians were not the only people accustomed to this method of war: the Parthians, originally sprung from the Scythians, fought much after the same manner, their cavalry were admirable, and rather besieged an army than fought it. The javelin, bow and arrow were
their

their only weapons : it was in vain to pursue them, as they had a manner peculiar to themselves, of directing their darts still better in flight than when standing still. The Romans have to their cost, frequently proved their agility and address.

The Heruli, another nation of Scythia, observed the same kind of discipline.

The Huns, who according to many authors, were also descended from the Parthians, were admirable archers; in the many incursions and invasions which those barbarians made all over Europe, they proved more destructive than any regular troops whatever.

It is probable that the Hungarians, who according to many opinions, are the same people with the Huns, still retained the manner of fighting, practised by their ancestors, till they came, under the command of Attila, to settle themselves in Italy. In effect, the best light troops of the present times are those formed by the Hungarians; the services they performed in the last wars, are yet fresh in most memories, and it is on their plan, that princes formed other light troops; which at first were only useful, but are now become absolutely necessary.

A general cannot make use of too many methods for receiving intelligence, or send out more detachments than are necessary, to examine the ground, and discover places capable of containing ambuscades; both which duties would too fatiguing for either infantry or cavalry : parties of light horse, therefore, should be employed upon these services, which are familiar to them, and to which they have been for a long time accustomed; their horses also inured to fatigue, and not to be disheartened, will save the other part of the army many painful and fatiguing labours. Having shewn how necessary light horse are to an army, it will be proper to mention the occasions where they become useful, and after what manner they should be employed.

CHAP. II.

Of the Service, in which a General should employ Light Horse during a Campaign.

THE necessity for light troops being once established, it is necessary to determine after what manner they may be employed to advantage. It hath been already seen, in many parts of this work, how useful these troops are for scouring outlets, forming advanced detachments, clearing of marches, covering the foraging parties, and on almost every other occasion.

The duty of light horse is directly what may be termed skirmishing; because they should be continually scouring about in detachments, and should always be so near the enemy, as to observe his motions, and prevent his attacking the army unawares, or turning it, in order to fall upon the convoys: they should be always in the front of the chain, on foraging days, to secure it from insult, and to enable the troops to carry off the forage unmolested; they should also be always near the enemy's army, that he may not detach any troops, but what their general shall receive intelligence of; they should also expeditiously and exactly report to him whatever new motions they perceive among the enemy, to prevent any designs being formed against the army, or at least to render them abortive. Such is the duty of light horse, and with which the officer to whom they are entrusted, should be thoroughly acquainted. Thus, if they form a large body, they will be posted in greater or lesser parties, in the front or upon the flank, according to circumstances, in proportion as the enemy is near, or at a distance, or as the body of light horse is more or less considerable.

Altho' it is necessary that these detachments should be continually in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp they should not be very numerous, because the stronger they are, the more liable they are to be discovered; but they should be sustained by detachments stronger than themselves, who should remain about half a league in their rear, sometimes more, or sometimes less, according to the knowledge they have acquired of the country. The detachments to sustain those which are in the front should conceal themselves in an ambuscade, which should be known only to the officer commanding in the front, that he may retire to it in case he is attacked and pushed.

The general commanding this advanced body of light horse should, if possible, receive daily information from the detachments in front of what they have seen and done; which, if any way consequential, he should communicate to the commander in chief of the army.

The escorts belonging to convoys should never be suffered to march without light horse; for, as has been already observed, these escorts should always have parties both in front and flank, to examine the country, scour the woods, villages, hollows, and every place capable of concealing troops. Although these troops are indisputably more calculated for this patrolling duty than cavalry, they can also retreat with more readiness, and are consequently a speedier means of conveying intelligence.

Convoys and chains of forage are, for the generality, attacked by light horse, strongly supported by cavalry or dragoons, and sometimes infantry; but it is the light horse who always begin the attack, and clear the way for the other troops to fall on with advantage; and they are furnished with infantry only to support them and facilitate their retreat, unless there are some villages which must be attacked.

As cavalry cannot act with the same agility, and should also remain always together, it would be improper to entrust them unassisted by other troops, with carrying these operations into execution. The dragoons, according

According to their first institution, could perfectly acquit themselves of this kind of business; but since they have been able, when mounted, to beat horse, and, also on foot to force grenadiers in their intrenchments, they have chiefly applied themselves to those two methods of fighting, and have left to the light troops, that for which they were originally instituted.

It is the same with regard to defence as attack; the ground taken up by a convoy, being often of great extent, and the advanced-guard, being unable to resist the impression of the enemy's light horse, may be beat before the bodies of cavalry belonging to the center and rear-guard, can have time to come to its assistance.

It is on these occasions that the light horse become very useful; by assembling and opposing together the efforts of the enemy, and stopping him, at least for such a length of time that the cavalry and dragoons may have sufficient time to come up with their whole strength, and charge in order, without being embarrassed by numbers, whilst the light horse take them in flank.

It is not to be understood here that cavalry cannot sometimes carry on war without the assistance of light horse, or that they are deficient either in order, bravery, or discipline: but experience proves cavalry to be always more secure, when furnished with light horse, who clear their march and give intelligence of the enemy's motions, the route he keeps, and whatever else they have discovered: they also give time for the cavalry to make their dispositions, in order to give the enemy a proper reception; instead of which, if cavalry is destitute of intelligence, the enemy's light horse can fall upon, and surprise it, whenever they think proper. What officer could, in this situation, undertake to reconduct the detachment in safety back to the camp.

The light horse are more accustomed than any other troops to scouring a country; they are ready in rallying to stop the enemy, and are also trained

up to fire on horseback; and although this fire may not do great execution, it will nevertheless answer the intention of keeping back the enemy, till the cavalry is assembled; whereas if there is only cavalry, the parties detached from it will never be able to go to the same distance as light horse, and consequently the country will not be above half examined. Bodies of cavalry can never move readily to the assistance of each other, because they should always keep their ranks close together; and light horse, although they do march in a body, can nevertheless reach the parts where they are wanted, in a much shorter space of time. The fire of cavalry is always less to be feared, than that of the light horse, owing to their little practice in the use of the musquet or carbine: cavalry, also being obliged to keep their ranks close, will, by that means, be too much confined to load and fire with proper quickness.

It is certain that if the enemy is destitute of light horse, a general may very soon make himself master of his country with troops of that nature, provided he knows how to employ them to advantage. If, owing to the smallness of the army, the disadvantageous situation of it, or from some other reason, the general finds himself under a necessity of acting on the defensive, he may, by the assistance of a large body of light horse, be enabled to act on the offensive; because the enemy's army must of course be greatly fatigued by continually making detachments to oppose those which are sent out against him: these light horse, whether in large or small bodies, will harass the enemy's army, oblige the general commanding it to alter his dispositions, and to be continually taking new precautions, in order to shelter himself from the inquietudes of which these troops are the occasion. His forages and convoys will be attacked, his marches foreseen, and every thing passing on the outside of his camp will be discovered, neither will any one be able to come out of it in safety; his detachments will be continually exposed or beaten, as the general to whom the light horse be-

long, will be always informed of the time of their setting out, by which means the enemy may be prevented from making any attempts, as he will be always apprehensive of falling into ambuscades.

A general who hath light horse in his army, is not liable to be stopped or embarrassed, neither will he have reason to fear the enemy's having got the start of him in a march, or that he hath been beforehand with him in taking possession of a post. The enemy, who is supposed to have none, or but few light horse, can receive intelligence from his spies only, who will be unable to gather information till the army is in motion, that is to say, at the time it ought to act; at which time, could the cavalry and dragoons perform the same service as the light horse, it would fatigue and render them unable to do what would be expected from them when the action became general. It is therefore impossible for a general to be too careful in providing a sufficient number of troops, thus necessary, and to place over them officers capable of conducting them, and preserving a spirit amongst them equal to the purposes for which they were instituted.

The utility of light troops hath been at all times acknowledged. Hannibal was indebted to his Numidian cavalry for his success at the battle of Theffia, who performed the same service as light troops; the Romans themselves very well understood the consequence of them, and their light or armed troops were very useful to them on many occasions.

An example still more memorable, is the ambuscade which Hannibal formed upon the Trebia*. After having concealed some troops among the rushes of that river, he caused his Numidian horses to pass it, with orders to advance to the camp of the Romans, with a design of drawing them into the ambuscade. Sempronius, who commanded the Roman army, sent out his cavalry, with six thousand archers, against the Numidians; these were soon followed by the rest of the army. The Numidians gave

* Polyb. Book 3. chap. 13.

ground designedly, and were followed by the Romans, who passed the Trebia, without resistance, in pursuit of them. The Carthaginian cavalry appearing in front of the Numidians, charged that belonging to the Romans, and put it to the rout, and the troops at the same time leaving their ambuscade, took them in the rear, and completed the defeat of the Roman army.

If daily experience left any room to doubt the necessity for having light troops, antiquity furnishes many examples of the great successes which have been gained by light troops only; our own times also have furnished us with proofs sufficient for what hath been advanced. It may also be boldly affirmed, that an army furnished with eight or ten thousand light horse, and four thousand light foot, may not only march in security, but also subsist in a country, where another army, unprovided with these troops, would not be able to procure subsistence, unless by sacrificing its cavalry and infantry; troops which should always be preserved with the greatest care against a general action.

CHAP. III.

On the Conduct to be pursued by a General commanding an advanced Body of Light Horse; and of advanced Detachments.

IT is from the conduct of generals that particular officers usually form their own behaviour: when these latter observe their superiors to be active and vigilant, they are eager to have those two qualities remarked in themselves; whereas a commanding officer who roves from camp to camp, and is in every place but that where his duty calls him, in some degree authorises the officers under his command to follow the same example.

ample. The soldier who sees himself, in a manner, at his own disposal, grows negligent, absents himself from the camp, which, void of order and discipline, may easily be surprized and taken. Neither should it be a matter of astonishment that subordination should be wanting to troops, when those who ought to maintain it among them, are the first to destroy it. When a general sets a good example, it attaches the troops to him, and gives him a right to punish those who are remiss. He should also be more attentive than those under him, subaltern officers being easily reclaimed by the behaviour of their general; but what commander can with justice reprimand officers, if he himself is not observant of his own orders?

A general who commands an advanced body, should never leave his camp without very essential reasons; such as, for example, when he has received intelligence of consequence which he should communicate to the general, and which he cannot explain sufficiently by letter, or whenever the general orders him to come to him; on these occasions, he must leave the camp after having acquainted the next in command with it; but the brigadiers, colonels, and other officers, should never leave it without his permission. Discipline and order, so essential to all bodies, seem more particularly so, to those which are advanced, because they are generally more exposed; and the officer entrusted with the command of them cannot be too attentive to their security. He should post advanced detachments, who must give him daily information of the enemy's motions, and he should also examine into the reports made to him; it being necessary for the security of the camp that he should employ every possible means for arriving at truth.

By way of example, let four brigades of light horse be supposed more or less in advance of the army, according to the situation of the country, the ground to be covered, or the distance of the enemy: before this
camp

camp is fixed, it will be necessary to know the enemy's position, his advanced posts, and the detached camps which he may have formed, as well as the passes by which he can come and attack, or turn the army, in order to annoy the convoys daily coming to it. The camp should not be fixed till these particulars are collected; and the general commanding the advanced body should receive information, by means of spies and detachments, of every movement made by the enemy. He should also be careful, that, through a desire of covering the army, he does not advance so far as to expose himself to the danger of being attacked and taken; for although he may be covered by advanced detachments, it may nevertheless happen, that the enemy's round-about ways and unknown roads may have escaped their search, and may fall upon the advanced body when least expected; and that, being at so great a distance from the army, it will be very difficult to preserve the communication, and retreat to it. In order, therefore, to avoid these inconveniencies, when circumstances require this body to be very much in advance, the commanding officer should at sunset cause the piquets to mount, and post them in the most exposed parts, and by which it is most probable the enemy would march. The piquets should send patrols into the front, during the night, who will stop from time to time to find whether there is any thing stirring during the night; also the guards should remain at the posts assigned them, and be very attentive. The general commanding the advanced body should be particularly careful to secure his communication with the army. If the advanced camp is not sufficiently strong to provide for its own safety, the general of the army should supply it with detachments, taken from the army, and post them between that and the advanced body. These troops should remain twenty-four hours in their posts, and then be relieved by others; yet if this body should be so far advanced, as to be liable to be attacked, without being in a situation of being readily assisted, it is then thought proper

proper to place one brigade of infantry, and two of dragoons, between the army and the advanced camp, but nearer to the camp than the army: these brigades will cover the advanced body of light-horse in its retreat, and at the same time keep up the communication between the two camps. When M. Saxe, in the year 1746, was encamped at Tongres, the count d'Estrées, who commanded the advanced body, was encamped at Houtain; and in order to secure this advanced body, and keep up its communication with the army, the marshal posted two bodies of troops between Tongres and Houtain, one of which was commanded by the count de Clermont Gallerande, and the other by the viscount de Chayla.

The general commanding the advanced body should every day go round the camp, and visit every post, of which he should avoid having too great a number, in order that the troops which are in the camp should not be too much fatigued; the troops on duty being generally sufficient to secure it, without posting unnecessary guards. As it is always necessary to have a proper number of fresh troops to replace those who return from detachment, the strength and the number of detachments sent out to examine the country, should be both fixed. Those sent out to gain intelligence concerning the enemy, to learn whether he hath decamped, whether he hath built any bridges, and other things of the same nature, of which the general must necessarily be informed, should have a day fixed for their return. There are other detachments, which should be sent out under the command of intelligent officers, and which should never lose sight of the enemy, in order to send in daily intelligence, to attack small convoys and baggage, to pick up marauders, and harass the advanced guards: there should be no time fixed for the return of these detachments, neither should they be confined to particular places; they should, notwithstanding, return to the camp at the expiration of eight, or ten days at farthest. The inconvenience arising from confining these detachments to a particular time would per-

haps be, that the very day appointed for their return would be that, on which they might have the fairest opportunity of learning intelligence of the enemy; and therefore being forced to return, their having been sent out will answer no purpose.

When these detachments are gone, the general should send out others of greater strength, in order to sustain them; these latter should not advance above a league and half, or two leagues from the camp, according as the country is open or enclosed, or the enemy near, or at a distance; these detachments are intended only to receive those which are advanced, in case they should be repulsed. If the enemy is so strong as to oblige the advanced detachments, and those sustaining them to retire, the out-guards should, on the first firing they hear, send notice to the camp that the detachments are attacked; then their piquets, which should be commanded by officers of rank, must immediately mount and march out to meet the detachments; but they must not advance more than a quarter of a league beyond the common guards, to sustain those who are beaten and repulsed, that in case they are briskly pursued, they may not carry the guards, who should always remain firm, away with them in their retreat.

It is necessary to observe, that the brigadier of the piquet should not order it to mount without giving notice to the general commanding the whole body; but there should also be a standing order, that as soon as news is received in the camp from the advanced-guards, of any detachments being repulsed, the officer commanding the piquet, which should be always in the front of the camp, should immediately order it to mount, always sending word of it to the general; and it is always to be understood that the piquet is not to advance above a quarter of a league from the guards, the design of these piquets being only to protect and favour the retreat of the detachments which are repulsed. This order becomes the more necessary, because if the piquet was always to wait the general's orders for mounting,

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ing, the enemy would have time to press upon and beat the advanced detachments, and perhaps carry off the guards before the arrival of this order; and the enemy, if sufficiently strong, seeing nobody in the camp in a state of defending it, would attack and probably carry it, because, as light horse march with great quickness, their success consists rather in the briskness with which they attack, than in keeping close together.

When the piquets have left the camp, it is proper to order the rest of the horses to be saddled, that the troops remaining in the camp may be ready to mount at a minute's warning, and they should continue in that situation till the piquets are returned.

The light horse composing an advanced camp, should keep their horses constantly saddled; it being only an indulgence to allow those off duty to have their horses unsaddled. It is very true that a camp of cavalry cannot be managed after the same manner; but then cavalry is seldom so situated as to be attacked, or to attack every day, which is the real business of light horse. They should serve as vedets to the whole army, in order to prevent the enemy from approaching it; whereas cavalry should never be employed but in the greatest operations, and on occasions which are to decide the fate of a campaign. Skirmishing is therefore solely the business of light horse, who should be constantly exposed as the forlorn hope of the army, or troops whose duty it is to be continually watchful for its repose and security.

The battle of Dénain *, gained in 1712, by Marshal Villars over the Allies, part of whose army was employed at the siege of Landrecy, conducted by prince Eugene in person, and the other under the command of lord Albemarle, at Dénain, to guard the communication between Marchiennes and the prince's army, is another proof of the necessity of light troops. Marshal Villars, whose design was to march and attack

* Hist. du prince Eugene, Tom. 4, Liv. 13.

Dénain and Marchiennes, at which places the Allies had fixed their magazines, made a motion on the side of the Sambre, as if he would march to the assistance of Landrecy; he even proceeded so far as to throw bridges over that river, and caused the opening of Femy to be enlarged, as if he intended passing at that place; he made all the movements necessary to induce the Allies to believe he would force their lines; he also caused thirty squadrons of dragoons to advance towards their lines of circumvallation; but he at the same time made his army march on the side of Dénain, and sent his light horse on before, who intercepted all the expresses going to lord Albemarle, from M. de Cronstrom, commandant of Bouchain, and the commandant of St. Amand, to inform his lordship of the marshal's march. These light horse, having passed the Censette, destroyed and took prisoners many detachments of cavalry, which had been sent out by lord Albemarle to bring him in intelligence; but being unable to receive any, he was surprised and beaten, the greatest part of his troops were made prisoners, the magazines at Marchiennes pillaged, the siege of Landrecy raised, and the design formed by the Allies of marching into the heart of France, vanished into air.

CHAP. IV.

The Manner of employing Light Horse on a day of Battle.

ALL the operations of a campaign cease as soon as a general engagement is decided; at that time, therefore, it is very essential for the light horse not to remain inactive: they should be posted in those places from whence they can most readily give assistance, and from whence by a brisk charge, they may have it in their power to cut off the retreat of a beaten and pursued enemy, or by attacking the flanks, slacken the pursuit of a victorious army.

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As the manner of mounting these troops does not render them sufficiently strong to charge cavalry, and their evolutions also differing with those of heavy horse, the general should, therefore, allot them such a situation, as to enable them to attack with advantage any troops of what nature soever. Sometimes they should be scattered about, at least part of them; at others they should continue together: but circumstances must decide when either the one or the other are proper. They should, on the day of battle, before the beginning of the action, serve as the vedet to the army, and enable it to form in order of battle without being disturbed by the enemy in that critical situation. The generals, by posting these troops in advance, may with ease pass from one part of the army to another, to make their proper dispositions without being annoyed by the enemy; and by their means also the enemy's generals will be prevented from advancing to examine the dispositions of the army, and change their own according to the observations they have made. They are also useful in taking possession of an advantageous post, or height, and continuing in it till they are relieved by infantry, cannon, or cavalry, according as the ground is most suitable. The evening before the battle of Lafeldt, gained by the French in 1747, the count d'Estrées with his body of light horse, took possession of the heights between Herderen and Alt, which obliged the Allies to retire to Gros, and Glain Spawen; and by that means made it easy for the troops, who arrived after them, to form in order of battle.

When the army is formed and ready for action, the general should send orders for the light horse to retire, upon which they should assemble, and form themselves in order of battle, in the rear of the first line, and there wait the general's orders.

There are many different methods of employing these troops advantageously; first, by posting them in the rear of the brigades of cavalry designed:

signed to charge the enemy. A general on the field of battle, may easily perceive from what part the enemy's cavalry will march out, and which part of it can with greatest ease make the first charge, and consequently will know the part by which he is to be opposed. It is in the rear of these brigades that the light horse should be posted, in order to take the enemy in flank, at the time of the attack. If the two wings of both armies can charge at the same time, the light horse should be divided into two; one part should be placed behind the first line on the right, and the other part behind it on the left: if the enemy is beat in this part, the light horse should be ordered to pursue him, and by a brisk charge prevent his rallying. A part of the wing of cavalry should, at the same time, follow the light horse, to sustain them, and the other part should remain in order to flank the enemy's infantry, at the same time that it is attacked in front by the infantry belonging to the army: at this conjuncture the second line should advance to keep back the second line of the enemy, in case it hath not been carried away in the defeat of the first; and if that has happened, the second line will still give greater weight to the attack upon the enemy's flank. It will also serve to protect that part of the wing of the first line that is to attack the flank of the enemy's infantry, in case it should be attacked in flank by some battalions of the enemy's second line, which he may order to march to oppose the attack of this cavalry. The general may undoubtedly place dragoons behind this cavalry, to perform the same service as light horse; cavalry would be yet better, provided it could be done without unfurnishing the first and second lines. A general should always endeavour to draw up his troops in such a manner, that they may easily be brought into action, and that, by the position given them, they shall not remain inactive. It is not to be here understood that they must all charge; the great secret of war is to employ as few troops as possible, and to oblige the enemy to oppose them with a great
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number: as, for example, not to employ more than ten battalions, and that in such a manner, as to give them the advantage over twenty belonging to the enemy. And although a general should avoid making all his troops charge at once, he should, nevertheless, post them in such a manner, as to enable them to act easily and on the first order; and that without destroying the front, they may take any position that occasion and circumstances shall require. If the light horse are not posted in this manner, or the one going to be mentioned, they will become useless, and remain only spectators of the battle. This inaction would relax their courage, and be attended with very bad consequences.

Let the light horse be posted after the manner just now supposed, the dragoons should then be placed in reserve, in order to march expeditiously to whatever part the danger is most pressing; which services they are very capable of performing, as their horses are not so heavy as those belonging to the cavalry, and yet are stronger than those of the light horse; by which means they are able to attack cavalry, which light horse cannot pretend to do, unless supported by other troops, either cavalry or dragoons.

But if the advantage has turned on the enemy's side, and the cavalry hath been either beaten, or obliged to give ground, the light horse, who, as hath been already mentioned, are placed obliquely upon the flank of the cavalry, should make a brisk charge upon the enemy sword in hand; and by this attack not only stop the violence of the pursuit, but also give the beaten wing time to pass without confusion, through the intervals of the second line, which ought at that time, to advance in order and charge the enemy, already upon its flank.

It is at this instant that the dragoons in reserve may be of very great service; part of them should march and form upon the same ground, and in the same position, in which the light horse were before they charged; by
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which situation the enemy's second line will be kept back : he will also be prevented from attacking the light horse in flank or rear, or even marching to the assistance of the first line, by this time attacked on every side.

In case there should be any hedges on the extremity of the wings, some infantry and field-pieces should be posted at them ; this infantry is supposed to be the more necessary, because if the enemy should have had the precaution to post any there, the light horse could not be of any service ; for at the time they take the enemy's wing in flank, their wings will also be attacked by his infantry ; instead of which, the infantry on their side will keep back that belonging to the enemy, and also sustain them when they make their attack : but if the enemy should have neglected to post any infantry there, that intended to oppose him may be very well employed in attacking the flank of his second line, at the same time with the dragoons who have taken the place of the light horse ; and these two bodies thus united, will render the success of this charge almost certain.

Secondly, a general may, on the day of battle, post his light horse on the right or left of the army, at the distance of one or two thousand paces, near the road by which the enemy may retire, in which situation they ought to wait the event of the battle. If the enemy is beat, they should cut off the retreat of his cavalry, which, in all probability, will be closely pursued by that belonging to the victorious army, and by these two united attacks accomplish the entire defeat of it. If two regiments of light horse which were posted behind Montenaken, at the battle of Lafeldt, had advanced on the side of Maestricht, when the cavalry of the Allied army was put to flight, they would have intercepted and placed it between two fires. If, on the contrary, the enemy should gain the victory, the light horse should draw near to the army, and post themselves upon the flanks of the troops who form the rear-guard of it, in order to cover them, and prevent the enemy from attacking them in flank.

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Thirdly, light horse may be opposed to the enemy's light horse; but as these last will remain in the rear, and not shew themselves when the action becomes general; and as any advantage also, which they can gain over each other, will neither decide the winning, or losing of the battle; this manner of disposing them cannot be attended with any advantage, unless the enemy's light horse have a design of attacking the flank of the army. Nevertheless, if the army is beat, there is no doubt of the enemy's light horse falling immediately upon its rear-guard; the general, therefore, should post his light horse, as hath already been mentioned, upon the right and left of the troops forming the rear-guard; first, to guard their flanks; secondly, to prevent the enemy from turning them, and attacking them in front at the time they are also attacked in rear; and, in short, to avoid confusion. The great difference between the evolutions of light horse and cavalry, is, that they go to the charge with great swiftness, and return from it in the same manner, which must certainly occasion disorder, and even spread a panic among cavalry and infantry, if the light horse form the rear-guard to the whole army; instead of which, by being posted upon the flanks, they can perform all the motions and evolutions which may be judged necessary, without destroying the order and disposition of the rear-guard.

Fourthly, upon the flanks of the two armies, at about the distance of half a league, either more or less, there may happen to be some places capable of concealing a large body of troops; a circumstance which the general should take advantage of, by posting some light horse in ambuscade in them; who, whilst the two armies are engaged, should rush out and fall upon the rear of the enemy's army. In order for succeeding in this, the light horse should have concealed themselves unobserved by the enemy, and the ground also between him and the light horse should be chosen as even as possible, that they may be able to fall upon him with

great velocity; and, indeed, in whatever position light horse are placed, their evolutions should be so expeditiously performed, that they may be at once, at the place where they are ordered. There are undoubtedly many other positions proper for light horse, of which it is impossible to give a detail as they depend upon the situation of the ground, and the position of the enemy, and the place the general intends to assign them in his own disposition of battle.

CHAP. V.

Of the Service light Infantry should be employed in, during a Campaign, and where they should be posted in a general Engagement.

THE only difference between the duty of light infantry and light horse during a campaign, is, that these last can march with more facility and expedition to whatever part they are ordered; in other respects they equally contribute to the security of an army, and by joining, shelter themselves from every sort of danger: nothing can stop them, and they are in a manner certain of succeeding in whatever enterprize they undertake. Light infantry, as well as light horse, may be continually employed in detachment, in the escorting of convoys, forming chains of forage, in taking possession of passes which are in the front, thro' which it is probable the enemy may march, and in guarding such posts as are necessary to be preserved; and whenever there is a body separated from the grand army, they are useful in keeping up the communication, and covering the advanced posts belonging to that separated body. They may, indeed, perform every kind of service in common with the light horse, excepting that they cannot so expeditiously transport themselves to the parts where they are ordered.

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There does not, at first sight, seem to be any essential difference between these troops, because regiments of light troops are usually half of them on foot, and half mounted, which last perform the same evolutions, and do the same duty as light horse: nevertheless, there is a sensible difference between troops trained up in the management and knowledge of horses, and those entirely unacquainted with them, and who perhaps were never before on horseback. With the foot soldier it is otherwise; his first campaign fits him for service; he can act offensively, if conducted by experienced officers; whereas the abilities, however great, of the officers commanding horse, will become entirely useless, if the troopers neither know how to manage their horses or their arms: besides as the establishment of the regiments of light troops is generally very low, till the commencement of a war, it is impossible for the light horse to be perfected in their exercise in such a manner, as to become immediately fit for service. It is neither the first or second campaign that will complete them, as the nature of the service they are generally engaged in, renders neither courage or bravery so essential as artifice and address, which qualities are to be acquired only by custom, and the continual presence of the enemy.

The genius of the French nation accommodates itself to every thing, but then there must be time. A Frenchman can familiarise himself to all customs, and adopt the manner of any country he pleases; but he is not by nature fit for this kind of war; he can march in front and attack with courage, but too volatile to listen to the dictates of prudence, he often employs courage on occasions where artifice only is necessary. The Hungarians and the Germans are endued with more coolness of blood, and more steadiness. The former are undoubtedly the only people to whom this business is natural, the latter attain it with a little practice.

The German, besides artifice and address, hath also great firmness in action, a quality the Hungarian can easily acquire by strict discipline and frequent exercise.

Besides the service which the light infantry can perform during the campaign, they may also be employed to great advantage in a day of battle; first, because, as hath been already remarked, it is often necessary to have infantry posted upon the extremities of the wings of the cavalry, light infantry ought of course to be posted on them, as neither belonging to the lines, or destroying the order of battle.

Secondly, they may also be placed in another position. There is scarcely any battle fought, but where the first advantages on either side depend on being possessed of a defile, hollow, wood, or some other post. The care of these posts, to all appearance, cannot be entrusted to any troops fitter for the purpose than these, who, without more bravery than others, are yet more accustomed to action, as they seldom pass a day without meeting the enemy. By custom, soldiers grow habituated to action, and familiarised to danger; it may be observed, that in sieges they are less anxious for their safety, at the second than at the first, and at the third than at the second; therefore light troops, who are continually skirmishing with the enemy, grow accustomed to every danger, and consequently fire quicker than other troops. On the other hand, what may not troops be expected to perform, who daily expose themselves, unassisted, to every service that offers; when they see themselves supported by piquets and grenadiers? If, notwithstanding all their resolution, they are obliged to retire, their retreat, which, by their continual fire, proves generally bloody to the enemy, makes no ill impression in the army; it being their custom both to retire whenever they find a force superior to their own, and rally as expeditiously, and return to the charge when circumstances require it; on the contrary, when the grenadiers or battalions are seen to fly or give ground, the courage of the troops will be depressed by such a check being given to the flower of the infantry, that of the enemy raised, and the whole army discouraged in such a manner as may probably end in its entire defeat.

It is very true that light troops are very useful in the field, as they are the only troops calculated for skirmishing, and covering the infantry and cavalry belonging to foraging parties and convoys; they also clear the march of an army, guard the troops from surprizes, and exempt the cavalry and infantry from many fatigues they must necessarily undergo, if they were employed on the services performed by the light horse and light infantry; in short, it is necessary for an army to be provided with them at all events, without considering whether the enemy hath any or not. If an army is furnished with light troops, the general can oppose them to the enemy's; if the enemy is destitute of them, his cavalry and infantry will be continually harrassed and fatigued in such a manner, as to be very little able of acting offensively.

The foregoing are thought to be, in a great measure, the principles on which the military science is founded. I do not flatter myself with having thoroughly examined each particular branch; the labour would not only be too great, but the design also chimerical. I shall therefore esteem myself sufficiently happy, if I can be so far successful as to become the means of persuading officers to the study of their business; and so far from being jealous of any man who objects to the principles I have laid down, provided he establishes better in their stead, I shall be in the highest degree contented with having been the cause of criticisms, which may, in the end, prove instructive.

The experience of many campaigns, and many years spent in study, will be scarcely sufficient to furnish an officer with a complete knowledge of the business of war. The science of war is very different from all others; any capacity may, by dint of application, attain to certain knowledges, however abstracted, but the genius requisite to attain to perfection in the military science is supposed to be born with us; for which reason, those who understand the theory of arms the best, are often most deficient in the

the practice. Prudence and execution, according to Sallust*, are seldom found together; although forecast is the spring of good counsel, yet too much of it renders men timid, and too great a degree of boldness in execution, may be termed rashness. Thus a general who hath been tried, and hath deservedly acquired reputation, ventures again, but continues diffident of his own abilities, because what he already knows, convinces him that there is much more to be learned. Modesty also is one of the attributes of a great man, as there cannot be a truer sign of understanding than owning there are some particulars of which he is ignorant.

The qualifications necessary for a general have been already mentioned in the beginning of this work†; neither can there be any thing more added to the subject, after what hath been already said on it by Onozander, Santa-Cruz, Feuquieres, and many others. Nevertheless, it is impossible to repeat too often, how greatly dependent the military excellencies are upon the practice of the moral virtues, of which humanity should always be considered as the chief: it is never to be acquired, nor can the want of it be disguised, if it is not originally born with us; nevertheless, it is that which throws lustre on all the rest. The man who possesses it, is never vain of his own talents; he is just and equitable, and always ready to sacrifice his own glory to the good of his country. One instance of humanity hath often conduced more to form the character of an hero, than the most shining actions; the battles of Arbella and Zama will for ever render the memoirs of Alexander and Scipio dear to posterity; where the generosity of the former towards the family of Darius, and the continence of the latter to his fair captive, whom he delivered from her bondage, were so remarkable.

Plutarch‡ relates, that one of the principal citizens of Athens having been taken prisoner by the Macedonians, was so well used by them, that

* De Bello Jugurt.

† Preliminary Discourse.

‡ In Alexandrum.

when

when his ransom came to be paid, he thus answered his countrymen, who were surprized to see him shed tears: "Do you imagine that I can, without regret, quit a city, where there are enemies so generous, that it will be difficult to find such friends elsewhere." Alexander, by this generous behaviour, gained more subjects than by the terror of his arms.

In the profession of war, there is one thing particular, which is, that reputation is neither dependent upon fortune or chance; for, with innate qualities, a private soldier may become an hero. The word hero supposes a man whose resolution is not to be moved by difficulties, intrepid in the midst of danger, and valiant in battle; these qualities naturally arise from virtue, which, if joined to experience, what soldier possessed of them may not expect to arrive at the name and character of a great man? It is sometimes the fate of merit to languish in obscurity, too great a share of modesty being generally the fault of the most deserving.

I hope I may be indulged, before I conclude this work, with venturing the following reflexion, that may perhaps prove useful to those possessed of military talents. In one day of battle only, there happens more fine actions, could they be all remarked, than has been mentioned in history during the course of many ages. Let those officers who have served in the last wars be questioned, and there is scarcely any of them but have been witnesses to some brave actions performed by some one belonging to the body wherein they have commanded, why, therefore, should these acts remain unrecompensed, and the name of a good soldier be buried in oblivion? Any brilliant action performed by a particular, being transmitted to his family, may perhaps prove a means of supplying a state with good troops. Wherefore should not the archives of every regiment be preserved, wherein the names of those soldiers, who were remarkable for their gallant behaviour, or who have distinguished themselves by the per-

formance

formance of signal services, should be handed down to posterity? Such kind of registers would spread a laudable emulation throughout entire bodies, and would be also a motive of exciting each particular to do his utmost, in the hope of having his name remembered hereafter. Permit me to say, that the Romans were much more attentive to the particular services performed by their soldiers, than is the custom at present.

* It was sufficient among them to have preserved the life of a fellow-citizen, to merit the reward of a civic crown. A good action undoubtedly is a reward in itself; recompences, therefore, should be considered rather as the means of exciting men to do good, than as a payment for so doing.

The warlike virtues will, nevertheless, be void of merit, if they are not produced of, and supported by others, of yet greater solidity; there are but few instances of great generals, who have not been endowed with piety, or who have been deficient in causing the rights of worship to be strictly observed. The Persians always implored the assistance of their gods before the beginning of the battle: the Greeks sought to render their gods propitious by the means of prayers and sacrifices: and the Romans before a battle devoted to their deities whatever spoils they should take from their enemies. The songs of victory among all nations were hymns in honour of the divinity. In short, if honour and the desire of glory, which at best are no more than happy prepossessions, act so powerfully over the mind, what is there that may not be effected by the means of religion, which

* La Noue, a very worthy man, who in the most untoward times, exclaimed against the little order observed in France, with regard to the bestowing of military rewards. "If any one, says he, is desirous of knowing what becomes of the poor maimed, or invalid soldiers, whose infirmities demand compassion, he will find, upon enquiry, that out of an hundred scarce ten are provided for; and again, what is this provision? Nothing more than a place in some abbey among lay monks, where the poor soldier is scarcely arrived, before the monks force him to seek refuge elsewhere." How satisfactory would it have been to this man, had he lived to see the establishment of the hospital of invalids; and the edict of the nobility in favour of officers, and the military school! Vid. les Discours Polit. & Milit. de la Noue. Disc. 7.

is,

is, or ought to be, deeply engraven in all hearts? "In a battle, says a writer of the present age, those who are most in the fear of God, are the men who least dread their enemy."

Modesty and humanity are the most desirable qualities a soldier can be possessed of. The religious man is of course modest, as he attributes his success to that being who directs his arm; he is humane, because religion is founded upon justice: a soldier, by the assistance of religion, undergoes his labours with patience, becomes tractable to his superiors, and obliging to his equals. Religion teaches him to regard his life as a deposit, which he ought to defend, but which it is his duty to venture, for the good of his country. In the day of battle, the soldier who is endowed with piety, hath no farther occasion for a guide, than in those cases where his understanding will not permit him to be his own conductor; but in the fury of battles, and in the arms of victory, he needs no rein. It is with regret that he sheds the blood, which the duty he owes to his king and country require; and humanity teaches him to forbear spilling that, which ought to be saved. I shall not enlarge upon the effects which religion produces in a general; the name of Turenne alone, comprehends every thing that can be said upon that subject.


In short, religion renders a soldier more courageous and docile; it assists the officer in the study of his duty, and supports him in the practice of it: it renders him the support of the state, the glory of his prince, and deservedly gains him the esteem of his countrymen. If it cannot supply the want of either talent or genius for war, it at least does not prevent those, to whom nature has refused these qualities, from the enjoyment of such employments as are more suitable for them.

During the course of this work, I have undoubtedly repeated many things which have been already said by others; but how could that be avoided, as I have been obliged to search for knowledge in those springs,

where such numbers have been before me; my sole view hath been to instruct others, by endeavouring to instruct myself. Not being able to give a genius and taste for the profession of war, to those who have them not, I have supposed them in my readers. This genius is the gift of nature: the love of glory first discovers it; it is methodized by study, and brought to perfection by practice.



The END of the FIFTH and Last Book.





EXPLANATION of the PLATES.


PLATE I.

- A. The army formed in order of battle, ready to march.
- B. The Park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and their escorts, also are assembled.
- C. March of the cavalry, to form the column on the right.
- D. March of the cavalry, to form the column on the left.
- E. March of the infantry, to form in three columns.
- F. March of the artillery and baggage, to form in a column.
- G. Parties of hussars, covering the flanks of the army, and forming the rear-guard of the rear-guards of the column, when the army hath passed.
- H. Bridges and fords, discovered by the advanced detachments, who have marked the route of the army.
- I. Bridges built by the same detachments.
- K. Front and rear-guards of the columns drawn from the troops of which the columns are formed.
- L. Parties of hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army.
- M. Parties of hussars marching at the head of the army, to scour the country through which the army is to pass, and also to examine the routes marked by the advanced detachments.


EXPLANATION OF THE ILLUSTRATIONS

P L A T E I

- A. The Army of the Republic of the United States.
- B. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- C. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- D. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- E. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- F. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- G. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- H. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- I. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- J. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- K. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- L. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.
- M. The Army of the Republic of the United States, in the field.



PLAN of the MARCH of an ARMY
which forms upon its right Flank.





Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League

100 200 300 400 500 600 1400 P.

P L A T E II.

- A. The army formed in order of battle, ready to march.
- B. March of the cavalry, to form in column.
- C. March of the infantry, to form in three columns.
- D. The column of artillery, with its escort.
- E. The baggage belonging to the army.
- F. Hussars marching in the front, and upon the flanks of the army.
- G. March of the infantry of the right column, to form in order of battle upon having received notice of the enemy's approach.
- H. March of the cavalry, to form in order of battle upon the wings of the infantry.
- I. March of the cavalry of the reserve, to form in the rear of the center of the infantry.
- K. March of the advanced-guards, of the two columns of the right, to take possession of the bridge, and the village on the flank of the cavalry.
- L. Hussars belonging to the advanced-guards of the two columns, scouring the wood upon the left.
- M. March of the infantry belonging to the rear-guard, of the column upon the right to take possession of the windmill, and the hedges which are on the height upon the right, and to cover the flank of the cavalry.
- N. March of the artillery, to take post in the front of the first line of infantry.
- O. The position taken by the two columns upon the right, till the other columns can arrive, and form in order of battle, in case the enemy threatens an attack.







PLAN of the
March of an Army
which
Forms in Front.

Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League
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








P L A T E III.

- A. The army drawn out in order of battle, ready to march.
- B. March of the cavalry, to form into columns.
- C. March of the infantry, to form into columns.
- D. The troops of the reserve, forming the rear-guard of the columns.
- E. Place for the baggage, if it remains with the army.
- F. The artillery distributed among the brigades of infantry.
- G. Dragoons, and hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army.
- H. The hussars of the advanced-guard of the encamping party, who meet the enemy's advanced-guard.
- I. Dragoons, sustaining the hussars who are advanced.
- K. Bridges guarded, by dragoons or by light infantry.
- L. The detachment and encamping party who have formed in order of battle, as soon as they have received notice from the hussars that the enemy is marching towards them.
- M. The march of the brigades of the army, to form in order of battle, when it has received notice of the enemy's approach.
- N. Dragoons and hussars, who having covered the flanks of the army during the march, form in order of battle upon the wings.







PLAN of the
MARCH of an ARMY
from its left
in prefence of the
Enemy's Camp.

Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League.



P L A T E IV.

- A. The army drawn out in order of battle in the front of its camp, ready to march from the left.
- B. The ground where the troops are assembled, which are to form the advanced-guard.
- C. The ground where the troops are assembled, which are to form the rear-guard.
- D. Hussars in the front of the army, to observe the enemy's motions, and to cover the flanks of the army during the march.
- E. The army in march.
- F. The artillery distributed among the brigades of infantry.
- G. The march and position of the dragoons and hussars forming the advanced-guard.
- H. The march and position of the troops of the rear-guard.
- I. Hussars dispersed about in many parties, to observe the enemy, and to cover the flanks of the army.
- K. Hussars belonging to the rear-guard, who have broke down the bridges as soon as the army has passed.

P L A T E IV

A. The army drawn out in order of battle in the front of the camp ready to march from the hill.

B. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the advanced guard.

C. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the main body.

D. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the rear guard.

E. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the left wing.

F. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the right wing.

G. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the center.

H. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the flanks.

I. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the reserves.

J. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the artillery.

K. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the engineers.


L. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the medical corps.

M. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the baggage train.

N. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the camp.

O. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the bivouac.


P. The ground where the troops are assembled which are to form the march.






The MARCH of an ARMY through a Mountainous Country.


A. The advanced-guard of the army.
B. The main body of the army.
C. The infantry of the advanced-guard of the army.
D. The artillery and baggage of the army.
E. The cavalry of the army.
F. The engineers of the army.
G. The medical department of the army.
H. The commissariat of the army.
I. The quartermaster's department of the army.
J. The provost-marshal's department of the army.
K. The adjutant-general's department of the army.
L. The chaplain's department of the army.
M. The band of the army.
N. The baggage-train of the army.
O. The hospital of the army.
P. The magazine of the army.
Q. The storehouse of the army.
R. The barracks of the army.
S. The camp of the army.
T. The fort of the army.
U. The citadel of the army.
V. The citadel of the army.
W. The citadel of the army.
X. The citadel of the army.
Y. The citadel of the army.
Z. The citadel of the army.







P L A T E V.


- A. The position of the army, before it begins the march.
- B. Parties of hussars forming the advanced-guard of the army.
- C. Parties of infantry of the advanced-guards of the columns.
- D. The infantry of the army forming the head of the columns.
- E. The artillery, and waggons belonging to the artillery.
- F. Battalions of artillery.
- G. The cavalry.
- H. The baggage of the army.
- I. The escort of the baggage.
- K. Parties of hussars.
- L. Parties of dragoons.
- M. The infantry of the reserve, forming the rear-guard of the army.
- N. Platoons of infantry marching upon the heights, to cover the flanks of the columns.
- O. Villages in front of the camp the army is to occupy, and of which the light infantry have taken possession.
- P. The artillery and baggage, with their escorts in the front of the camp.





PLAN of the MARCH of an ARMY
through a Woody Country.





P L A T E VI.

- A. The army formed in order of battle.
- B. The cavalry, which hath marched some paces in advance, in order to make room for the infantry.
- C. The infantry, which, by facing to the right, forms the column upon the right.
- D. The infantry, which, by facing to the left, forms the column upon the left.
- E. Bodies of infantry, which are to march at the head of the columns of cavalry.
- F. The park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and the escorts, are assembled.
- G. The march of the infantry, forming in columns.
- H. The march of the cavalry, forming in column.
- I. The march of the artillery and baggage with their escorts, forming in column.
- K. The army in march.
- L. Hussars of the advanced-guard keeping the roads, marked out by the detachments sent on before.
- M. Infantry, forming the advanced-guard of the columns.
- N. Small parties of infantry, marching upon the flanks of the columns.
- O. Parties of hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army.
- P. Infantry of the reserve forming the rear-guard of the army.

P. I. A. T. D. VI

The first of these is the fact that the

second of these is the fact that the

third of these is the fact that the

fourth of these is the fact that the

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
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
eleventh of these is the fact that the

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
fourteenth of these is the fact that the






PLAN
of the
POSITION of an ARMY
in its
CAMP.

Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League





P L A T E VII.

- A. The camp of the main body of the army.
- B. An advanced camp, composed of dragoons and hussars, in order to cover the right of the army, to guard the passes by which the enemy might make incursions upon the flanks and rear of the army, molest the convoys, and cut off the communications.
- C. Villages and bridges, guarded by the light infantry.
- D. Posts of dismounted dragoons in the front of their camp.
- E. Post of dragoons on horseback, to secure the communication between their camp, and that of the main body of the army.
- F. Bridges built, to keep up the communication between the grand and the advanced camp.
- G. Bridges and villages guarded by detachments of infantry.
- H. Grand guards of horse.
- I. Guards of infantry.
- K. Bridge, village, and mill, guarded by the infantry belonging to the army.
- L. Camp of dragoons and hussars covering the left of the army, and supporting the light infantry.
- M. Villages and bridges guarded by the light infantry.
- N. Posts of dismounted dragoons in the front, and on the flanks of their camp.
- O. Posts of dragoons on horseback.
- P. Posts and detachments of hussars, to patrol in the front and upon the flanks of the army, and their camp.

P. L. A. T. I. N.

A. The camp of the main body of the army.
B. The advanced camp, consisting of a group of tents, and
C. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and


D. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
E. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
F. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and

G. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
H. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
I. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and

J. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
K. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
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N. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
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
P. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
Q. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and
R. The camp of the main body of the army, consisting of a group of tents, and





PLAN
of an
Intrenched Camp.

Scale of $\frac{1}{4}$ a League.

100 200 300 400 500 600 1200 T.







P L A T E VIII.

- A. The army encamped behind its entrenchments.
- B. The camp of the troops of the reserve.
- C. Camp of the dragoons, to secure the rear of the army.
- D. Camp of hussars, to cover the ground upon the right of the army.
- E. Villages and redoubts guarded by the light infantry, to secure the camp of the hussars.
- F. Bridges built to secure the communication of the army with the ground upon the right, and to favour the retreat of the troops posted on the opposite side.
- G. Brigades of artillery distributed upon the flanks, and along the whole front of the army.
- H. The park of artillery.
- I. A bridge entrenched, to secure the communication between the army and the ground upon the left.
- K. Villages and farm-houses, guarded by detachments of hussars and light infantry, to patrol in the front of the army.

PLATE VII

A. The main example of the ...

B. The ...

C. The ...

D. The ...

E. The ...

F. The ...

G. The ...

H. The ...

I. The ...

J. The ...

K. The ...

L. The ...

M. The ...

N. The ...

O. The ...

P. The ...

Q. The ...

R. The ...

S. The ...

T. The ...

U. The ...

V. The ...

W. The ...



X. The ...


Y. The ...

Z. The ...

PLAN
of the March of a
Convoy.

Scale of 2 a League.





P L A T E IX.

- A. The convoy on its march.
- B. Infantry belonging to the escort of the convoy.
- C. Cavalry belonging to the escort of the convoy.
- D. Small parties of infantry and cavalry.
- E. Hussars and dragoons belonging to the advanced and rear-guards.
- F. Parties of dragoons marching upon the flanks of the convoy, in order to support the hussars.
- G. The hussars marching upon the flanks, in order to cover the convoy, scour the country, and take possession of the passes.
- H. The convoy parked, in order for its defence.
- I. Ground taken up by the horses belonging to the convoy, when taken from the carriages.
- K. The position of the infantry.
- L. The position of the cavalry.
- M. Dragoons and hussars upon the wings of the cavalry.
- N. Small parties of hussars.
- O. Parties of hussars, who, having discovered the enemy, and given information of it to the officer commanding the escort, retire to it.
- P. The convoy parked, in order to pass a bridge or a defile.
- Q. Position of the troops of the head, and at the center of the convoy.
- R. Position of the troops of the rear-guard of the convoy.
- S. Position of the small parties marching upon the flanks.
- T. Parties of hussars and dragoons covering the convoy, during the passage.
- U. Parties of hussars, to examine and scour the country beyond the bridge or defile, before the convoy passes.
- X. The ground on which the convoy and the escort forms, after having passed the bridge, in order to proceed on its march.

100

THE HISTORY OF THE


A. The first of the
B. The second of the
C. The third of the
D. The fourth of the
E. The fifth of the
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G. The seventh of the
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J. The tenth of the


K. The eleventh of the
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P. The sixteenth of the
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R. The eighteenth of the
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U. The twenty-first of the
V. The twenty-second of the
W. The twenty-third of the
X. The twenty-fourth of the
Y. The twenty-fifth of the
Z. The twenty-sixth of the

The PLAN of
a Chain of
Green Forage.

Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League.






P L A T E X.

- A. Position of infantry.
- B. Posts of cavalry and dragoons forming the chain.
- C. Parties of cavalry and infantry in reserve.
- D. Parties of hussars forming a chain in front.
- E. Small advanced parties of hussars to observe the enemy's motions.


P L A T E

- A. Position of infant.
- B. Position of cavity and its position relative to the body.
- C. Position of cavity and its position relative to the body.
- D. Position of cavity and its position relative to the body.
- E. Position of cavity and its position relative to the body.




PLAN of the CHAIN for a dry FORAGE.

Plate XI.



T. Jefferys sculp.




P L A T E X I.

- A. Villages destined to be foraged.
- B. Posts of infantry forming the chain.
- C. Posts of dragoons or cavalry forming the chain.
- D. Companies of grenadiers and cavalry in reserve.
- E. Posts and parties of hussars in advance of the troops which form the chain.

P L A T E X I

- A. Wings defined to be forelegs.
- B. Pairs of infantry forming the chain.
- C. Pairs of dragons or cavalry forming the chain.
- D. Companies of gentlemen and cavalry in reserve.
- E. Pairs and parties of hunters in advance of the troops which form the chain.








PLAN of the PASSAGE of a BRIDGE by a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons.

Plate XII.



T. J.

P L A T E XII.

FIG. 1.

- A. The detachment drawn up in order of battle, to pass the bridge from the center.
- B. Parties of infantry, which have advanced to take possession of the bridge, and support the dragoons on the opposite side, in case they should be repulsed
- C. Dragoons in advance, who detach small parties to the right and left, to scour the country.
- D. The rear-guard facing towards the country, over which the detachment has marched.
- E. The position taken by the troops of the detachment, according as they pass the bridge.

FIG. 2.

- A. Infantry formed in a column, to effect the passage of the bridge.
- B. Piquets of infantry posted at the head of the column.
- C. Dragoons, who are dismounted in order to be posted in the same line with the piquets of infantry.
- D. Dragoons on horseback, behind whom are the horses of those who are dismounted.
- E. The column forcing their passage over the bridge.
- F. Piquets and dragoons, who, by their fire, favour the passage of the column.
- G. Dragoons following the column at a certain distance, whilst it advances.
- H. The ground, where the detachment forms in order of battle, according as it passes, in order to advance.

CHAPTER I

A. The first part of the book is devoted to a general survey of the subject.

I. The second part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

II. The third part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

III. The fourth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

IV. The fifth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

V. The sixth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

VI. The seventh part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

VII. The eighth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

VIII. The ninth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

IX. The tenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.


X. The eleventh part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.


XI. The twelfth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

XII. The thirteenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.

XIII. The fourteenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.


XIV. The fifteenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the subject.





PLAN
of the different Motions
of a Detachment of
Cavalry.

Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League.



P L A T E XIII.

FIG. 1.

- A. March of the detachment in column by troops.
- B. The detachment which causing the left of each troop to march, forms in order of battle.
- C. The detachment forming in front, upon two lines.

FIG. 2.

- A. The detachment in order of battle.
- B. The detachment forming in column.
- C. Sections detached from each troop to cover the flanks.
- D. Huffars, forming the advanced and rear-guards, and covering the sections of the cavalry.

FIG. 3.

- A. The detachment, formed in order of battle.
- . Troops which have advanced to form the first line.
- C. The detachment formed in two columns, in order to continue the march.
- D. Sections marching upon the flank of each troop.
- E. Huffar, of the advanced and rear-guards.
- F. Huffars marching upon the flanks of the detachment.

P. L. A. T. E.


1871


A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q. R. S. T. U. V. W. X. Y. Z.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200.








P L A T E XIV.


FIG. 1.


- A. The detachment drawn up in order of battle, in the front of the bridge, over which it is to pass, in order to retreat.
- B. Dragoons, who by wheeling to the right or the left by fours, retire one troop after the other to pass the bridge, dismount and to march to the spot C. to favour the retreat of the infantry by their fire.
- D. Dragoons on horseback holding the horses of those who are dismounted.
- E. The retreat of the four companies of the right and left of the infantry, who retire one after another, and form at F.
- G. The retreat of the four companies of the center, who retire one after the other, under cover of those who are posted upon the right and left of the bridge, and who in proportion as they pass, form in a column at H.

FIG. 2.

- A. Dragoons who retreat one troop after the other, and who, having passed the bridge, dismount and post themselves at B.
- C. Dragoons on horseback, holding the horses of those who have dismounted.
- D. Companies of infantry, who have passed after the dragoons, in order to form upon the right and left of the bridge, and who with their fire, together with that of the dragoons, favour the retreat of the column.
- E. Companies of grenadiers and piquets, forming the rear-guard of the column.
- F. The column retiring in proportion, as the front ranks have fired, dividing to the right and left, forming the column again at G.








PLAN
of the
ATTACK of a CONVOY.


Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League
100 200 300 400 500 600 1200 T.


T. Jefferys sculp.



P L A T E XV.

- A. March of the convoy and its escort.
- B. The road by which the troops march who are to attack the convoy.
- C. The place, where the troops who are to attack the convoy are in ambuscade.
- D. The ambuscade of the troops, who are to attack the center, and who form themselves at that post, as soon as they receive notice from the hussars, that the head of the convoy is passed.
- E. The troops which are to attack the rear of the convoy, and have drawn near the wood, as soon as they have received notice that the rear-guard of the convoy has passed them.
- F. The hussars of the advanced-guard of the convoy, discovering the ambuscade.
- G. Troops which have left their ambuscades, as soon as they have been discovered, to form and attack the head of the convoy.
- H. Troops leaving the wood, to form and attack the rear-guard of the convoy.
- I. Troops which have left their ambuscades, to form and attack the center of the convoy, as soon as they are informed that the head and rear of it are attacked.
- K. Parties of hussars charging and attacking those which are in their front, and the small parties which surround the convoy.
- L. Parties of hussars, which are detached from the bodies which attack the head and rear of the convoy in order to turn it, and to charge the small parties which are upon the left flank of the convoy.
- M. Posts of infantry and dragoons, who have taken possession of the bridges at the beginning of the attack upon the convoy, in order to favour the retreat of the troops who attack it.







PLAN of the ATTACK of a FORAGE.



Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League.






P L A T E XVI.

- A. The troops forming the chain of forage.
- B. The road where the troops separate in order to form ambuscades, before the troops of the chain are arrived.
- C. The ambuscade of the party of hussars, who are to begin the attack.
- D. Small parties of hussars in ambuscade behind the village, in order to cover the large party behind them.
- E. A body of infantry concealed behind the height.
- F. A body of cavalry and dragoons in ambuscade, in order to form the second attack upon the left of the chain.
- G. Bodies of cavalry and dragoons in ambuscade, in order to form the attack of the center.
- H. Parties of hussars, in ambuscade in the front of the bodies of cavalry, in order to conceal them from the patrols belonging to the chain.
- I. Hussars belonging to the chain, discovering the ambuscades formed by the enemy's hussars behind the villages.
- K. Parties of hussars, who have repulsed those belonging to the chain, which were advanced.
- L. Bodies of hussars, sustaining the small parties in their front, and who also make a great noise with trumpets, in order to attract the attention of the troops belonging to the chain.
- M. A body of cavalry, having left its ambuscade, marches to charge the chain, as soon as the hussars upon the left have attacked the right.
- N. A body of cavalry, having left its ambuscade, marches to attack the center of the chain, when the two attacks upon the right and left are formed.
- O. Parties of dragoons marching upon the flanks of the cavalry, in order to dismount and attack, in case there should be any infantry posted to stop the progress of the cavalry.
- P. Hussars, repulsing those which were advanced, belonging to the chain.
- Q. Parties of hussars, coasting along the side of the rivulet, upon the right of the chain, as soon as it is attacked, to find a passage, in order to attack the foragers who are in the rear, or upon the road.
- R. Infantry taking post in the hollow, to favour the retreat of the cavalry, in case it should be repulsed.

THE HISTORY OF

THE CITY OF BOSTON
FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT
TO THE PRESENT TIME
IN TWO VOLUMES
BY NATHANIEL BENTLEY
OF THE BOSTON BAR
VOL. I.
FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT
TO THE YEAR 1780
PUBLISHED BY J. B. BENTLEY
1787







P L A N
of the Position of
an Army
for the Defence of a
R I V E R.

Scale of 1 League.

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








P L A T E XVII.

- A. The camp of the army, divided into three parts, for the defence of the river.
- B. The camp of the light horse, light infantry, and dragoons upon the wings of the army.
- C. Castle and village, guarded by light infantry.
- D. A town occupied by the infantry, belonging to the army.
- E. Bridge, broken down.
- F. Islands, occupied by infantry.
- G. Posts of infantry, distributed along the side of the river.
- H. Batteries established along the side of the river.
- I. Posts of cavalry, to keep up the communication between the camps.
- K. Bridges constructed, to preserve the communication of the islands.
- L. Bridges constructed for the communication of the camps.









P L A T E XVIII.

- A. Bridges of boats.
- B. Redoubts which cover the bridges.
- C. A battery, under cover of which the infantry work at the construction of the redoubts.
- D. A battery to prevent the enemy from annoying the army on its march.
- E. The march of the army.
- F. The artillery distributed among the brigades of infantry.
- G. Infantry, forming in columns to open on the opposite side through the intervals of the redoubts.
- H. March of the columns into the front of the redoubts, who halt, in order to give time for a part of the cavalry to form upon its flanks.
- I. A battery erected to facilitate the forming of the cavalry.
- K. Cavalry, which in gaining the opposite shore, forms in order of battle, and posts itself upon the flanks of the infantry.
- L. Eight battalions in column upon the right wing of the army, to go and examine the village, and attack the enemy in it, in case he should be possessed of it.
- M. Hussars and dragoons, who have taken possession of the height, which is on the left wing of the army.
- N. A brigade of infantry posted next the height, covering the left wing of the cavalry.
- O. The disposition of the army, marching up to the enemy.

THE END

27. 1. 1911


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PLAN of the distribution of Quarters.


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


P L A T E XXIII.

- A. The head quarters.**
- B. Towns and villages occupied by the infantry and the huffars, forming the first line of the quarters.**
- C. Villages forming the second line of the quarters, occupied by the infantry and dragoons.**
- D. Villages forming the third line of the quarters, occupied by the cavalry.**
- E. Bridges which are entrenched, for the conveniency of the detachments and patrols of huffars, which are sent into the front.**
- F. Bridges and fords which are destroyed.**







P L A T E XXIV.

- A. Troops, which having marched in two columns, divide into six bodies, to form the attack of the quarters.
- B. Hussars and dragoons, making the advanced-guards of each body, and which also send off small parties to the right and left, to clear their march.
- C. The advanced-guard of hussars, who attack and repulse all the patrols, and advanced posts belonging to the enemy.
- D. Infantry which takes possession of, and guards all the bridges which are in the rear, in order to secure the retreat of the troops.
- E. Hussars and dragoons, who, after having repulsed all the advanced posts, surround the quarters, and prevent any thing from coming out of them.
- F. Dragoons guarding the bridges, by which the enemy might send assistance to the quarters.
- G. Infantry attacking the front of the quarters.
- H. Infantry, to attack the flanks of the quarters.
- I. Dragoons, who have dismounted, in order to attack the rear of the quarters.
- K. Cavalry observing the country over which the enemy might send assistance, and who guard the communication of one attack to another.
- L. Guard of cavalry.
- M. Patrols of hussars in front, to observe the enemy.

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
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
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
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
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




PLAN
of the
Retreat of an Army
in different Positions.

Scale of $\frac{1}{2}$ a League.

T. Jefferys sculp.



P L A T E XXV.

FIG. 1.

- A. The infantry in column, with the grenadiers and piquets upon the flanks of each battalion.
- B. The brigade of artillery.
- C. The cavalry formed upon two lines.
- D. The hussars and dragoons.
- E. The light infantry, covering the wings of the army.
- F. The second line of cavalry, marching some paces in advance, to favour the retreat of the first line.
- G. The first line of cavalry, which retreats by wheeling to the right, by fours, or by half troops, and who, after having marched about two hundred paces, by the same movements by the left present a face to the enemy.
- H. Hussars and dragoons, who retreat as soon as the two lines of cavalry have performed their motions.
- I. March of the light infantry, who retire at the same time with the hussars and dragoons, always covering their flanks.

FIG. 2.

- A. Columns who halt, or march on very slowly, in order to give time to the three others to double up and join their head.
- B. Columns, which march on briskly, but in order, to gain the head of those on which they are to double.
- C. A column, which in marching draws up to that of the center, to keep the necessary distance, one from another.
- D. The brigade of artillery, which doubles up at the same time with the column.
- E. The first line of cavalry which retreats by wheeling to the right, by fours, or by half troops, passing through the intervals of the second line.
- F. Half of the first line, facing towards the enemy, when it has retreated about two hundred paces.
- G. Half of the first line, which continues marching on two hundred paces; that of the right facing to the left, and that of the left to the right, and posts itself opposite to the intervals of the line it finds in its front.
- H. The second line, which performs the same motion as the first, and forms the third.
- I. Half the second line, which by passing through the intervals of the three lines, forms the fourth.
- K. Hussars and dragoons, who perform the same movement as the cavalry, and cover the flanks of the cavalry, forming itself in four lines.
- L. Light infantry, covering the wings of the army, and who retreat at the same time with the hussars and dragoons.

FIG. 3.

- A. The first and second lines of cavalry retreating, in order to pass the defile.
- B. The column of the center, which passes after the two first lines of cavalry.
- C. The brigade of artillery, which the column of the center has left at the entrance of the defile, guarded by grenadiers.
- D. Piquets posted on the right and left of the defile.
- E. Columns drawing near to each other.
- F. The third and fourth lines of cavalry, who pass the defile after the column of the center hath entirely retreated.
- G. Hussars and dragoons, who have drawn near the columns, when the cavalry has passed the defile.
- H. The column on the right, which passes the defile after the cavalry.
- I. Dragoons, who retire after the cavalry on the right has passed.
- K. The column on the left, which passes after the dragoons.
- L. Hussars, who retire after the whole of the infantry is passed.
- M. Light infantry forming the rear-guard to the hussars, and which joins itself to the grenadiers, to form the rear-guard of the army.
- N. The position of the army after having passed the defile.
- O. The position of hussars and dragoons, after they have passed the defile.

FIG. 4.

- A. The position of the army, before it passes the bridges.
- B. The first and second lines of cavalry upon the right and the left, who retire, in order to occupy the ground at C.
- D. The column of the center, which passes over the two bridges after the first and second lines of cavalry, and marches to the right and left with its cannon to E.
- F. The third and fourth lines of cavalry, who march over the two bridges, and take post at G.
- H. Hussars and dragoons, drawing near the infantry after the cavalry hath retreated.
- I. Dragoons retreating, who pass the two bridges, and take post at K.
- L. Columns of infantry, who retreat together, and pass over the two bridges.
- M. Hussars, who draw nearer and nearer to the redans, in proportion as the infantry retires, and who, as soon as it hath passed, take post at N.
- O. Light infantry, which retreat at the same time as the hussars, always covering the flanks, and forming their rear-guard, sustained and protected by the infantry which is in the redans.

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